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The purpose of my dissertation is to examine whether and how national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) can be a driving force for the establishment of regional human rights 
institutions (RHRIs) in the Asia-Pacific region, which remains the only region without such 
institutions in contrast to Europe, the Americas, and Africa. 
I first explore the issue of whether RHRIs are desirable in this region, and argue that such 
a system is desirable. Then I examine the reasons why RHRIs have not emerged in this region. I 
located these reasons in part by examining the reception of human rights in Asia and issues like 
the emergence of international human rights law from the Western cultural heritage, and the 
problematic question of what the Asian way of human rights means. The analysis of the 
obstacles that have hampered the creation of RHRIs leads me to focus on NHRIs. By reviewing 
the role that NHRIs can play in addressing the concerns and inhibitions of Asian states, while 
furthering the aims of international human rights law, I maintain that the way in which NHRIs 
collaborate demonstrates that they can be eminent actors toward the establishment of RHRIs. 
Further, I suggest four specific ways to realize this goal. Lastly, I explore the broader literature 
on the role that human rights NGOs can play in the relationship with RHRIs and NHRIs, thus 
illuminating their particular role in the Asian human rights context. 
I conclude that we need a new actor which can strengthen the human rights system at the 
national level, change a government’s human rights policies, and ultimately lead to the creation 
  
 
of RHRIs in this region. It should be a channeling institution that can mediate between the 
national interest and international norms, similarly to RHRIs that can work as intermediaries to 
reflect the regional specificity and meet international human rights standards. At the same time, 
this new actor should gradually raise public awareness of human rights through an active 
cooperation with civil society. Overall, NHRIs can play such a role as a driving force for 
establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Unlike their counterparts in Africa, the Americas, and Europe, countries in the Asia-
Pacific region have not created regional human rights institutions (RHRIs) yet. This region 
remains the only one which does not have any regional human rights mechanisms comparable to 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 
or the African Court of Human and People’s Rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine whether and how national human rights institutions (NHRIs) can be a driving force for 
establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, and while answering this question, to review the 
way in which NHRIs and RHRIs can protect and promote human rights in Asia.   
 
1.1. TERMINOLOGY: THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Before I proceed further, let me explain how I understand the Asia-Pacific region. It is 
impossible to define the Asia-Pacific region by its single or common elements of identities like 
ethnicity, culture, history, language or religion. Even geographical boundaries that distinguish 
this region from others are not clear. Rather than perceiving it as any homogeneity among Asian 
countries or as an objective geographical point of view, it is generally maintained that the 
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concept of the Asia-Pacific is constructed by the reflection of the Western-centric perception.1 
As Onuma Yasuaki points out, “[t]he very notion of Asia is not Asian, but of European origin. 
There is no single Asia, there are many Asias.” 2  In this context, considering geographical 
proximities, historical and cultural backgrounds, and economic and political affiliation, a sub-
regional approach has generally been used in the Asia-Pacific region, which comprises for 
instance East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and the Pacific. 
Indeed, several inter-governmental organizations have been established based on such a sub-
regional grouping: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South-East Asia 
region, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the South Asia 
region, and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in the Pacific region.  
Further, in various international institutions there are no general guidelines to categorize 
their member states into regional groupings in the name of the Asia or Asia-Pacific region. Even 
in the U.N. structure, there are no official standards. For example, in the General Assembly, the 
member states are unofficially divided into five geopolitical regional groupings: the African 
Group, with fifty-three member states; the Asian Group, with forty-three member states; the 
Eastern European Group, with twenty-three member states; the Latin American and Caribbean 
Group (GRULAC), with thirty-three member states; the Western European and Others Group 
(WEOG), with twenty-eight member states.3  In the Regional Commissions of the U.N. for 
                                                          
1 See Edward W. Said, ORIENTALISM, 1-9 (2003). See also Paul Evans, the Concept of Eastern Asia in EASTERN 
ASIA: AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY, 7, 8 (Colin Mackerras ed., 2000). 
2 Onuma Yasuaki, In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal VS. Relative, Human Rights Viewed from 
an Asian Perspective, 1 Asia Pac J.HR & L, 53, 55 (2000). For example, the word Asia was derived from the Greek 
word Asu, which means the east of Greece, and the other term Orient was derived from the Latin word Oriens, 
which means where the sun rises. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asia Values, The New Republic, 13 (1997). 
3 See the U.N. deleGATE: Members of the General Assembly Arranged in Current Regional Groups 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf  
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Economic and Social Cooperation, the five regional commissions are: the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (UNESCWA).4 In the case of the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNOHCHR), member states are grouped into five regional sections: Africa, Americas, Asia-
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa.5 As seen above, different 
institutions of the U.N. use different regional grouping guidelines based on their operational 
needs, and as a result, the number of member countries grouped into the Asia or Asia-Pacific 
region are all different.  
Regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region are using even more complicated 
grouping guidelines for their memberships. For example, in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), there are twenty-one member economies6 within the name of the Asia-
Pacific including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Chile in Americas, but not India, Sri Lanka, and 
Pakistan in the South Asia region. The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions (APF), which is one of the main focuses of my dissertation, expands its membership 
to countries in the Middle-East region like Jordan and Qatar.  
I recognize the Asia-Pacific region as the geo-political notion consisting of several sub-
regions which share common elements rather than as a clearly defined geographical concept. 
                                                          
4 The U.N. Regional Commissions, http://www.un.org/regionalcommissions/about.html  
5 The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/HumanRightsintheWorld.aspx  
6 The APEC calls each member not a state but an economy in order to accommodate Taiwan and Hong Kong as its 
members. http://www.apec.org/en/FAQ.aspx  
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That is, as David P. Fidler articulates, from the perspective of subaltern theory, the world can be 
divided based on the geo-political context and Asia, Africa, and Latin America can be 
categorized as one group: the Third World.7 In this sense, I understand the Asia-Pacific region as 
a flexible and fluid notion which belongs to the Third World rather than one with a strict 
boundary, and for human rights discussion purposes, the general scope of this region is followed 
but not limited to the UNOHCHR regional categories. Therefore, the Asia-Pacific region in my 
dissertation embraces forty countries in four sub-regions: eight in the South Asia region 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka),  eleven 
in the South-East Asia region (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
and Viet Nam), sixteen in the Pacific region (Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu), and five in the 
East Asia region (China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of 
Korea, and Mongolia).8 However, as various initiatives for the establishment of regional human 
rights system in the Asia-Pacific region which will be discussed in the following chapters, have 
not been confined to those four sub-regions, the states in other sub-regions, for example member 
countries of the APF in the Middle-East region, are not entirely excluded from the discussions 
and will be taken into consideration.  
One more thing to be noted is that the regional identity of Asia might be emerging in the 
era of globalization. It means that in the era of a rapidly integrating world in the areas of 
                                                          
7 See David P. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9.S.Y.B.I.L. 19 (2005). 
8 The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), Asia Region. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/AsiaRegionIndex.aspx   
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economy, security, and politics, we recognize the increasing number of human rights problems 
that cannot be handled by one single country only, such as human trafficking and migrants, and 
as a result, there is growing consensus on the need to promote regional integration and 
cooperation in the name of Asia, for instance creating regional human rights systems to solve 
regional human rights issues of common concern which is the main focus of my dissertation.  
 
1.2. OVERVIEW 
After the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, international 
human rights law developed rapidly with the emergence of an increasing number of international 
human rights treaties. Indeed, international communities have made an effort to legalize 
fundamental human rights within the U.N. framework, extending the areas of human rights to be 
universally bound by. Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, their focus has moved to the 
internalization of human rights under the international human rights monitoring system, even 
though the internationalization of human rights is still a work in progress. As Mary Robinson 
points out, normative works for the protection and promotion of human rights are largely done at 
the international level, and the main task now is to effectively implement international human 
rights standards at the regional and national level. 9  How can this task be accomplished 
specifically in the Asia-Pacific region? That is the initial question of my dissertation and my 
broad argument is that we need institutions as medium for the effective implementation of 
international human rights norms, especially considering two major changes in the development 
                                                          
9 Mary Robinson, Realizing Human Rights: “Take hold of it boldly and duly…” UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Romanes Lecture 1997, Oxford University (Nov. 11, 1997)   http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1938.htm 
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of the international human rights system: the concept of sovereignty and the nature of actors 
involved.  
The first change is in the understanding of the principle of sovereignty. In Asia, most 
countries have challenged the concept of universal human rights because they consider current 
established international human rights norms not really internationally acceptable ideas in the 
sense that they originate in the West. Many Asian governments have argued that Western 
countries use international human rights law as a tool to intervene in their domestic affairs and 
national sovereignty.  They also maintain that their unique Asian values and Asian way of human 
rights have not been reflected in the process of formulation of most international human rights 
norms. I am skeptical to the debate on the universality of human rights itself, not because of the 
fact that there have been discussions on human rights and human dignities in the history of Asia, 
but because of the fact that now most countries have ratified major international human rights 
treaties and they have committed to comply with them. I believe that the universality of 
fundamental human rights should be maintained at least based on this simple but important fact. 
The evolving international human rights norms suggest that human rights issues should not be 
overlooked and that gross violations of human rights are no longer the exclusive concern of each 
individual state’s domestic jurisdiction. 10  Furthermore, they suggest that the protection and 
promotion of human rights should be achieved through the principle of state sovereignty, which 
is the main element of the public international law.  
It is undeniable that protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty are both 
important items in current international law. The problem is how to protect and promote human 
                                                          
10 Buhm-Suk, Baek, Economic Sanctions against Human Rights Violations, 15-8, Cornell Law School Inter-
University Graduate Student Conference Papers (2008). http://lsr.nellco.org/cornell/lps/clacp/11 
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rights without impairing the principle of state sovereignty under the existing international legal 
system. The view that sovereign rights of states should be defied in the case of certain human 
rights violations because gross human rights violations can give legal grounds for defying the 
principle of state sovereignty has been gaining momentum.11 In other words, the traditional 
concept of sovereignty has gradually changed from a limited understanding as the right of a state 
not to be interfered with by other countries, to include its responsibility to protect its nationals’ 
basic human rights. That is, each individual state has a responsibility to protect and promote the 
human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of sovereignty.  
Overall, I argue that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should 
and can be complementary. The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced by 
the respect for a state’s sovereignty. States should be viewed not as deniers of human rights, but 
as protectors and promoters of the human rights of their nationals. Respect for state sovereignty 
can be realized by protecting the fundamental rights of a state’s nationals. State sovereignty and 
independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a guarantee for the realization of the 
fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals.12 Each individual state, then, should cooperate 
with other Asian states in order to carry out their obligations under state sovereignty and 
international human rights law. Therefore, it is necessary to establish regional human rights 
bodies in the Asia-Pacific region as mediators. They can effectively monitor individual member 
states’ implementation of international human rights norms with the cooperation of neighboring 
member states, and at the same time, reflect regional specificities and consider historical, cultural 
                                                          
11 See generally, Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian 
Intervention, 6 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 95 (1992); Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International 
Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 417 (1999); 
Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 417 (2000). 
12 Buhm-Suk, Baek, supra note 10, at 18. 
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and social context in the region. They can serve as channeling institutions not for the 
replacement of but as an effective supplement to the human rights protection system in each 
Asian state. 
The second change is the emergence of new actors in the evolving international human 
rights mechanism. A growing number of actors, other than states, have emerged in many areas of 
public international law and their importance has increased, especially in international human 
rights law with its dynamic development, a fact discussed at length in the norm diffusion theory 
of international relations and the vernacularization theory in law and anthropology. Civil 
societies, human rights NGOs, and all other rights stakeholders now actively interact, share 
information for best human rights practices, act together cooperatively, enabled by technological 
developments like social media and the Internet. In other words, we live in the era of 
globalization in which the power of the people and the power from below cannot and should not 
be ignored.  
It is undeniable that the historical paths of human rights development in Asian countries 
were not identical to those in Western countries. Most Asian states, however, embraced the ideas 
of human rights, democracy, and constitutional rights during their struggle against colonialism. 
And at the same time, people in Asia have also witnessed instances of misuse of the human 
rights language by authoritarian governments. I believe that human rights norms have developed 
in Asia through a complicated process, which includes not only the actions of individual states, 
but also the active intervention, participation, and cooperation of other emerging actors, 
including civil societies.  
 9 
 
By exploring such a unique progress, I argue that it is important to have a institution as 
medium -NHRIs and RHRIs- for the protection and promotion of human rights in the Asia-
Pacific region to intertwine the two main approaches on human rights: the top-down one of the 
U.N. and individual governments in the region and the bottom-up one of civil society, as well as 
take into consideration both the international standards and the regional, national, and local 
specificities, needs, traditions, and culture. Further, such a dynamic process of internalization of 
international human rights law through the intermediate institutions of RHRIs and NHRIs 
enables harmonization between the national, regional, and international norms, as Amitave 
Acharya maintains: 
The localization of … norms does not extinguish existing local beliefs and practices, but may 
instead universalize and amplify the latter… A more interactive understanding of the 
process is warranted, in which the initiative belongs also to local agents. Through local 
initiative, feedback, and reconstruction, the constitutive localization process stimulates norm 
diffusion. 13 
Since the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration in 1993, there have been numerous 
initiatives to establish regional human rights institutions and charters in the Asia-Pacific region. 
All efforts, however, have been impeded by deep cultural, political, and historical issues. The 
Asian governments’ efforts under these processes have remained a mere ritual, with non-legally 
binding promises and temporal discussions, but without any concrete actions. Many countries in 
this region constantly stress the importance of “the inviolability of national sovereignty, political 
independence and territorial integrity” while also admitting “the need for international 
cooperation to address problems of massive and systematic violations of human rights.”14 Most 
                                                          
13 Amitav Acharya, WHOSE IDEAS MATTER? AGENCY AND POWER IN ASIAN REGIONALISM, 4-5, 167-9. (2009). 
14 See, for example, Press Release, UN GA/9606, “Questions of Sovereignty, the State System, the Future of the 
Organization Raised by General Debate Speakers,” (Sept. 24, 1999) (including Singapore, Iraq, Dominican Republic, 
 10 
 
Asian governments have only shown that there is no sufficient political will to establish RHRIs 
with their step-by-step approach and the excuses of sovereignty, regional diversity and culture, 
and the Asian way of human rights.  
I believe it is necessary first and foremost to strengthen the domestic system for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in order to change the attitude of governments against 
the creation of RHRIs. And for this, we need a new actor which can strengthen the human rights 
system at the national level, change a government’s human rights policies, and ultimately lead to 
the establishment of RHRIs in the region. It should be a channeling institution that can mediate 
between the national interest and international human rights norms, similarly to RHRIs that can 
work as intermediaries to reflect the regional specificity and meet international human rights 
standards. At the same time, this new actor should gradually raise public awareness of human 
rights through an active cooperation with human rights NGOs and civil society. Overall, NHRIs 
can play such a role as a driving force for establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region and this 
is the main argument of my dissertation.  
Therefore, I will first explore the issue of whether RHRIs are desirable for the Asia-
Pacific region. Then I will examine the reasons why such regional human rights systems have 
not emerged. These reasons are revealed in part by examining the reception of human rights in 
Asia and certain developments over the last few decades: the Asian values debate, and, more 
broadly, the emergence of international human rights law from the Western cultural heritage, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Kazakhstan, and Iran); Press Release, UN GA/9627, “General Assembly Begins Discussion on Secretary-General's 
Annual Report on Work of Organization” (Oct. 6, 1999) (including Colombia, Kuwait, Mongolia, China, 
Bangladesh, India, Venezuela); Press Release, UN GA/9633, “Importance of State Sovereignty, Need to Address 
Human Rights Violations, Council Reform, Discussed in Assembly” (Oct. 8, 1999) (including Cuba, Algeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, and the Sudan). 
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the problematic question of what the Asian way of human rights means. I will then proceed to 
critically examine these broader debates in order to explore the ways in which NHRIs can be a 
key player for the establishment of RHRIs by addressing some of the concerns and inhibitions of 
Asian states, while furthering the broad policies and aims of international human rights law. In 
examining the unique strengths and weaknesses of NHRIs and how they may play such a role, 
this paper also explores the role that non-state actors can play in the creation, administration and 
furtherance of international human rights law, thus illuminating the particular role of such actors 
in the relationship with RHRIs and NHRIs in the Asian human rights context. 
 
1.3. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter Two will examine the basic question of whether a regional human rights system 
is desirable for the Asia-Pacific region. After reviewing the development of human rights both in 
the international legal context and the Asian context, I conclude that such a system is desirable.  
Asia is the largest and most populous region in the world. It is also the place where most 
of the major religions in the world originated. Indeed, in a region as large, diverse, and complex 
as Asia, it is a challenge to build an integrated regional system in which most Asian countries 
can agree on the protection and promotion of human rights because it is hard to generalize on the 
perception of human rights. Moreover, while regionalism in Asia has gradually developed in the 
areas of security and economic cooperation, especially after the financial crisis in Asia in the 
1990s accelerated the integration of this region, human rights issues, including the discourse on 
the creation of regional human rights bodies have been intentionally avoided for a long time in 
 12 
 
diplomatic forums both at the regional and sub-regional levels. Opponents of the establishment 
of a regional human rights mechanism often argue that this region does not need to set up RHRIs 
which are designed to assess invariant universal standards or values within a single - mainly 
Western - cultural context. Therefore, the first question that should be asked about the 
establishment of a regional human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region is whether it is 
desirable to have RHRIs there.  
In Chapter Two, I will first provide four general reasons behind the necessity to establish 
RHRIs for the protection and promotion of human rights. First, RHRIs can be an additional 
highly effective tool for the implementation of international human rights norms though the state 
itself should still be the main obligor for the protection of human rights. Second, compared to the 
U.N., RHRIs can further enhance the legitimacy of interventions against gross human rights 
violations as demonstrated by controversial humanitarian interventions that have not always been 
attainable, or indeed desirable, as the past experiences in Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea 
reveal. Third, RHRIs can offer a better opportunity for individual states to participate in the 
cooperation for the protection of human rights through the neighborhood effect. Lastly, RHRIs 
can provide a better chance to protect the victims and human rights defenders when the U.N. or 
other international human rights institutions can hardly access the countries in which human 
rights violations occur, and also when they cannot work properly. 
Then, I will show why it is desirable to have RHRIs specifically in the Asia-Pacific 
region by reviewing the development of international human rights law and the counter-
responses by Asian countries against international human rights norms, that is, the birth of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the debate on universality versus relativity 
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of human rights, which has long been discussed in the scholarly literature.  I will maintain that 
the validity of the universality of human rights should come at the very least as the product of a 
process in which most countries are committed to international human rights law by ratifying 
major international human rights conventions and treaties. However, because the universality of 
human rights does not mean uniformed implementation of human rights norms, it is necessary to 
establish some kind of intermediate human rights institutions at the regional and national levels 
to respond to the social and cultural context.  In other words, it is desirable to create RHRIs in 
the Asia-Pacific region as a mediator for the internalization and localization of international 
human rights norms if individual states cannot and do not want to comply with international 
human rights norms, because RHRIs can be a mediator between regional specificity and 
international standards through their extensive contacts with individual states, civil society, and 
international institutions.  
In addition, I will briefly review RHRIs in other regions: Europe, the Americas, and 
Africa to show how RHRIs can contribute to the promotion of human rights. Many human rights 
activists and scholars in other regions have published numerous papers and reports criticizing 
regional human rights courts’ decisions or commissions’ resolutions, and I agree that there is 
ample room for further improvement in RHRIs in those regions. The experience of RHRIs in 
Europe and the Americas, however, demonstrates positive effects on the development of human 
rights in the sense that at least regionally adopted human rights treaties reflect the specific 
sentiments in the region, and that regional institutions can handle human rights violation cases 
effectively with a better understanding of the context of a problem. 
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Overall, RHRIs can serve as an effective tool for the protection and promotion of human 
rights in this region not as a replacement, but as a supplement to both the international and 
national human rights system. They can make a meaningful difference to the human rights 
situation in the region as a channeling institution to reflect regional specificity and particular 
needs, and, at the same time, monitor an individual state’s practices to meet international 
standards on human rights. If they are properly constituted and managed, RHRIs can be powerful 
tools for human rights by translating Asian countries’ commitment on human rights into real 
improvements for the people in this region 
Chapter Three will then provide the reasons why such a regional system has not 
emerged in the Asia-Pacific region so far. Since the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration in 1993, 
there have been numerous initiatives to establish regional human rights institutions and charters 
in Asia. All efforts, however, have been impeded by deep cultural, political, and historical issues. 
There have been two main approaches to the establishment of RHRIs: the top-down one and the 
bottom-up one. Many human rights activists and scholars argue that the former approach of the 
U.N. and the governments of Asian states has not fully cooperated with already existing national 
and regional institutions and has mainly relied upon individual governments’ political will. The 
latter approach of numerous NGOs has lacked enough support from formal governmental 
institutions. Thus, examining this problem is the starting point of my research in Chapter Three 
and the main question that should be asked is why Asia has not had regional human rights 
institutions so far.  
To answer this question, I will first review all the major initiatives to establish RHRIs in 
this region, especially since the first Asia-Pacific Workshop on human rights organized under the 
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umbrella of the U.N. in 1990. This workshop was considered the first step in exploring the 
possibility of regional human rights arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region.15 As the initiatives 
for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region have been mainly categorized by their leading 
agencies, this chapter will review them in three parts: the U.N. initiatives, the NGOs initiatives 
and the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) initiatives. These are examined in 
chronological order to see what items have been discussed, what has been a key development in 
their discussion, whether they have evolved toward realizing the establishment of RHRIs and 
lastly, how their activities can be evaluated. My broad argument is that the last more than two 
decades have witnessed futile efforts to establish regional human rights mechanisms, both 
through the top-down approach of the U.N. and Asian governments and the bottom-up approach 
of numerous NGOs in Asia, which only reveals that each Asian government has no sufficient 
political will to build up RHRIs in the region yet. The NHRIs initiatives, with their relatively 
immediate approach, have worked successfully both with governments and NGOs, and have 
shown some promising signs. To my mind, however, there are no concrete steps toward the 
establishment of RHRIs yet; only the hope that NHRIs and their regional network can gradually 
change the individual governments’ attitudes, as demonstrated at the sub-regional level with the 
establishment of the ASEAN human rights body. 
Through the analysis of all the major initiatives for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, I, then, will provide five main reasons that have hindered the establishment of a regional 
human rights system in Asia. Sovereignty is the first one.  Truly, sovereignty and the traditional 
concepts of the principle of non-intervention have been one of the main obstacles for setting up 
                                                          
15 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in 
the Asian and Pacific region, G.A. Res. 45/168, UN Doc. A/RES/45/168. (Dec. 18, 1990). 
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RHRIs in this region because for a long time, most Asian governments have considered human 
rights issues an internal affair. The second reason is the failure in the recognition of human rights 
after WWII.  It is deeply related to the issue of the post-war compensations and the reparations of 
war victims by Japan, the gross human rights violator at the time of the War. The third reason is 
the failure of major Asian powers to play a leading role in the human rights movement. The lack 
of regional leadership for the improvement of the human rights conditions in the region by the 
major Asian powers, China, Japan, and India shows the practical difficulties in establishing 
RHRIs in Asia. The fourth reason is the relatively low ratification rate of U.N. human rights 
treaties. It means that in many Asian countries, there is still a lack of individual governments’ 
political will to comply with international human rights norms. And lastly, the fifth reason is the 
Asian values debate, a unique human rights discourse in this region, which has been examined in 
a large number of publications by both scholars and activists for over a decade. The last reason 
of the Asian values will be examined in a separate section, because I believe that it is the most 
important factor in most Asian countries’ reluctance to establish RHRIs. With the ongoing 
conversation on post-colonialism, Lee Kuan Yew’s famous Asian values argument, indeed, has 
been a major challenge for setting up a regional human rights system in the region because it 
rejects international human rights law as a Western concept and thus argues that it is inapplicable 
to the Asian context. 
After examining the five major reasons, I conclude that all those obstacles, including the 
Asian values discourse that have hindered the establishment of RHRIs, are the result not of a 
different understanding of fundamental human rights under the already existing international 
human rights legal system, but mainly of political considerations. Therefore, I will ask who 
benefits from these assertions behind the rejection of RHRIs in the region. Those who are most 
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vulnerable to violations of their fundamental human rights and find it hard to seek the protection 
of their rights both at the international and the national level are definitely not the ones who will 
benefit from the absence of RHRIs in the region. Neither are the human rights defenders who 
fight for them. Finally, the analysis of the identified obstacles will lead me to focus on national 
human rights institutions, relatively new actors in the international human rights framework, as a 
driving force for the establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Overall, most initiatives to explore the possibility of establishing RHRIs have remained a 
mere ritual only, with non-legally binding promises and ad-hoc discussions, but without any 
concrete actions. As a result, it leads me to focus on a new actor which can strengthen the human 
rights system at the national level, change a government’s human rights policies, and ultimately 
lead to the establishment of RHRIs in the region. It should be an intermediate institution that can 
link between the national needs and international human rights standards, similarly to RHRIs that 
can work as channeling institutions to mirror the regional characteristics and meet international 
human rights norms. This new actor should also raise public consensus on human rights through 
an active collaboration with civil societies including human rights NGOs. My broad argument is 
that NHRIs can play such a role as an eminent actor for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
Chapter Four will examine why NHRIs can be an eminent actor for setting up RHRIs. 
To answer these questions, I will first review what NHRIs are and examine how they have 
emerged in the development of international human rights law. In addition, by reviewing the 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea as a case study, I will show how NHRIs can work 
and interact with all other rights stakeholders and what issues they may encounter. The 
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precondition for NHRIs to be a main actor toward RHRIs is that they should be well constituted 
and managed. Preconditions such as independence, effectiveness, and accountability have 
already been discussed in a large number of articles by human rights scholars, lawyers and 
activists. Though they are not the main focus of my research, I will briefly review them as well. 
Later in this chapter, I will provide three reasons why NHRIs can be a driving force for 
the establishment of RHRIs in the region. First, NHRIs can bridge the gap between the 
international community, including the U.N., and the individual government in the Asia-Pacific 
region, on the understanding of international human rights norms. For over a decade, NHRIs 
have been strong critics of the idea of Asian values. Unlike other governmental institutions that 
have argued for the Asian way of human rights with the sole purpose of maintaining their power 
and undemocratic policies, NHRIs can redefine the universality of human rights from the 
perspective of the people. In other words, NHRIs are independent national agencies established 
to protect those who are most vulnerable to violations of their fundamental human rights and 
examine the cause of the problems in light of local culture and traditions. The second reason is 
the nature of NHRIs. They are mediators that can reflect both the national interest and public 
opinion. They exist as both state and non-state institutions; that is, they are governmental 
institutions but their dynamic interaction with civil society makes them work as non-
governmental organizations, too. This characteristic of NHRIs makes them a distinct national 
institution that can strengthen the domestic system for a better human rights practice, together 
with raising public awareness of human rights. The last reason is their cooperation through the 
Asia Pacific Forum (APF), the network of NHRIs in this region. The regional networks of 
NHRIs have shown some positive signs. By sharing information, exchanging staff members and 
identifying human rights issues of common concern, they have enhanced the capacity of 
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individual member NHRI for a better human rights practice at the national level, and have also 
encouraged the establishment of NHRIs in Asian countries without them. Notably, their 
successful cooperation at the sub-regional level, for example the ASEAN human rights body, 
demonstrates why they can be eminent actors for setting up RHRIs in the end. 
Overall, NHRIs can be a driving force for the establishment of a regional human rights 
system. Unlike other initiatives toward RHRIs, their cooperation and networks will strengthen 
the human rights protection system at the national and regional level, and in the end, change each 
government’s skeptical attitude towards RHRIs.  
Chapter Five will discuss the next question of how NHRIs can work together to take 
specific steps toward establishing a regional human rights mechanism. For this, I will suggest 
four ways in which NHRIs can work together for the establishment of RHRIs.  
The first one is to support setting up regional arrangements on human rights issues of 
common concern. If it is hard to build up regional human rights arrangements that govern all 
human rights areas at once, it would be a good idea to establish legally binding agreements on 
specific human rights issues at first. Through the U.N. workshops and the APF annual meetings, 
there has been an effort to identify human rights issues of common concern, which should be 
handled together with neighboring countries. In order to propose the most viable solutions to 
identified regional human rights problems, NHRIs have cooperated together to research, share 
information and report those issues to their governments and international communities. Such a 
process will lead to the adoption of regional agreements on human rights issues of common 
concern, which meet international human rights standards and at the same time, reflect regional 
specificity and needs. I believe that the increasing number of such agreements will ultimately 
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lead to the adoption of a regional human rights charter.  In this section, I will illustrate how the 
APF and NHRIs have worked together in eight selected areas of human rights of common 
concern, with the potential to take practical steps for regional arrangements. These areas are 
human trafficking; women’s rights; the rights of people with disabilities; the rights of human 
rights defenders; the prevention of torture; the rights of internally displaced persons; the rights of 
migrants; and the environment. 
The second suggestion is to establish sub-regional human rights bodies in advance. The 
APF and member NHRIs have already worked together and supported the setting up of sub-
regional human rights arrangements in the South-East Asia, South Asia, and Pacific regions. For 
this, they have cooperated with already existing sub-regional organizations like the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), even though these sub-regional bodies were 
originally established for political and economic cooperation. I maintain that sub-regional 
mechanisms will be a good starting point for establishing RHRIs in the region, because once sub-
regional organizations are created, it would be much easier for them to build an institution from 
the sub-regional to the regional level. That is, they can facilitate the integration of several sub-
regions under the unified regional human rights mechanism. In the sections that follow, I will 
review how each sub-regional organization has worked, in cooperation with NHRIs, for the 
establishment of a sub-regional human rights body, which can be the most positive and important 
development for a human rights protection mechanism in this region. 
My third suggestion is to strengthen the role of the Asia Pacific Forum of National 
Human Rights Institutions (APF). The APF has emerged as the most cohesive regional human 
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rights body in the region so far. Since Asia has no RHRIs comparable to Europe, the Americas 
and Africa, NHRIs still represent the best tools to monitor, investigate and seek remedies for 
human rights violations in this region. Thus, it is difficult to overstate the important role of the 
APF, which is to enhance the functions of NHRIs to meet international standards and coordinate 
their operation to accord with the best human rights practices. In this section, I will present three 
ways to enhance the role of the APF. By strengthening its own mandate, the APF should raise 
member NHRIs’ operational powers and capacities based on the standards of the Paris Principles. 
Also, the APF annual meeting should not remain as a forum for NHRIs only, but be developed as 
a place that can bring all rights stakeholders in this region together to discuss human rights issues. 
Lastly, through the APF, NHRIs should urge their governments to adopt legally binding regional 
human rights arrangements. At the initial stage, NHRIs can draft human rights declarations on 
common issues during the APF annual meetings. Such statements can be developed, as a soft law, 
in the form of informal and non-legally binding agreements when representatives of individual 
NHRIs sign them. As NHRIs are national institutions, such agreements can finally be developed 
into formal and legally binding resolutions when ratified by high ranking officials from countries 
with member NHRIs.  
The fourth suggestion is to start establishing RHRIs among the countries which favor 
them in the first place. Realistically, the odds of Asia having a single unified human rights 
system that all Asian states across the region participate in are rather low. But, the APF and a 
network of NHRIs have shown that there are many human rights issues of common concern 
which cannot be handled by any individual state alone. So, it could be an alternative solution to 
establish RHRIs with small number of countries with NHRIs that understand the necessity to 
solve complicated human rights issues together. Once they are established, their practices will 
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attract other countries in the region, because it is not at all impossible to encourage other states to 
accept the regional human rights system by increasing the benefits of membership. Thus, the 
founding countries can, in the long run, extend membership in these small but strong human 
rights bodies in the Asia-Pacific region to other neighboring countries.   
Overall, the quest for establishing a regional human rights system in the Asia-Pacific 
region is a significant timely issue in progress and I believe that with the four suggestions 
provided, NHRIs and their network in the APF can play a vital role as a breakthrough for moving 
forward to setting up RHRIs in this region.  
Chapter Six will explore the broader literature on the role that human rights NGOs might 
play in the creation, administration, and furtherance of international human rights law, thus 
illuminating the particular role of such actors in the relationship between NHRIs and RHRIs in 
the context of Asian societies.  It is no longer a new phenomenon, and indeed is an undeniable 
fact that human rights NGOs have played a crucial role for the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the world. Especially, their transnational character and increasing intervention 
on and participation in human rights issues at the national, regional and international level cannot 
be over emphasized. I believe RHRIs can play an essential role as an intermediate institution to 
link regional human rights NGOs’ advocacy network to social change and legal mobilization for 
fostering a human rights culture in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, NHRIs and their 
networks are also vital for better human rights practices in individual Asian countries as a 
channeling institution actively cooperating and collaborating both with individual governments 
and local human rights NGOs.  
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In this chapter, I will review the characteristics of human rights NGOs and their evolving 
role within the existing international and regional human rights mechanisms, and further, in Asia, 
the way in which they have worked together for better human rights practices and the 
establishment of RHRIs in this region. Then, I will examine the role of human rights NGOs in 
strengthening human rights protection systems at the national level, especially in cooperation 
with NHRIs. In addition, the process of establishing NHRIs in selected countries in Asia and 
more specifically, how human rights NGOs have influenced this process will be briefly discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
Do We Need Regional Human Rights System in Asia?  
 
The normative work is largely done. The international human rights standards are in place. 
The task for us all ….. will be to implement them.1 
Human rights are African rights. They are also Asian rights, they are European rights. They 
are American rights. They belong to no government, they are limited to no continent, for 
they are fundamental to humankind itself.2  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Asia is the largest and most populous region in the world.3 It is also the place where most 
of the major religions in the world originated.4 Because of this uniqueness of the Asia-Pacific 
region, Choong-Hyun Paik recognizes that regional human rights mechanisms in Asia, “[a]n 
attempt to identify and, even, to create a homogeneous community in Asia bound by the 
common goals of human dignity protection, thus, may be looked as equal to building a cultural-
                                                          
1 Mary Robinson, Realizing Human Rights: “Take hold of it boldly and duly…” UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Romanes Lecture 1997, Oxford University (11 November 1997)   http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1938.htm  
2 Kofi Annan, Address to the Facing History and Ourselves benefit, New York, (15 October, 1997) Press Release, 
SG/SM/6359. 
3 See The Asia Pacific Forum (APF), The Region. http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/the-region  
4 See BRADLEY K. HAWKINS, ASIAN RELIGIONS: AN ILLUSTRATED INTRODUCTION (2003); See also National 
Geographic, Religion and Belief Systems in Asia, 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lessons/10/g68/index.html  
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legal bridge that extends across the boundaries of Islamic creeds, Christian beliefs, Hinduist 
custom, Buddhist philosophy and Confucian regimes.”5  
Indeed, it is a challenge to build an integrated system in which most Asian countries can 
agree on the protection and promotion of human rights in this region because it is hard to 
generalize on the perception of human rights in a region as large, diverse, and complex as Asia.6 
This diversity is also the main reason why Asia has not established regional human rights 
institutions (RHRIs) so far. In this sense, through the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, the ministers 
and representatives of Asian countries recognized that “while human rights are universal in 
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international 
norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.” 7  Furthermore, one of the Chinese delegates 
argued at the U.N. Workshop for the Asia-Pacific Region on Human Rights Issues that “Asia-
Pacific was not a homogeneous area with respect to history, culture, language or political 
orientation. Models of existing regional arrangements were therefore, for the establishment of 
human rights regime in Asia, only of limited usefulness because of this lack of any unifying 
tradition.”8  
                                                          
5 Choong-Hyun Paik, Regional Arrangements: Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of Regional 
Human Rights Mechanism in paper presented at the Third Asia-Pacific Workshop on Human Rights Issues, Seoul, 
Korea, 2 (18-20 July, 1994) cited in Seong-Phil Hong, Problems and Prospect: Establishment of Regional Human 
Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  VOL.2., 336, 337-8 (The 
Korean Society of International Human Rights Law, 2004) [written in Korean]. 
6 Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 10 Asia. Pac. J.HR & L., 1, 9-52 (2000). 
7 Bangkok Declaration, Art.8, REPORT OF THE REGIONAL MEETING FOR ASIA OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, (Bangkok, Mar. 29 – Apr. 2, 1993),  UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8. 
8 REPORT: UNITED NATIONS WORKSHOP FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, (Jakarta, Jan. 
26-28, 1993), 13-4. UN Doc. HR/PUB/93/1 cited in Seong-Phil Hong, supra note 5, at 338. 
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In addition, for a long time, regionalism in Asia was strongest mainly in the areas of 
security and economic cooperation.9 As Richard Falk argues, globalization compels Asia to be 
grouped as a region and Asia had to be united as a group to compete against and at the same time 
co-exist with other regions in the rapidly integrating world economy. 10  For example, the 
financial crisis in Asia in the 1990s accelerated the integration of Asia at the regional and sub-
regional level.11 Overall, regional cooperation is still focused on economic and security issues, 
while human rights issues are intentionally avoided in diplomatic forums both at the regional and 
sub-regional levels.  
A regional human rights mechanism is, however, not designed to assess invariant 
universal standards or values within a single cultural context.  As Michael Reisman suggests, it is 
set up “to build a regional society where the states and nations with divergent value systems may 
prosper together with the benefit of minimizing unnecessary conflicts and confusions in the 
concept.”12 Therefore, the first question that should be asked regarding the establishment of 
regional human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region is whether it is desirable to have RHRIs 
there.  
Over the last two decades, there have been a large number of studies by human rights 
scholars in law, anthropology, sociology, and political science, exploring the possibilities for 
establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. They, however, have mainly focused on 
                                                          
9 For example, the APEC, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and ARF have been accelerating regional integration in Asia. 
10 See Richard Falk, Regionalism and World Order after the Cold War, 1995 St. Louis-Warsaw Trans’L 71 (1996). 
11 Id. 
12 W.M.Reisman, Establishment of a Regional Human Rights Arrangement in the Asian and Pacific Region: 
Experiences of Other Regions in REPORT: THE FOURTH ASIA-PACIFIC WORKSHOP ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
ARRANGEMENTS: ASIAN AND PACIFIC, 14-6 (Kathmandu, Feb. 26-28, 1996), UN Doc. HR/PUB/96/3. 
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examining the reasons why such regional human rights systems have not emerged in the Asia-
Pacific region and on suggesting ways in which RHRIs in this region can be created, without 
answering or only slightly discussing the basic question that should be reviewed first: the issue 
of whether we need RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, this question has long been 
ignored in most academic literature. But it is necessary first and foremost to answer it in order to 
explore further the ways for establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region and analyze the 
obstacles they face, and this is the main purpose of this chapter. 
So, I will first provide four general reasons behind the necessity to establish RHRIs for 
the protection and promotion of human rights. First, RHRIs can be an additional highly effective 
tool for implementation of international human rights norms though the state itself should still be 
the main obligor for the protection of human rights. Second, compared to the U.N., RHRIs can 
further enhance the human rights situation in the specific area making humanitarian interventions 
unnecessary since very often, they are neither attainable, nor indeed desirable, as the past 
experiences in Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea reveal. Third, RHRIs can offer a better 
opportunity for individual states to participate in the cooperation for the protection of human 
rights through the neighborhood effect. Lastly, RHRIs can provide a better chance to protect the 
victims and human rights defenders when the U.N. or other international human rights 
institutions can hardly access the countries in which human rights violations occur, and also 
when they cannot work properly. 
Then, I will show why it is desirable to have RHRIs specifically in the Asia-Pacific 
region. To this purpose, I will review the development of international human rights law and the 
counter-responses by Asian countries against international human rights norms. Here, I will 
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examine the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the debate on the 
universality versus the relativity of human rights, a long-standing issue in the scholarly literature.  
I do not, however, intend to engage in the traditional philosophical debates over universalism and 
relativism. Rather, I will focus on the ways in which the universality of international human 
rights law has been challenged ever since the adoption of the UDHR to articulate why and how 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have responded and interacted with the development of 
international human rights law. My broad argument is that the validity of the universality of 
human rights should come at the very least as the product of a process in which most countries 
are committed to international human rights law by ratifying major international human rights 
conventions and treaties. Some kind of human rights institutions as medium are necessary for the 
implementation of international human rights law at regional and national levels to meet their 
social and cultural context because the universality of human rights does not mean uniformed 
implementation of human rights norms. If individual states cannot and do not want to comply 
with international human rights norms, the role of RHRIs is important as an intermediate 
institution for the internalization and localization of international human rights norms because 
RHRIs can be a mediator between regional specificity and international standards by extensive 
contacts with individual states, civil society, and international institutions.  
Lastly, I will briefly review RHRIs in other regions: Europe, the Americas, and Africa, to 
show how RHRIs can positively impact the promotion of human rights, another reason why it is 
desirable to establish RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, as well. Many human rights activists and 
scholars in Europe and the Americas have published numerous papers and reports criticizing 
regional human rights court decisions or commissions’ resolutions. It is also true that there is 
ample room for further improvement in RHRIs in other regions. The experience of RHRIs in 
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Europe and the Americas, however, demonstrates positive effects on the development of human 
rights in the sense that at least regionally adopted human rights treaties reflect the specific 
sentiments in the region, and that regional institutions can handle human rights violation cases 
effectively with a better understanding of the context of a problem. 
 
2.2. NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
2.2.1. Regional Human Rights Institutions 
RHRIs have created after WWII with the global consensus of adding human rights 
agendas from the national to the regional and international level, based on human rights 
provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13 RHRIs can be 
said, in general, to consist of three elements. 14   First, there should be a list or lists of 
internationally guaranteed and regionally agreed human rights and corresponding state 
obligations such as regional human rights charters or conventions based on international human 
rights norms. Second, there should be permanent institutions such as regional human rights 
courts, and/or regional human rights commissions. And third, legally binding enforcement 
procedures and compliance mechanisms should exist to guarantee the protection and promotion 
of individual human rights. In this sense, regional human rights systems do not exist in Asia but 
do in Europe, the Americas, and Africa.  
                                                          
13 Dinah L. Shelton, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 16 (2008). 
14 Id., at 15. 
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Here, I will provide one main reason and three additional ones to explain the necessity of 
establishing regional human rights systems under the framework of international human rights 
law. 
 
2.2.2. Effective Tool for Implementation of International Human Rights Norms: Better Account 
of Regional Conditions and Peculiarities 
With the ongoing debate on the universality of human rights in the last decades, both 
international relations and international law scholars have increasingly produced 
interdisciplinary studies in the area of human rights.15 The questions of who the main actor in the 
internalization process of international human rights norms is and what the role of all related 
actors in the international human rights system is have been the main interest in both areas of 
scholarship.16  
While international relations scholars mainly focus on state actors, a different liberal 
school of international relations theories – including the ideational approach, neo-liberalism, and 
constructivism - has emerged. These scholars emphasize that the individual state is just one of 
                                                          
15 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, et. al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998). 
16 See Helen M. Stacy, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2009); 
Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink eds., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999); Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt, HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME 
(2004); Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry eds., THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN 
THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL (2007); Kevin Boyle ed., NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION (2009); 
Julie A. Mertus, HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS (2009); Beth A. Simmons, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
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many different actors17 and stress international cooperation18 as explained by Kant in his article 
Perpetual Peace. 19  Scholars like Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore underline the 
importance of the different values of each state and region in the cooperation of implementing 
international human rights norms.20 These scholars emphasize the role of transnational advocacy 
networks.21 As Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink propose, transnational advocacy networks are 
a methodology to understand the normative dynamics of international law.22 They argue that a 
state is an entity that is “composed of different institutions and individuals.” The development of 
human rights is not solely a domestic matter, but a process of interaction among international 
organizations, civil society, media, corporations, academics and other private entities at the 
international, regional and national level. 23  Domestic social movements have played an 
especially critical role in the process of legalizing international human rights standards.24 Along 
the same lines, as Jack Donnelly points out, using the regime approach to the field of human 
rights, the importance of the role of international organizations has increased.25 He describes the 
                                                          
17 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 A.J.I.L. 205 
(1993). 
18 Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832, 1842-43 (2002). 
19 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, 99-102 (Hans Reiss 
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991); See also Ken. I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and International Relations Theory, 69 
Alb. L. Rev. 771, 783-90 (2006). 
20 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
International Organization 887 (1998). 
21 See Thomas Risse et. al., supra note 16, 17-35 (1999). 
22 Id., at 4. 
23 Id, at 20-35. 
24 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW 245-253 (2003). See also A. M. Wiesburd, 
Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human  Rights, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 45, 111 (1999). 
25 See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: a regime analysis, 40 International Organization 599 (1986). 
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international regime as consisting of “norms and decision-making procedures accepted by 
international actors to regulate an issue area”26and I understand this not only as the consensus of 
each individual state for the protection of human rights but also the interaction of all related 
stakeholders as the foundation of international human rights regimes. International law scholars 
like Harold Koh emphasize a transnational legal process approach to explain the roles of 
transnational actors in the domestication of human rights norms while also introducing the 
definitional change of the principle of sovereignty.27 That is, the relationship between human 
rights and state sovereignty should and can be complementary. In other words, the protection and 
promotion of human rights can be enhanced with a respect for state sovereignty. Each individual 
state has a responsibility to protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon 
the principle of sovereignty. State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, 
but as a guarantee for, the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. 
Therefore, each individual state should cooperate with other states and human rights related 
actors in order to carry out their obligations under state sovereignty and international human 
rights law. 
The discourse on international human rights law by various international relations and 
international law scholars reveals at least two things.  
First, there are many actors in the process of the development of human rights. Their 
interaction especially with the civil society is important in the protection and promotion of 
human rights in individual states. However, it might be a mistake to place too much emphasis on 
                                                          
26 Id., at 602. 
27 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yale L. J. 2599, 2635,  2645-6, 2656-7 
(1997). 
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the interactions with civil society only, including human rights NGOs, and other private entities. 
There are still national borders that divide countries and human rights issues are often highly 
politically contentious.28 Indeed, individual states have constantly used human rights as political 
tools in international diplomatic fora.29 While the internal dynamic of the civil society and the 
cooperation among local, national, and international human rights NGOs is an important factor 
in the protection and promotion of human rights in individual countries, the state is, still, 
inevitably the main actor in international human rights law. For example, in countries like 
Myanmar and North Korea, there are few domestic human rights NGOs. Only a couple of 
government-sponsored NGOs might exist to mislead the population into justifying human rights 
violations by the government. In this case, external pressures from the regional and international 
level may be more important. This is why cooperation and collaboration at the state level are 
important factors in the process of the development of human rights while it is still necessary to 
find ways to communicate and cooperate with local NGOs and the local population.  
Second, therefore there is a necessity to establish so-called channeling actors like RHRIs 
which link various actors at the local, national, regional, and international level.  Furthermore, 
the fact that almost all related discourse on international human rights deals with cultural 
diversity, different levels of economic development, political systems, and various levels of 
constitution and domestic legislation in individual states, shows the necessity to have regional 
human rights institutions as a medium. Human rights problems are so complex that they are hard 
                                                          
28 See Sigrun I. Skogly BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION, 23-55 (2006). 
29 See Id., 13-5; See also Anne L. Clunan, Redefining Sovereignty: Humanitarianism’s Challenge to Sovereign 
Immunity in NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ACTORS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLITICS, 7-9 (Noha Sahwki and Michalelene Cox eds., 2009). 
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to understand from a single perspective.30 Considering the interdependence, complexity, and 
dynamics of the norms, institutions, and procedures of international human rights law,31 it is 
important to establish intermediate institutions like RHRIs, especially when the state, the main 
obligor for the protection of human rights, does not work properly and is reluctant to accept any 
intervention from international human rights institutions. 
RHRIs are indeed important in the Asia-Pacific region because no such regional human 
rights regime has been formed there yet. If a regional human rights institution is established, the 
individual state in the Asia-Pacific region will surely benefit from its geographical proximity and 
historical and cultural bonds. Furthermore, a regional institution can ensure higher standards or 
effective enforcement of human rights because it is the result of the need to provide an additional 
or better protection of human rights.  
Regional human rights systems emerged as a result of the frustration with the 
ineffectiveness of the mechanisms at the international level32 and, at the same time, the desire for 
a better implementation of international human rights norms as a complement to international 
human rights mechanisms. The global human rights systems have less ability to reflect the 
diversity and particularities of each region than a regional body does. The U.N. Charter and the 
international human rights treaties cannot fully incorporate regional contexts. That is the reason 
                                                          
30 James L. Hildebrand, Complexity Analysis: A Preliminary Step toward a General Systems Theory of International 
Law, 3 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 271, 291-293 (1973). 
31 See Dinah Shelton, the Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 363 (Burns Weston and Stephen Marks eds., 2000); See also Dihan Shelton, supra note 13, at 16-7. 
32 Id., at 353-54. 
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why the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) has been trying 
to enhance its presence in the field by establishing regional offices.33  
Overall, regional human rights mechanisms are considered a more effective and efficient 
tool for the protection and promotion of human rights than the international human rights system 
under the U.N. structure.34 Along with the emphasis on “the need to explore the possibilities of 
establishing regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia” in 
the 1993 Bangkok Declaration,35 the Vienna Declaration of the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights clearly shows the necessity for regional human rights mechanisms: 
37. Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human 
rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in 
international human rights instruments, and their protection. The World Conference on 
Human Rights endorses efforts under way to strengthen these arrangements and to increase 
their effectiveness, while at the same time stressing the importance of cooperation with the 
United Nations human rights activities. The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates 
the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and sub-regional 
arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not 
already exist36 (emphasis added). 
Surely, RHRIs cannot be a perfect solution and a total remedy to all human rights 
violations in the region. They, however, can work effectively not as a replacement but as a 
complement to both the international and the national human rights system, because regional 
human rights mechanisms can reflect regional specificity and its particular needs, and at the 
                                                          
33 See The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), OHCHR in the world: Making 
Human Rights a Reality on the Ground. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/WorkInField.aspx  
34 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA, 1-2 (2004)  
35 Bangkok Declaration, supra note 7, Art. 26. 
36 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, para. 37 of part I. (Jun. 14-
25, 1993), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23. 
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same time monitor individual states’ practices in their region to meet international standards on 
human rights.37  
 
2.2.3. The Legitimacy of Interventions 
Regional arrangements can enhance the legitimacy of interventions. 38  The U.N. has 
greater authority than a regional body, but its intervention is not always attainable and sometimes 
not desirable.39 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations 40  clearly state the principle of non-intervention in 
                                                          
37 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 34, at 1-2. 
38 See Sigrun I. Skogly, supra note 28, at 171-185. 
39 See in general Mahmood Mamdani, SAVIORS AND SURVIVORS: DARFUR, POLITICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2009). 
40 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970) U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV). 
.....The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in 
accordance with the Charter   
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in 
violation of international law.  
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State 
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of 
any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State.  
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of 
the principle of non-intervention.  
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State.  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as affecting the relevant provisions of the Charter relating 
to the maintenance of international peace and security.  
..... To this end:   
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international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also recognized the principle of 
non-intervention.41 Numerous General Assembly Resolutions have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, too.42  
However, evolving international human rights law now requires a re-examination of this 
principle. That is, when states agree to bilateral, multilateral or customary human rights norms 
through human rights treaties or conventions, their sovereignty will be limited by such norms.43 I 
believe that to a certain extent, as Sir Hartley Shawcross confidently declared at the Nuremberg 
Trials, “[t]he right of … intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in a 
manner shocking the sense of mankind, has long been considered to form part of the recognized 
law of nations.”44  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(a) States shall co-operate with other States in the maintenance of international peace and security;  
(b) States shall co-operate in the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and all forms of religious 
intolerance;  
(c) States shall conduct their international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and trade fields in 
accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention;  
(d) States Members of the United Nations have the duty to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.   
States should co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the field of science and technology 
and for the promotion of international cultural and educational progress. States should co-operate in the promotion 
of economic growth throughout the world, especially that of the developing countries. 
41 See, for example, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 106-109, Para.202-207 (June 27). 
42 Meinhard Schoroder, Principle of Non-intervention in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II, 
620 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1999). 
43 Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 417, 428-
9 (2000). 
44 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 3, Tuesday, 4 December 1945, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/12-04-45.htm  
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It is undeniable that intervention against gross human rights violations had been abused 
in the past by strong states to pursue other political, economic or military objectives.45 There is 
little express support from states for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by individual 
states or by the international community as a whole.46The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also 
rejects humanitarian intervention as having no legal basis in the U.N. Charter.47 The time may 
not yet be ripe for recognizing humanitarian intervention as an established exception to the 
principle of non-intervention. The reasons are as follows: first, the U.N. Charter and the current 
international treaties do not seem to incorporate such a doctrine specifically. Second, in the last 
two centuries, and especially since the end of WWII, only a very few cases can be considered a 
genuine humanitarian intervention, if any at all. Last, the potential for abuse of humanitarian 
intervention overshadows its usefulness. However, it is certain that there is increasing 
international interest in the development of a detailed framework for humanitarian intervention 
for the protection of human rights.48 At this point, the most important element is to focus on how 
to reduce the reluctance of the country in question to accept humanitarian intervention by 
                                                          
45 Peter Malanczuk, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 221, (7th ed., 1998). 
46 See Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 594-7 
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006). 
47 Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit, para.54, (Havana, Apr. 10 -14 2000) 
www.nam.gov.za/documentation/southdecl.htm  
54. We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the 
United Nations. We reject the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United 
Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law... We further stress the need for scrupulously 
respecting the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 
46/182, and emphasize that these principles are valid, time-tested and must continue to be fully observed. 
Furthermore, we stress that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of host countries, and should be initiated in response to a request or 
with the approval of these States. 
48 Christine Gray, supra note 46, at 596. 
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lessening any politicized motives from other countries and how to enhance the legitimacy of 
intervention by sharing a bond of sympathy with other countries with a common background.  
Therefore, the role of RHRIs is important because a regional system can be positioned 
“in the middle between undesirable unilateral actions and desirable but less accessible roles of 
the U.N.”49 In other words, through the RHRIs, human rights would improve in the area in 
question, making it unnecessary to have humanitarian interventions.  For example, in the case of 
gross human rights violations in Myanmar, the international community and the U.N. have 
constantly criticized the Myanmarese government’s misdemeanors but there have been no 
significant changes.  Myanmar argues that the international community condemns it without 
understanding its historical, social, and cultural background. But, what if there were human 
rights resolutions against the Myanmar government’s human rights violations by the ASEAN 
countries? Criticisms from neighboring countries which share common social and cultural 
background will be a more powerful means of changing the government’s human rights policy 
compared to those from the international community, especially developed Western countries. 
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) may show how the regional 
framework on the protection of human rights can be developed. It states that the African Union 
has “the right … to intervene in a Member State … in respect of grave circumstances, namely: 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”50 
Regionally adopted human rights treaties can reflect the specific sentiments in the region, 
and a regional institution can consider the context of a problem in a better way while avoiding 
                                                          
49 See Joseph S. Nye, INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM, 79 (1968). 
50 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union, (Jul. 1, 2000) http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm  
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high-level politicization because regional human rights bodies will be staffed by people from that 
region who are very closer to local realities and are less likely to be subject to political 
manipulation by governments or local elites.51 RHRIs can have “a distinct vantage point that 
derives from their position as neither national nor international… [thus] are positioned [to be not 
only] broadly compatible with the spirit of international treaties but also to respond to the ways 
that local cultures coexist with national politics and national economic capacity.”52 Overall, it is 
necessary to establish RHRIs because they can improve the human rights situation in the subject 
area and reduce the danger of politicization by other countries by avoiding humanitarian 
interventions, still a controversial international norm.  
 
2.2.4. The Neighborhood Effect 
A regional institution can offer a better opportunity for individual states to participate in 
human rights cooperation with its neighborhood effect.53 Originally, the neighborhood effect was 
institutionalized in Europe.54 To be considered for the European Union membership, states must 
become member state to the European Convention on Human Rights and accept the jurisdiction 
                                                          
51 Helen M. Stacy, supra note 16, at 150-1. 
52 Id. 
53 See David P. Forsythe and Patrice C. Mcmahon eds., HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY: AREA STUDIES REVISITED, 
311 (2003); See also Robert Wade, Selective Industrial Policies in East Asia: Is the East Asian Miracle Right? In 
MIRACLE OR DESIGN? LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE, 65-69 (Overseas Dev. Council Policy Essay No. 
11, 1994). 
54 David P. Forsythe & Patrice C. Mcmahon, id., at 312  
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of the European Court on human rights.55 It means that applicant states for the EU should show 
their serious commitment to human rights.  
In a regional system, states with similar economic and security concerns can invite 
neighboring states to join the forum, and can force each other to comply with international 
human rights obligations with less political tension. Indeed, a regional human rights body will 
encourage more non-member states to participate in the institution and bring them to join the 
human rights dialogue with greater openness. At first, there might be a small number of states 
that agree to establish a regional human rights body. But once established, this regional body will 
solicit more non-member Asian states to join the existing regional human rights framework. In 
that sense, it is necessary to establish RHRIs because the regional institution can implement 
human rights norms with increased persuasiveness in dealing with human rights situation 
operating in a more candid and friendly manner than the much politicized international 
institutions.56  
 
2.2.5. Effective Tool for the Protection of Victims and Human Rights Defenders 
A regional human rights institution can offer a better opportunity to the victims of human 
rights violations and human rights defenders who often put their lives at risk in their work for the 
protection of the rights of others. It is easy for them to utilize RHRIs which offer a more 
                                                          
55 See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 95 
(2003). 
56 Tae-Ung Baik, EMERGING REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN ASIA – WITH A FOCUS ON EAST ASIAN STATES, 
Dissertation, 255 (Notre Dame Law School, 2009). 
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convenient opportunity for remedies by mobilizing neighbor states, especially when the U.N. or 
other international human rights institutions cannot work properly.57  
The victims of human rights violations face many difficulties trying to reach international 
human rights agencies and pursuing their remedies and protection from the violating state in 
question. For instance, because of geographical limitations, they have to hide in remote areas and 
it is hard for them to cross borders. Sometimes because of the language problem, it is also hard to 
access English-language resources. Even worse, human rights defenders, who play an important 
role in assisting victims and serve as a crucial link between victims and the state, have 
consistently been victims of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, 
detention, and torture, particularly where states use national security laws in the context of 
countering terrorism. 
Therefore, an effective and accountable regional human rights body at the regional level 
is necessary to promote an overall culture of respect for human rights. There is also the need to 
establish through RHRIs a regional index on human rights victims and human rights defenders in 
order to effectively track their situation and facilitate experience sharing. In the case of the 
Americas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for instance, has been devoted to 
the protection of human rights defenders and has been able to refer cases to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.58 
At present, Asia has not established a regional human rights system that has the mandate 
to investigate individual complaints of human rights violations, monitor and report on the human 
                                                          
57 David P. Forsythe and Patrice C. Mcmahon, supra note 53. 
58 See Human Rights Defenders Mechanisms in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Functional Unit for 
Human Rights Defenders, http://www.humanrights-defenders.org/iachr-mandate/  
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rights situations in its member states, conduct visits and investigations, raise awareness of human 
rights issues, and issue recommendations pertaining to human rights issues to member states. If 
both national and international human rights institutions cannot work properly, the establishment 
of RHRIs is vital as they can identify gaps in the protection of human rights by monitoring 
member states’ national human rights situations and providing effective remedies for human 
rights victims and human rights defenders. 
 
2.3. IDEAS IN TRANSIT: DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE 
ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT 
In the previous section, I demonstrated why it is necessary to have regional human rights 
institutions by providing one major reason and three additional ones. Most of them have already 
been discussed by a number of human rights scholars and activists within the discourse of the 
development of international human rights law. Their discussion has been mainly focused on the 
debate of the universality versus the relativity of human rights, along with the role of various 
human rights institutions at the national, regional, and international level of international human 
rights norms. For a long time, many Asian states have been reluctant to accept the concept of 
universal human rights and have been maintaining that human rights is a domestic issue and it 
should be handled at the national level. Asia still remains the only region which does not have 
RHRIs.  
Thus, the next question that can be asked is why it is necessary to establish RHRIs 
specifically in the Asia-Pacific region. And to answer that question, it is necessary to examine 
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Asian human rights context within the framework of international human rights law and its 
development since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
As Louis Henkin mentions, the concepts of human rights are heavily indebted to natural 
law (jus gentium) and Western philosophical traditions.59 The values of human dignity in the 
Asian context, the so-called Asian values, should be recognized as part of the philosophical and 
cultural component of the Asian human rights context. The development of international human 
rights law in Asia is, however, not just the acknowledgment of the philosophical values but a real 
process of adopting treaties and conventions which have a binding power on individual states 
and related actors. Here, to show why Asia needs to have RHRIs, I will review how human rights 
have developed as legal norms both in the international and the Asian human rights context and 
will examine whether, as Amartya Sen articulates, fundamental human rights and rights ideas 
have existed not only in Western cultures, but in Asian cultures as well 60  and how Asian 
countries have dealt with the progress of legalization of international human rights.61 
 
2.3.1. UDHR: Before and After 
                                                          
59 Louis Henkin et. al., HUMAN RIGHTS, 7-8 (1999). 
60 Amartya Sen, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES, 30 (1997). 
61 Legalization of human rights can be defined in many different ways: the attempt to secure human rights ideals by 
international and domestic law (Michael Freeman, Jack Donnelly and Richard Ashby Wilson); the establishment of 
a practice of adjudicating and monitoring domestic conflicts by international institutions (Edward Weisband);/ 
international institutionalization of legal protections for human rights in post-conflict reconstruction (David 
Chandler); an attempt to limit the interpretation of the notion of human rights by appeal to certain forms of authority 
supposedly underlying international legal norm production (Upendra Baxi). In general, it is about the discussion of 
the role of law in defining and pursuing human rights goals. See Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Basak Cali ed., THE 
LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
(2006). 
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The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is generally considered a 
starting point of modern international human rights law. The idea of human rights, mainly civil 
and political rights developed between 16th and the 19th centuries by many eminent Western 
jurists, theorists and philosophers like Francisco de Vitoria, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, 
plays a rather prominent role in the UDHR. Indeed, the standard human rights theories view the 
idea of human rights as having emerged after the Middle Ages with the resistance to religious 
intolerance and political-economic bondage, along with the long transition to liberal notions of 
freedom and equality.62 The Magna Charta of 1215, the Petition of Rights of 1628 and the Bill of 
Rights in England (1689) all show the shift from natural law as duties to natural law as 
inalienable rights.63   
Francisco de Vitoria, the 16th-century Spanish jurist, expresses the idea of natural rights 
in his De Indis Noviter Inventis, regarded as the first international law text.64 Vitoria searches for 
the “lawful titles whereby the aborigines of America could have come into the power of 
Spain.”65 He assumes that “[t]hese aborigines were true owners alike in public and in private law 
before the advent of the Spaniards among them”.66 In other words, Vitoria recognizes that every 
human being, including indigenous people, has certain natural rights. He, however, justifies 
                                                          
62 See Cho Hyo-Je, A Grammar of Human Rights 49-89 (2009) written in Korea. 
63 Id. 
64 See Anthony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9, 17-23 (2004). 
65 Franciscus de Victoria, De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones (‘On the Indians Lately Discovered’) 150, (Ernest 
Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917). 
66 Id., at 115. 
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Spain’s colonization by arguing that a violation of those rights which the Spanish enjoy under 
the law of nature67 could have constituted a lawful title of power over the Indians.68  
John Locke, the 17th-century British political theorist, is one of the key philosophers on 
the development of human rights. As the godfather of modern natural law, he claims that certain 
rights self-evidently pertain to individuals as human beings because they existed in the state of 
nature, before human kind entered civil society.69 Locke, therefore, argues that people create 
governments by entrusting the protection and enforcement of their natural rights to them.70  
Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century German philosopher, provides an account of modern 
philosophical justifications of human rights.71 Based upon an appeal to the formal principles of 
ethics, he emphasizes ideals of equality and the moral autonomy of rational human beings. For 
Kant, the basis of moral reasoning must rest on “a condition that all rational individuals are 
bound to assent to.” 72  With this basic sense of universality, he provides a formulation of 
fundamental moral principles that are based on equality and moral autonomy of all rational 
human beings.73 In other words, human rights are rights we give to ourselves, so to speak, as 
autonomous and formally equal beings.  
                                                          
67 Id., at 154. 
68 Anthony Anghie, supra note 64, at 28-31. 
69 John Locke, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. XIII, ∫149 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
70 Cho Hyo-Je, supra note 62, at 59. 
71 See Marc F. Plattner, Human Rights in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, CONCEPTS (Marint Lipset 
Seymour ed., 2001). 
72 Andrew Fagan, Human Rights, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts  
73 Id. See also Immanuel Kant, supra note 19, at 99-102. 
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These scholars have had a profound influence on the Western world of the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries. Although the philosophy of natural law (jus gentium) lent much to the 
conceptual basis of human rights, with time, it became increasingly important to translate vague 
concepts of rights derived from nature into specific written laws, which would provide concrete 
protection for the rights of the individual within the larger framework of society. Great 
precedents in the recognition and protection of specific human rights lie in such documents as 
the U.S. Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.74  
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Eleanor Roosevelt, first chairwoman of the Commission 
on Human Rights (CHR) which drafted the Declaration, stated that it "may well become the 
international Magna Carta of all men everywhere."75 The UDHR has been approved by virtually 
all governments representing all societies, and human rights are enshrined in the constitutions of 
virtually every one of today’s 170 states.76 Indeed, the Declaration is generally considered a 
starting point of international human rights law. Its preamble describes the “….. inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family….. fundamental human rights….. as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”77 The UDHR arose from the experience 
of WWII and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are 
                                                          
74 America’s Declaration of Independence, proclaimed by the thirteen American Colonies on July 4, 1776, states: 
“…all men are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Similarly the French imitated the pronouncements in the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in August 26, 1789. See also Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 1, 6 (1990) 
75 Eleanor Roosevelt, Speech: On the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, delivered Dec. 9 
1948 in Paris, France.  http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/eleanorrooseveltdeclarationhumanrights.htm  See 
also Mary Ann Glendon, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
76 See Louis Henkin, supra note 59, at Preface, xvii. 
77 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
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entitled.78 As a declaration, it is not legally binding.  However, because many of the rights in the 
UDHR have become widely observed as a binding law, they have become a recognized part of 
customary international law.79 Since its adoption, a large number of human rights treaties have 
been adopted and entered into force on the international and regional levels. Among them, these 
nine international human rights treaties are considered the major ones: the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),80 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),81 the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (OPT 1),82 the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (OPT 2), 83  the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT),84 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), 85  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
                                                          
78 See Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 75. 
79 See Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context, 151 (2nd ed. 2000). 
80 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
82 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force March 23, 1976. 
83 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of 
the death penalty, G.A. res. 44/128, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered 
into force July 11, 1991. 
84 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, 
[annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987. 
85 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981. 
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(CERD),86 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),87  and the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (MWC).88 
As pointed out, most of the civil and political rights developed by Western jurists and 
philosophers between the 16th and the 19th centuries, feature prominently in the UDHR. It also 
seems that there is no dispute about the Western origins of the philosophy of the international 
human rights; even non-Westerners who advocate its universality accept this basic fact. 
 
2.3.2. Challenges against International Human Rights Law 
In the last decades, there have been a lot of debates in Asia about the nature of 
international human rights law, and more specifically, the universality of international human 
rights in light of cultural relativity. The main questions are whether it is possible to maintain the 
fundamental universality of human rights while still taking into account the historical and 
cultural particularity of human rights and further, whether human rights themselves are universal. 
This paper argues that the question that should be asked is about the scope of fundamental 
human rights, i.e. what sorts of human rights are universal, and about the extent of their 
implementation, because it is an inescapable fact that there are certain universal human rights 
even though the idea of modern international human rights originated from Western countries. 
                                                          
86 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 
20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, UN Doc. A/6014 (1966), entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
87 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, UN Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990. 
88 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, UN Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 July 
2003. 
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This paper, however, does not aim to enter the traditional philosophical debates over 
universalism and relativism. Rather, it focuses on the ways in which the universality of 
international human rights law has been challenged ever since the adoption of the UDHR to 
articulate why and how countries in the Asia-Pacific region have responded and interacted with 
the development of international human rights law, which will be discussed at length in section 
2.3.3. 
The first criticism against the universality of human rights came from the American 
Anthropological Association (AAA)’s statement on human rights in 1947,89 published just one 
year before the adoption of the UDHR. It argues that if the Declaration were “a statement of 
rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and 
America,”90 it could not be applicable to all human beings because “[t]he Personality of the 
individual can develop only in terms of the culture of his society.” Karen Engle regards this 
statement as having been written in the context of colonialism to oppose a dominant belief that 
the West and Western culture are superior and to suggest that all men are formed by the 
communities in which they live.91 Interestingly, the AAA changed its position on the universality 
of human rights in its 1999 declaration92 for the following reasons: 
Cultural relativism is a major factor which has severely retarded anthropological 
involvement in human rights since the Executive Board's 1947 statement on the UN 
                                                          
89 See American Anthropological Association: Statement on Human Rights 49 American Anthropologist New Series, 
No.4, 539 (Oct.-Dec., 1947) 
90 Id. 
91 Karen Engle, Culture and Human rights: the Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 291, 
308-9 (2000). 
92 American Anthropological Association, Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights (1999) 
http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/humanrts.htm  
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, in recent years some countries 
accused of gross violations of human rights have attempted to take refuge in relativism and 
simplistically and falsely asserted that human rights are reducible to Western moral 
imperialism…93 
I agree with Engle’s assertion that in reality AAA’s position on human rights and its 
understanding of culture have not significantly changed.94 Even though at first glance, it may 
seem that the AAA’s 1947 statement is skeptical of international human rights law, “the 
statement does not argue against the idea of a declaration on human rights. Rather, it suggests 
that any declaration must attend to differences among cultures95 … [and] imagined there could 
be a document with worldwide applicability.”96 
As the AAA’s 1947 statement explained, many non-Western countries were still under 
colonial rule and had no chance to participate in the drafting of the UDHR in 1948.97 In addition, 
the so-called Third World at the United Nations at that time was mainly composed of non-Asian 
or African countries, but rather of Latin American countries whose dominant world view was 
European. Mary Ann Glendon emphasizes the important role played by Charles Malik of 
Lebanon and Peng-chun Chang of China in the drafting of the Universal Declaration,98 but 
Makau Mutua argues that although they were non-Westerners, both Malik and Chang were 
                                                          
93 American Anthropological Association, 1995 Annual Report: Commission for Human Rights (1995) 
http://www.aaanet.org/committees/cfhr/ar95.htm  
94 Karen Engle, From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American Anthropological Association from 
1947-1999, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 536, 527-549 (2001). 
95 Id., at 540. 
96 Id., at 559. 
97 51 countries participated in the establishment of the UN in 1945 and member states were increased to 58 in 1948. 
Even the member states from Asian region were only five: China (Taiwan), India, Philippine, Thailand and Burma. 
See  UN: Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present. http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml  
98 See Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 75. 
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educated in the United States and were firmly rooted in the European intellectual traditions of the 
day.99 
The contributions of these two prominent non-Westerners were not steeped in the 
philosophies or the intellectual and cultural traditions from which they hailed. In fact most 
of the Third World human rights formulators were trained in the West. Even African 
conceptions of peoples’ rights and duties and the more celebrated right of development 
remain marginal to the mainstream practice of human rights.100 
Balakrishnan Rajagopol describes this issue as the birth defect of the international human 
rights movement in terms of its representativity, simply noting the absence of particular cultures 
and communities.101 He also argues that this defect has never fully been cured because of the 
way in which it responded to colonialism, the most dominant political question of the 20th 
century. 102 Similarly, Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham identify two types of: meta-ethical 
relativism and normative relativism.103 The former understands that the idea of human rights 
originated from the West and universal human rights themselves reflect the theoretical values 
and ideas of the West. Thus, it is inadequate to apply them to non-Western societies. The latter 
recognizes the universal human rights movement as another type of colonialism and criticizes the 
use of human rights as a tool meant to change non-Western cultures into a uniform standard. 
Thus, as Mutua sees, liberalism, democracy and human rights are used as a Holy Trinity for 
Western countries to keep their hegemony over non-Western countries: 
                                                          
99 Makau Mutua, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL & CULTURAL CRITIQUE, 154-5 (2002). 
100 Id. 
101 Balakrishnan Rojagopol, The International Human Rights Movement Today, 24 Md. J. Int’l L. 56, 57-8 (2009) 
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In the historical continuum, therefore, liberalism gave birth to democracy which in turn now 
seeks to present itself internationally as the ideology of human rights. The main focus of 
human rights law has been on those rights and programs that seek to strengthen, legitimize, 
and export political or liberal democracy. Furthermore, the currency of civil and political 
rights has been so strong that they have become synonymous with the human rights 
movement.104 
In other words, the universality of modern international human rights law has been 
challenged ever since the adoption of the UDHR.  Further, Upendra Baxi argues that the 
paradigm of the UDHR is being replaced by a trade-friendly and market-friendly human rights 
paradigm to promote and protect the collective rights of global capital and international 
corporate well-being. 105  International financial institutions and donor agencies constitute an 
increasingly important component of the political approach to human rights: see, for example, 
the World Bank’s Good Governance Project as a dual policy that opposed human rights 
violations while strengthening democracy.106Anthony Anghie even claims that “the colonial 
history of international law is concealed even when it is reproduced” 107  and “the rhetoric 
governance, as articulated by the West and the IFIs [International Financial Institutions], is 
driven significantly by economic considerations... [and] the powerful discourse of human rights 
has been used for this purpose.”108 
                                                          
104 Makau Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 589, 601-2 (1996). 
105 See Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 163-4, 8 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 
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Preface (2006). 
106 Anthony Anghie, supra note 64, at 245-272. 
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108 Id., at 269. 
 54 
 
Many human rights scholars also expose the fact that the most prominent international 
human rights NGOs, based in Western countries, have sought to enforce the application of 
human rights norms internationally, particularly towards repressive states in non-Western 
countries. Mutua criticizes the mandates of leading INGOs like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, stressing the narrow range of civil and political rights, and the 
overlooking of other important human rights violators like international corporations.109  
So, has international human rights law been developed in such a biased way based solely 
on developed Western countries’ perspectives and mainly focused on civil and political rights? 
Were there any contributions by Third-World developing countries to the development of 
international human rights norms? 
Contrary to the views of Mutua and Rajagopal, there are human rights scholars who 
maintain that international human rights have been by and large about Third-World states, as 
Roland Burke argues: 
The principal triumph of the African, Asian, and Arab diplomats who entered the UN in the 
1950s and 1960s was their successful struggle to make human rights truly universal… [and] 
in virtually every significant debate, Arab, Asian, and African delegations played a leading 
role, with their contribution central to the creation of major pillars of the modern human 
rights system: the covenants, ICERD, and the right to individual petition… [they] had 
secured the status of universal rights and greater scrutiny of state power.110 
It was the Third-World states that have put the biggest human rights issues on the U.N. 
agenda including colonialism, self-determination, racial discrimination, apartheid, the right to 
development and economic, social and cultural rights for last 60 years after the adoption of the 
                                                          
109 Makau Mutua,  supra note 104, at 610-626 
110 See Roland Burke, DECOLONIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 145-9 (2010). 
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UDHR. Third-World states, especially early anti-colonial nationalists who were ardent 
supporters of universality have played a major role in developing international human rights 
norms,111 though at the same time, many post-colonial authoritarian governments also use the 
same anti-colonial doctrine to impose their power and authority and maintain their regimes in the 
name of cultural relativism. 
Therefore, I suggest that the argument of whether the role of Third World countries in the 
development of international law during the process of decolonization after WWII, has been 
positive or not, is both partially right and partially wrong. Roland Burke is right in the sense that 
“[t]he politics of anti-colonialism both advanced and obstructed the progress of international 
human rights.”112 Though it is true that much of Asia and most of Africa had not been involved 
in the drafting process of the UDHR in 1948, it is also true that the adoption of the UDHR itself 
is not the end of the story for the universality of international human rights norms but its 
beginning in a decades-long process by those who had no chance to participate in the creation of 
the UDHR.113  
It seems that even among cultural relativists, there is no one who completely sides with 
anti-human rights relativism except for undemocratic and human rights abusive authoritarian 
regimes. That is, there is no one who argues that if a certain culture permits it, torture and slavery 
can be allowed. What is more, with the gradually increasing number of countries which ratified 
major human rights conventions and treaties, people inside individual states’ civil societies have 
increasingly used international human rights norms to enhance the legitimacy of their claims for 
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113 Id., at 146. 
 56 
 
the protection of certain fundamental human rights. Therefore, this paper believes that there are 
certain basic human rights and that these human rights should be promoted and protected by the 
state, the basic obligor of human rights law, the international community, and all human rights 
related actors. The questions that should be asked are, what kind of human rights can be 
embraced in non-Western cultures and how such a process can be conducted in non-Western 
societies,114 as Bhikhu Parekh explains: 
The minimum universal values which we may legitimately insist upon are by their very 
nature general and need to be interpreted, prioritized, adopted to, and in case of conflict 
reconciled, in the light of the culture and circumstances of each society. Respect for human 
life is a universal value, but different societies disagree on when human life begins and ends 
and what respect for it entails.115 
Similarly to Jack Donnelly, I believe that in the world we live in today, human rights are 
not optional but necessary116 because human rights protection itself is about human dignity and 
justice. Therefore “some kind of intermediate position is required” because unrestricted 
relativism is as inappropriate as radical universalism.117 I suggest that it may be RHRIs that are 
uniquely situated “to formulate morally credible and practically attainable standards of human 
rights – a negotiation between reality and hope.”118 
 
2.3.3. Human Rights in the Asian Context 
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As Amartya Sen articulates, human dignity and fundamental rights ideas have existed not 
only in Western cultures, but in Asian cultures, as well. A number of historical and classical texts 
discuss the values of human dignity, as well as the pursuit of economic, social, and cultural well-
being in the Asian cultural context.119 Thus, the so-called Asian values and the Asian way of 
human dignity should be recognized as a philosophical and cultural component of the Asian 
human rights context. These are, however, different from the modern concept of human rights, 
especially in terms of its legal nature. This is precisely the reason why human rights are still 
regarded as somewhat alien by many Asians. As Onuma Yasuaki mentions, the formulation of 
modern human rights emerged in a legalistic culture, with the protection of individual rights to 
be realized by the rule of law.120 This is also why the notion of human rights was born in 
Western countries where a legalistic culture is predominant, whereas Asian countries have relied 
on the concepts of virtue, conciliation, family, community ties, or prudence121 and have not been 
very comfortable with this legalistic culture. 
In the last decades, however, Asian countries have achieved a remarkable development in 
the legalization of human rights. 122  The progress seems slow, but it is undeniable that an 
increasing number of actors have been involved in the process of developing human rights norms 
in Asia. Their interacting initiatives, including intergovernmental, NGOs’, and other public and 
private entities’ cooperation, have gradually and positively changed the environment of human 
                                                          
119 See Onuma Yasuaki, In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: “Universal” Vs. “Relative” Human Rights 
Viewed from an Asian Perspective, 1 Asia. Pac. J.HR & L., 53 (2000). 
120 Id., at 75-6. 
121 Id. 
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rights in individual states. This section will examine the normative development of a human 
rights framework in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Many Asian states incorporated basic human rights norms in their domestic laws as early 
as the 19th century. The modern Western concepts of rights and constitutionalism were initiated 
and promoted in Asia mostly by Asian people themselves rather than imposed by the external 
world, as those elites of the movements against imperialism during the 19th and 20th centuries 
dreamt of independent states with democracy and human rights protections.  
For example, Western ideas, civilization, and technologies were introduced to China by 
Chinese intellectuals only in the 19th century.123 Undoubtedly, Henry Wheaton’s book, Elements 
of International Law, translated into Chinese in 1876, also contributed to the introduction of 
Western legal ideas.124 The 1911 Xinhai Revolution led by Sun Yatsen was a form of democratic 
revolution and the civil rights ideas of the West had a great impact on the movement.125 Japan 
pursued the Meiji Reform, initiated by the Japanese Emperor; it was a strong push for 
Westernization in Japan.126 Fukuzawa Yukichi was a leading scholar who introduced Western 
ideas and institutions with his numerous publications, including Seiyo Jijo in 1867.127 In Korea, 
Seoyu Gyeonmun (Observations on a Journey to the West) by Yu Kil-Joon (1889) played a 
significant role in introducing the ideas of democracy and rights. 128  In Vietnam, French 
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colonialists imported Western rights-based law and political morality during the colonial period 
between 1867 and 1954, and at the same time Vietnamese elites also selectively adopted the 
rights concept during their independence movements.129 In the Philippines, the human rights 
discourse began with the independence movement against Spain, and resulted in the 1899 
Political Constitution of the Republic, written in terms inspired by the French Revolution.130 
Thailand did not experience colonialism, but Thai kings such as King Mongkut and King 
Chulalongkorn were active in absorbing Western culture during the modernization process.131 It 
is no surprise to see that, when Asian states adopted their constitutions and domestic legislation 
after independence, they were eager to add civil and political rights provisions.132 The leaders of 
newly independent Asian states promised internally and externally to respect democracy and 
rights values. The regimes, however, could not fulfill their vows and it took a rather long time for 
many Asian states to enforce fully and meaningfully the constitutional texts.133 It should also be 
noted that the concepts of rights and other Western-oriented human rights ideas adopted in Asia 
did not carry the exact same meanings and effects as in Western society.134  
Ever since the early 1990s, there has emerged a negative response to the human rights 
discourse from a group of newly industrializing countries in Asia. Its most active advocate may 
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be Singapore.135 It is hard to define the argument clearly, because it conflates, on the one hand, 
the development argument, which gives priority to economic development over other social 
goals, and, on the other, the post-colonialism argument, which describes human rights 
movements in cultural imperialism terms.136 As Bilahari Kausikan points out, most East and 
South-East Asian governments see “order and stability as preconditions for economic growth, 
and growth as the necessary foundation of any political order that claims to advance human 
dignity.” 137  Through the Asian value debate on economic development and a non-Western 
approach to human rights, many Asian governments have rejected the universal validity of 
international human rights norms. 138  It seems that most Asian leaders, especially those in 
authoritarian governments, have the intention of weakening the normative basis of Western 
interference.139 
Although the concept of Asian values is considered relatively recent, peaking at it did in 
the mid-90s, it should not be seen as a novel phenomenon.140 Asian values have many localized 
precedents in colonial and post-colonial history as Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun explain: “the 
late nineteenth-century Chinese debate on ‘self-strengthening’; the post-war Indonesian 
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Pancasila ideology; the Panchayat system in Nepal; the ‘Basic Democracy’ policy in Pakistan 
and the more recent Malaysian ‘2020-vision’ under Premier Mahathir are all examples of 
struggles to activate a native values resource in the service of nation-building and frequently in 
the face of foreign domination.” 141  Besides those, there are also countless examples of 
emergency orders, which may rest on similar principles. 
I believe that such a view shows a clear misunderstanding of the nature of human 
rights.142 As Kevin Tan argues, there is a fine line between the West and the East regarding 
economic development and the anti-colonialism argument.143 For instance, countries like Taiwan 
and Korea have experienced the oppression of an Eastern colonial power, namely, Japan. And 
the people in these states who suffered are still claiming the remedies from the Japanese for past 
wrongs under the internationally recognized principles of fundamental human rights. In addition, 
as Amartya Sen points out, there is no direct evidence that authoritarian governance influenced 
economic growth in Asia and furthermore, it is very doubtful that there are pre-existing rights 
standards or values that all Asian states can accept other than those contained in modern 
international human rights law.144 
In March 1993, Asian state representatives adopted the Bangkok Declaration, a statement 
that would represent the Asian region’s stance on human rights at the World Conference on 
Human Rights held in June of the same year in Vienna.145 Although delegates of the Asian 
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regional group recognized that some human rights were universal, they asserted that there were 
other human rights which were founded on the Western ideal of individual autonomy and which 
did not necessarily reflect Asian values.146 They further stated that, in the absence of economic 
development and social stability, emphasis on civil and political rights, as in the developed 
countries, would be inappropriate.147 A large number of Asian human rights NGOs, intellectuals, 
and ethnic minorities also gathered in Bangkok at the same time and issued the NGO Bangkok 
Declaration,148 a significant departure from the governments’ statement. It argued that cultural 
and religious traditions did not constitute an obstacle to the realization of international human 
rights norms.149 What is more, as Yash Ghai notes, the NGOs also addressed the market system 
and the international economic order, and saw “a closer connection with domestic oppression 
and international exploitation.... [by] multinational corporations and aid agencies.” 150  Civil 
society in Asia geared up its efforts to build regional human rights mechanisms with the adoption 
of the Asia Pacific NGO Human Rights Congress Resolutions in 1996151 and the Asian Human 
Rights Charter of 1998, signed by more than 200 human rights NGO groups.152 In addition, there 
have been some sub-regional normative developments in Asia, including the ASEAN 
Declaration of 1967, 153  the ASEAN Charter of 2007 154  in South-East Asia, the Charter of 
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SAARC of 1985,155 and the Social Charter of 2004156 in South Asia. All the discussions and 
normative consensus on human rights are limited and not always the focus of their cooperation, 
but at least some positive changes have been made at the regional and sub-regional level.157 
More importantly, these changes have been effected not by Asian states themselves, but by the 
regional cooperation of a complex network of civil society, including both internal forces like 
grassroots human rights activists and local NGOs and external forces like regional and 
international human rights NGOs. 
As illustrated, the development of human rights in Asia is not as the result of 
transplanting foreign concepts but as the product of its internal dynamics of normative 
development. As Amartya Sen articulates, the concept of freedom, liberty, rights, and human 
dignity might have existed not only in Western cultures, but in Asian cultures as well.158 
However, as Jack Donnelly argues, human dignity is a concept distinct from that human rights 
which is a legal idea. And in that sense, Asian traditions may be not identical to the modern 
forms of human rights.159 As Louis Henkin maintains, “the contemporary idea of human rights 
was formulated and given content during the Second World War and its aftermath.”160 As briefly 
reviewed above, many Asian countries chose to adopt a democratic political system and 
embraced the ideas of human rights and constitutional rights after their long fight against 
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colonialism or authoritarian regimes.161  Another point to emphasize is that people in Asia have 
also witnessed instances of misuse of the human rights language. In other words, states that 
provide for extensive human rights protection through national legislation and constitution have 
continuously violated the human rights of their people in reality.162 As Tae-Ung Baik asserts, 
“the right provisions in many newly independent [Asian] states were often mere window-
dressing until democracy movements changed the political landscapes of these Asian 
societies.”163 Undeniably, however, once adopted or ratified, human rights norms create a moral 
power that mobilizes internal social movements to monitor the enforcement of the norms, 
provide rallying points for activists, and offer hope for social change to people.164 
Overall, there is no reason that Asia should not have a regional human rights system 
comparable to other regions. Actually, it is even more necessary to establish RHRIs in the Asian 
human rights context because in the process of legalization of human rights, Asian countries 
need to reconcile the new foreign cultural norms and ideas with domestic moral traditions.165 
And if each individual country cannot afford to do it or is not willing to do it, regional human 
rights institution can fill the gap between the adoption of international human rights norms and 
their implementation, or, in other words, the gap between the current U.N. human rights system 
and many national legal systems, because RHRIs can effectively work as a complement to 
already existing human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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2.4. THE EXPERIENCE OF RHRIS IN OTHER REGIONS: EUROPE, THE AMERICAS, AND AFRICA 
So far, I have examined whether it is necessary to have RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region 
both in the international human rights context and in the Asian human rights context and 
concluded that it is desirable to do so. Lastly, this chapter will briefly review regional human 
rights systems in other regions to show their positive contribution and particular advantages for 
the promotion and protection of human rights, which can be reflected in the Asia-Pacific region 
to show why it is desirable to establish RHRIs in this region, as well. 
Regional human rights systems emerged after the end of WWII but different historical 
and political reasons inspired each region for the creation of RHRIs.166  
The Americas has the oldest regional human rights protection system. The Inter-
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted in 1948 with a growing 
“regional solidarity developed during the movements for independence” 167  and a coalition 
against communist threats.168 Following that, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
was created in 1959 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted in 
1969. The Convention itself deals mainly with civil and political rights but it has two Protocols 
on economic, social and cultural rights and on the abolition of the death penalty, though 
compared to the Convention, they have a relatively weak protection mechanism by reserving the 
individual petition system only for the violations of the right to education and trade union rights. 
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169 Finally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in 1979. Most of its cases 
concern Central and South America and Mexico, mainly focusing on human rights violations 
related to military coups.170 
Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and established the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1950 as part of a European reconstruction for democracy, 
the rule of law and peace to guarantee individual rights after the experience of the WWII 
atrocities. As A.H. Robertson describes, European states needed human rights to be respected so 
as to secure democracy and avoid dictatorship. The conflict between Eastern and Western 
Europe also enabled states in the West to make an exclusive human rights system.171 In 1954, the 
European Commission of Human Rights was established, but it was abolished in 1998 with a 
project to reformat the European Court of Human Rights. Today, the ECHR exercises 
jurisdiction over the twenty seven members of the EU and the additional twenty member states 
of the Council of Europe. 172 The Court received more than 50,000 complaints in 2006 alone and 
the number is increasing, especially from the newly democratized countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe.173 
Africa adopted the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) in 1981. 
Self-determination from colonization was a recognized part of the African human rights agenda, 
as were the regional actions ignited by the apartheid policy and human rights abuses in South 
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Africa. 174  The Charter distinctively recognizes collective rights and especially the right to 
development in its Article 22.175 It also recognizes legal obligations to the community (ubuntu), 
family, and society. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights was created in 
1987 and the following year saw the adoption of the Protocol establishing the African Court of 
Human and People’s Rights. Finally in 2006, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
was established. The Court has a unique provision which differs from other regional human 
rights courts, according to which any human rights treaties that have been ratified by African 
member states are claimed as part of the Court’s jurisdiction.176 
RHRIs in other regions show how regional human rights institutions can get positive 
results in the promotion of human rights though the degree of effectiveness of each system may 
vary. As Helen M. Stacy maintains, “if [RHRIs] developed in the right way, [they] could play a 
role in making cultural human rights adjudication both morally credible and practically 
attainable.” 177  Dinah Shelton describes the effective contribution of RHRIs in Europe, the 
Americas, and Africa to human rights as follows: 
The functioning European and Inter-American courts are one of the great contributions to 
human rights by regional systems. The … protocol to the African Charter, creating a court 
in the African system,… add[s] to the regional protection… Thus, regional systems have 
elements of uniformity and diversity in their origins. All of them began as the global human 
rights system was developing and they were inspired by the agreed universal norms. At the 
                                                          
174 See Dinah Shelton, supra note 31. 
175 Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: 
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their 
freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.  
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.  
176 Helen M. Stacy, supra note 16, at 149-150. 
177 Id., at 141-145. 
 68 
 
same time, each region had its own issues and concerns. As the systems have evolved, the 
universal framework within which they began and their own interactions have exercised a 
strong influence…178 
The regional human right systems in Europe, the Americas and Africa also offer some 
meaningful lessons for the establishment of an Asian human rights system, namely, regional 
human rights conventions, a reporting system, individual petition, and regional human rights 
courts. 
First, the provisions of human rights charters or conventions in those other regions 
include their own regional characteristics, along with the goal of meeting international human 
rights standards. Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the right to life, for 
instance, contains an anti-abortion provision which is believed to reflect the Roman-Catholic 
religious background of most Inter-American countries: “Every person has the right to have his 
life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of 
conception” (emphasis added). Unlike Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 5 of the ACHR, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights does not specify the right to privacy. This may 
arise from the unique African view on personhood which is different from the Western concept 
of individualism. Therefore, the ACHPR emphasizes the harmonious development of the family, 
national solidarity and independence, and African values and unity in Article 29. 179  These 
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examples might be a valuable lesson to Asian states that seek to preserve indigenous 
distinctiveness. 
Second, all three regional human rights institutions have their own reporting system on 
human rights violation by member states or monitoring systems for member states’ compliance. 
In Europe, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has operated to 
monitor member state’s commitment in human rights and fundamental freedoms. 180  Active 
inspections and investigations include unfettered visits, empirical study, ad-hoc visits etc., and 
Europe is considered to have a very advanced system of preventive mechanisms for human rights 
violations. The Inter-American Commission does not have a coercive power to intervene in 
individual member states’ internal affairs, but its activity in investigating and issuing a country 
report based on Article 41 of the ACHR has contributed to raising public awareness in the region 
and also to mobilizing the international community.  
Many Asian countries have regarded the reporting and monitoring system by 
international human rights institutions as an infringement of sovereignty. But, if RHRIs are 
established in the Asia-Pacific region, they might accept reports from RHRIs with less reluctance 
because an investigation by neighboring countries can be seen as a relatively informal procedure 
and be conducted in amicable environments. RHRIs, however, should be mindful of the danger 
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that countries with dismal human rights record can submit a report as a means of defending 
themselves, bypassing an otherwise long and extensive investigation.  
Third, individual petitions are considered a critical component of the European human 
rights system but inter-state complaints have been politically sensitive issues in other regions. In 
fact, individual complaints have not been a core activity of the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights. But Inter-America has a much more advanced system than other regions in 
allowing exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies based on Article 46 of the ACHR.181 The 
unstable political conditions in Latin America, similar to those in many Asian states, might be 
the main reason for such a provision. As a democratic system has not been institutionalized in 
many Asian countries, such specific provisions might need to be taken into consideration for the 
establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, unlike Europe, the lack of public 
awareness on human rights violations and the lack of means to bring the case to the regional 
level will lead to relatively small number of individual complaints at the beginning of RHRIs in 
this region.  
Lastly, in the case of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights greatly strengthens 
the protection of human rights on the continent. The Court initially started as a marginal 
institution under the Council of Europe, but it has become one of the most important institutions 
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of the organization. 182  As a permanent judicial body with full-time judges, it has been 
successfully supplementing other human rights institutions in Europe.183 Such a harmonization 
with all different human rights institutions under different organizations has not weakened the 
protection of human rights but strengthened it. It can be a good example for Asian states in their 
multidimensional efforts to institutionalize a human rights system. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has extensive competence in providing advisory opinions to any member state of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) regardless of its ratification of the Convention,184 
and in this sense, the OAS has also become an integral part of the human rights protection 
system in the region.185 While the fact that not all OAS member states have signed the American 
Convention on Human Rights, indeed one of the weaknesses of the American human rights 
system, the Inter-American Commission’s full authority to monitor and deal with human rights 
violations sustains the system as a useful mechanism.186 It shows that the establishment of 
RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region can be started with a small number of countries at first once 
there is a guarantee on the authority, effectiveness and independence of RHRIs. Then, with the 
increasing number of member states, RHRIs can gradually strengthen their power for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. In Africa, it took a long time for states to obtain 
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sufficient ratifications to establish the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.187 The 
eventual establishment of the Court, however, demonstrates that well-coordinated efforts and 
interactions between the stakeholders - states, NGOs and regional bodies- can push a region 
toward the establishment of a regional human rights institution.188 The function of the Court is to 
“complement the protective mandate of the commission” and individuals and NGOs cannot bring 
a suit against a state through the Court.189 Thus, the responsibility of human rights protection is 
heavily imposed on the Commission itself. But because of the African states’ risk-averse 
political culture, the African Commission has no power to enforce its decisions, which is 
considered a major drawback of the African human rights system.190 Thus, it is important for the 
Asian human rights system to design a way in which RHRIs can ensure member states’ 
compliance with declared or recommended decisions by exerting political clout and providing 
clear remedies to victims of human rights violations.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
Regional human rights mechanisms are considered a more effective and efficient tool for 
the protection and promotion of human rights than the international human rights system under 
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the U.N. structure,191 and it is indeed desirable to establish RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. If a 
regional human rights institution is established, Asian states will surely benefit from their 
geographical proximities, and historical and cultural bonds.  
As discussed, most Asian countries have experienced colonial rule, during which there 
were abundant human rights violations by the colonizing state or the local collaborators. In many 
states, the colonial legacy has not been disposed of properly and it often becomes a source of 
continuing human rights violations. In addition, there are transitional justice issues concerning 
the principles and mechanisms that can guarantee justice during a transition from an 
authoritarian regime or internal conflict to a democratic rule.192 Asia has been facing many 
unresolved transitional justice issues during and after democratization. These human rights 
violations include the legacy of killing fields in Cambodia, the Cultural Revolution and the 
recent Tiananmen Massacre in China, the WWII issue of comfort women, forced labor, and the 
Nanking Massacre committed by Japan, the Gwangju Massacres in South Korea, war crimes 
during the Vietnam War, and the human rights violations in North Korea.193  None of the 
historical legacy issues in Asia is easy to solve by a single country, which truly hinders the 
development of human rights in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, these are only a few of the many 
troublesome human rights issues that cannot be effectively handled either at the domestic or the 
international level.  
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Surely, RHRIs cannot provide a total solution to human rights violations. A regional 
human rights system, however, emerges as the result of the frustration with the ineffectiveness of 
international mechanisms194 and, at the same time, the hope for a better implementation of 
international human rights norms as a supplement to human rights mechanisms. RHRIs have 
unique institutional advantages for the promotion and protection of human rights. Considering 
the continuing debate on Asian values and the Asian way of human rights in the last two decades, 
the U.N. Charter and the international human rights treaties cannot fully incorporate Asian 
regional contexts, which is another reason why regional human rights institutions should be 
established in the region.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
Why Have We Failed to Establish RHRIs in Asia? 
 
It was never the people who complained of the universality of human rights, nor did the 
people consider human rights as a Western or Northern imposition. It was often their 
leaders who did so.1 
In the twenty years [since 1990], there has been a growing recognition in the [Asia-Pacific] 
region… of the importance of developing regional arrangements to complement national 
and international efforts in promoting, protecting and realizing human rights… [T]he 
establishment of regional mechanisms lies at the heart of any credible regional human 
rights arrangement.2 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, after examining the development of human rights both in the 
international legal context and the Asian context, I concluded that it is desirable to establish 
regional human rights institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, RHRIs can serve as an 
effective tool for the protection and promotion of human rights in this region not as a 
replacement, but as a supplement to both the international and national human rights system. 
They can make a meaningful difference to the human rights situation in the region as a 
channeling institution to reflect regional specificity and particular needs, and, at the same time, 
monitor individual state’s practices to meet international standards on human rights. If they are 
                                                          
1 Statement by Kofi Annan,  cited in José A. Lindgren Alves, The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity, 
22 Hum. Rts. Q. 478, 498 (2000). 
2 Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement at 15th Workshop on 
Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region (Bangkok, Apr. 
21, 2010). 
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properly constituted and managed, RHRIs can be powerful tools for human rights by translating 
Asian countries’ commitment on human rights into real improvements for the people in this 
region. 
Since the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration in 1993, there have been numerous 
initiatives to establish regional human rights institutions and charters in Asia. All efforts, 
however, have been impeded by deep cultural, political, and historical issues. There have been 
two main approaches to the establishment of RHRIs: the top-down one and the bottom-up one. 
Why have both not worked? Many human rights activists and scholars argue that the former 
approach of the U.N. and the governments of Asian states has not fully cooperated with already 
existing national and regional institutions and has mainly relied upon individual governments’ 
political will. The latter approach of numerous NGOs has lacked enough support from formal 
governmental institutions. Thus, examining this problem is the starting point of my research in 
Chapter Three and the main question that should be asked is why Asia has not had regional 
human rights institutions so far.  
To answer this question, first, I will review all the major initiatives to establish RHRIs in 
this region, especially since the first Asia-Pacific Workshop on human rights was held in Manila, 
the Philippines in 1990, which was organized under the umbrella of the U.N., particularly the 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). This workshop was 
considered the first step to explore the possibility of regional human rights arrangements in the 
Asia-Pacific region.3 As the initiatives for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region have been 
mainly categorized by their leading agencies, this chapter will review them in three parts: the 
                                                          
3 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in 
the Asian and Pacific region, G.A. Res. 45/168, UN Doc. A/RES/45/168. (Dec. 18, 1990) 
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U.N. initiatives, the NGOs initiatives and the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
initiatives. These are examined in chronological order to see what items have been discussed, 
what has been a key development in their discussion, whether they have evolved toward 
realizing the establishment of RHRIs and lastly, how their activities can be evaluated. 
Through the analysis on all the major initiatives for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, I, then, will provide five main reasons that have hindered the establishment of a regional 
human rights system in Asia. That is, first, sovereignty.  Truly, sovereignty and the traditional 
concepts of the principle of non-intervention have been one of the main obstacles for setting up 
RHRIs in this region because for a long time, most Asian governments have considered human 
rights issues an internal affair. The second reason is the failure in the recognition of human rights 
after WWII.  It is deeply related to the issue of the post-war compensations and the reparations of 
war victims against Japan, the gross human rights violator at the time of the War. The third 
reason is the failure of major Asian powers to play a leading role in the human rights movement. 
The lack of regional leadership for the improvement of the human rights conditions in the region 
by the major Asian powers, China, Japan, and India shows the practical difficulties in 
establishing RHRIs in Asia. The fourth reason is the relatively low ratification rate of major U.N. 
human rights treaties. It means that in many Asian countries, there is still a lack of individual 
governments’ political will to comply with international human rights norms. And lastly, the 
fifth reason is the Asian values debate, a unique human rights discourse in this region. The first 
four reasons will be discussed in the same section, while the Asian values argument, which has 
been examined in a large number of publications by both scholars and activists for over a decade 
now, will be reviewed in a separate section. The reason for examining it separately is my belief 
that it is the most important factor in most Asian countries’ reluctance to establish RHRIs. With 
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the ongoing conversation on post-colonialism, Lee Kuan Yew’s famous Asian values debate, 
indeed, has been a major challenge for setting up a regional human rights system in the region 
because it rejects international human rights law as a Western concept and thus argues that it is 
inapplicable to the Asian context. 
After examining the five major reasons, I will conclude that all those obstacles, including 
the Asian values discourse that have hindered the establishment of RHRIs, are the result not of a 
different understanding of fundamental human rights under the already existing international 
human rights legal system, but mainly of political considerations. Therefore, I will ask who 
benefits from these assertions behind the rejection of RHRIs in the region. Those who are most 
vulnerable to violations of their fundamental human rights and find it hard to seek the protection 
of their rights both at the international and the national level are definitely not the ones who will 
benefit from the absence of RHRIs in the region. Neither are the human rights defenders who 
fight for them. Finally, the analysis of the identified obstacles will lead me to focus on national 
human rights institutions (NHRIs), relatively new actors in the international human rights 
framework, as a driving force for the establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. NHRIs 
will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
3.2. INITIATIVES TO ESTABLISH RHRIS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
There have been numerous initiatives to establish regional human rights mechanisms in 
the Asia-Pacific region for the past two decades after the first 1990 Asia-Pacific Workshop on 
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human rights explored the possibility of regional human rights arrangements in the region.4 They 
can be categorized, in three main subsets: U.N. initiatives, NGOs initiatives, and NHRIs 
initiatives.  
 
3.2.1. The U.N. Initiatives  
The first category includes the U.N. initiatives. In the 1960s, the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights created a study group to review the establishment of regional human rights 
institutions all over the world and in 1968, it requested that the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, 
organize regional seminars in the regions with no RHRIs with a view of establishing such 
regional bodies.5 A series of U.N. General Assembly resolutions on regional arrangement for the 
promotion and protection of human rights followed in the 1970s. For example in 1977, the U.N. 
G.A. resolution pointed out: 
Recognizing the important contribution of the regional commissions of the United Nations in 
the economic and social fields,  
1. Appeals to States in areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights do 
not yet exist to consider agreements with a view to the establishment within their 
respective regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of 
human rights; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General, under the programme of advisory services in the field of 
human rights, to give priority to the organization, in regions where no regional 
commission on human rights exists, of seminars for the purpose of discussion the 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 Sou Chiam, Asia’s Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism, 40 Vict. U. Wellington L. 
Rev. 127, 128 (2009). 
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usefulness and advisability of the establishment of regional commissions for the 
promotion and protection of human rights;6 
In 1982, the U.N. organized a seminar on “National, Local and Regional Arrangements 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region” in Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
7  During the seminar, the U.N. Centre for Human Rights called upon the participating 19 
member states of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to ratify the 
major human rights conventions and recommended setting up periodic regional meetings on 
human rights issues.8 It called for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) to facilitate a dialogue among member states on appropriate arrangements for human 
rights in the Asia-Pacific region. But the participants agreed that it was untimely to discuss the 
establishment of a regional arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. 9  Finally, in 1990, the 
OHCHR began to organize an annual Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region.  
There have been 15 workshops so far: in Manila (1990), Jakarta (1993), Seoul (1994), 
Kathmandu (1996), Amman (1997), Tehran (1998), New Delhi (1999), Beijing (2000), Bangkok 
(2001), Beirut (2002), Islamabad (2003), Doha (2004), Beijing (2005), Bali (2007) and Bangkok 
(2010). They were attended by representatives of individual governments in Asia, NHRIs, 
                                                          
6 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights, 
UN Doc. A/RES/32/127 (1977). See also UN Doc. A/RES/34/171 (1979), A/RES/35/197 (1980), A/RES/36/154 
(1981). 
7 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA, 112 (2004). 
8 Id. 
9 Sou Chiam, supra note 5, at 128. 
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international organizations, including U.N. agencies and human rights NGOs.10 The main issues 
discussed and the key developments of those workshops are briefly reviewed below: 
The Asia-Pacific 
Workshop on Human 
Rights 
Time, Place and Participation 
Main Issues and Report  
(emphasis added) 
The 1st Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Manila, the Philippines, 1990. 
23 governments. 
* Reviewed the role the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights had played. 
* Reviewed other regional systems for 
promoting and protecting human rights.  
* Debated the advantage of a regional human 
rights institution. 
The 2nd Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1993. 
28 governments. 
* Outlined the main objectives of subsequent 
meetings, including: 1) raising awareness of 
human rights standards and procedures and 2) 
of existing mechanisms available to 
governments in fulfilling their human rights 
obligations, 3) promoting bilateral 
cooperation, and 4) encouraging the 
development of human rights institutions in 
the region. 
* Identified key obstacles to the establishment 
of a regional system: 1) the geographical 
complexity, 2) different levels of development 
and cultural diversity, 3) the lack of a unifying 
tradition and 4) the absence of mutual 
understanding between governments. 
The 3rd Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Seoul, South Korea, 1994. 
29 governments. 
* Agreed to adopt a step-by-step, “building 
block” approach to developing a regional 
arrangement. 
* Emphasized the importance of national-
level actions to protect human rights, 
particularly through national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) and the development of 
national action plans (NAP). 
The 4th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Kathmandu, Nepal, 1996. 
30 governments. 
* Focused on the need to create regional 
arrangements that would be agreed upon by 
consensus. 
                                                          
10See website of OHCHR, Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Asian and 
Pacific region, http://www.unhchr.ch/   See also website of Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, 
HURGHTS OSAKA, http://www.hurights.or.jp/index_e.html  
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* Welcomed the NGOs’ participation in the 
process of development of regional 
arrangements.  
* Affirmed that the building blocks of human 
rights arrangements include: 1)  national 
human rights education programs, 2) the 
ratification of human rights instruments, 3) 
the development of national action plans, and 
4) the establishment of national human rights 
institutions. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/46/Add.1 
The 5th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Amman, Jordan, 1997. 
31 governments. 
* Urged OHCHR to work with governments 
to implement a regional technical cooperation 
program. 
* Reiterated that any regional arrangement 
must emerge from the needs and priorities set 
by the governments of the region. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/44  
The 6th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Teheran, Iran, 1998. 
36 governments. 
* Stressed that any regional arrangement for 
the Asia-Pacific region should be based on 
priorities and needs identified by the region. 
* Adopted a Framework for Regional 
Technical Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region (the so-called Teheran 
Framework) built on four pillars:  
1) national human rights plans of action, 2) 
human rights education,  
3) national human rights institutions, and 4) 
strategies for the realization of the right to 
development and economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
* Decided that countries in the region would 
implement technical cooperation programs in 
partnership with OHCHR. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/50  
The 7th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
New Delhi, India, 1999. 
29 governments. 
* Recommended that a series of inter-
sessional workshops be organized to discuss 
the Framework’s four pillars.  
* Reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, 
interdependence, and interrelatedness of all 
human rights and the promotion of universal 
respect for human rights by the step-by-step 
and building-blocks approach. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/94  
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The 8th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Beijing, China, 2000. 
40 governments. 
* Emphasized the importance of the rights of 
women, children, and other marginalized 
groups.  
* Requested OHCHR to undertake an 
evaluation of the implementation of the 
Tehran Framework. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/102  
The 9th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Bangkok, Thailand, 2001. 
33 governments. 
* Called for “concrete and sustainable sub-
regional and national activities” and for 
“training and awareness programs for 
government officials and key professional 
groups…” 
* With recognizing civil society’s significant 
contribution for human rights, decided to hold 
consultations with NGOs prior to the opening 
of each annual Workshop. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/98 
The 10th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Beirut, Lebanon, 2002. 
30 governments. 
* Recommended that activities to combat 
racism be included in national action plans for 
human rights. 
* Recognized the importance of good 
governance, at national and international 
levels. 
* Recognized that poverty and unemployment 
are among the major obstacles to the 
realization of the right to development and 
economic, social, and cultural rights. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WP3  
The 11th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Islamabad, Pakistan, 2003. 
29 governments. 
* Focused on the right to development and 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  
* Recognized the link between development 
and the full realization of human rights. 
* Emphasized the need for participation by 
developing countries in international 
economic decision-making and standard-
setting. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/109  
The 12th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Doha, Qatar, 2004. 
36 governments. 
* Adopted the Plan of Action 2004-2006 that 
focused on: 1) gathering lessons learned and 
best practices concerning national plans of 
action, 2) incorporating human rights 
education within national school systems, 3) 
strengthening the role of national human 
rights institutions and the Asia-Pacific 
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Forum, and 4) strengthening national 
capacities to realize the right to development 
and economic, social, and cultural rights. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/89 
The 13th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Beijing, China, 2005. 
33 governments. 
* Discussed in depth the issue of human rights 
and human trafficking. 
* For the future of the Asia-Pacific 
Framework, some states stressed the primacy 
of improving national level activities for the 
protection of human rights, while other states 
supported a sub-regional approach to 
promoting the Framework. 
* UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/100  
The 14th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Bali, Indonesia, 2007. 
25 governments. 
 
* Summarized the recommendations of the 
regional workshops since the 1991 workshop 
in Manila. 
* Recognized the important linkage between 
human rights and efforts to address extreme 
poverty. 
* UN Doc. A/HRC/7/35 
The 15th Asia-Pacific 
Workshop 
Bangkok, Thailand, 2010. 
31 governments. 
* Provided participants with an opportunity to 
study already existing regional human rights 
mechanisms in Africa, the Americas, and 
Europe, as well as the recent sub-regional 
developments such as ASEAN and the Arab 
League. 
* Recognized that regional networks of 
NHRIs can play a valuable role in supporting 
the establishment of regional human rights 
mechanisms. 
* Noted that the regional arrangements, while 
evolving in different forms in different 
regional contexts, should reinforce universal 
human rights standards. 
* Underlined the importance of developing 
partnerships between governments, NHRIs 
and civil society at the national and regional 
levels in developing regional mechanisms. 
* UN Doc. A/HRC/15/39 
Table 1: The U.N. Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the 
Asia-Pacific Region 
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All fifteen workshops’ main discussions can be summarized with the four priority pillars 
under the Asia-Pacific regional human rights framework – generally known as the Tehran 
Framework. 
The first pillar is national human rights action plans. The workshops have discussed and 
shared information and good practices to support each member state initiating a national human 
rights action plan because the OHCHR and the participants believe that the development of such 
a national time-bound plan can strengthen the culture of human rights by reforming various 
human-rights related domestic legislation and also consolidate the cooperation among similarly-
minded government officials, NHRIs, NGOs and all other civil society stakeholders.11 Along the 
same lines, a number of sub-regional and inter-sessional regional workshops on national human 
rights action plans have been organized, e.g. in Bangkok (1999), Tokyo (2000), Ulaanbaatar 
(2000), and Bangkok (2004). Still, only a small number of Asia-Pacific countries have adopted 
national human rights action plans and even in countries with action plans, there are concerns 
over their slow and limited implementation.12 
The second pillar is human rights education. The important role of human rights 
education has been emphasized both for children through the school curriculum and for 
professional groups like law enforcement officials, judges, and lawyers through technical 
training programs.13 Such a rights-based approach to education is believed to raise awareness of 
human rights among the general public and at the same time, enhance domestic human rights 
                                                          
11 See Report of the Secretary-General on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in the Asian and Pacific Region, Annex I (Mar. 12, 1998) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/50. 
12 Vitit Muntarbhorn, In Search of the Rights Track: Evolving a Regional Framework for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, 14, UNOHCHR (2005). 
13 Id., at 15. 
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protection systems. But, as these human rights education programs are national rather than 
regional, individual states can face financial difficulties implementing them with limited 
resources if there is no support from the outside, including the OHCHR.14 Sub-regional and 
inter-sessional workshops on human rights education have also been held, for example, in Seoul 
(1999), the Marshall Islands (2001), Chiangmai (2001), Fiji (2002), and Doha (2004). 
The third pillar is economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. The 
recognition of the right to development as a human right is indeed a contribution of developing 
countries, including most Asian states. The right to development and the realization of economic, 
social, and cultural rights has been identified as an important item of regional cooperation since 
the Fifth Workshop in Amman, Jordan (1997).15 In addition, the workshops, including the inter-
sessional and sub-regional ones, have constantly emphasized the close relationship of economic, 
social and cultural rights and human trafficking, the rights of women, children and migrant 
workers, and poverty. 16  But, there has been limited implementation at the national level 
compared to the active efforts and discussions during the workshops. Even when there are 
actions taken by individual states, in most cases they are “ad hoc rather than sustainable or 
sustained.”17 
The last pillar is national human rights institutions (NHRIs). Participating member states 
at both the 12th Workshop in Doha (2004), and the 13th Workshop in Beijing (2005) stressed that 
                                                          
14 Id., at 15. 
15 See Report of the Secretary-General on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in the Asian and Pacific region, (Jan. 27, 1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/44. 
16 Id. 
17 Vitit Muntarbhonr, supra note 12, at 16-7. 
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an NHRI is the strongest of the Tehran Framework’s four pillars.18 Indeed, the Asian-Pacific 
Forum (APF), a network of national human rights institutions, is the closest, that this region has 
come to regional mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights so far. Seventeen 
countries in the region have established NHRIs and their network through the APF has played a 
central role in the establishment of a culture of human rights in Asia.19 Under the 1993 Paris 
Principles, 20  NHRIs have a power to review and monitor national legislation, government 
policies and programs to meet international human rights standards, to receive and investigate 
complaints of human rights violations cases, and to raise public awareness of human rights 
through their human rights education programs.21 In the Asia-Pacific region, their network under 
the framework of the APF, established in 1996, has contributed to each NHRI improving its own 
capacity through sharing human rights information and best practices, and training and 
exchanging staff. It also demonstrated how a regional approach to human rights issues can be 
effectively handled with the cooperation of NHRIs, for example, on the issue of the rights of 
migrant workers, and of internally displaced persons through the APF coordinated annual 
meetings. 22  The OHCHR has also actively supported and participated in the APF annual 
                                                          
18 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/89 and E/CN.4/2006/100. 
19 The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Summary of Recommendations made and 
Progress achieved under the Framework on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, United Nations, 17 (2010). http://bangkok.ohchr.org/news/events/asia-pacific-
regional-framework-workshop-2010/files/summary_recommendations_progress.pdf  
20 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 134, U.N. GAOR. 48th Sess., 85th mtg., (1993) UN DOC. A/RES/48/134. 
Paris Principles list the role and functions of NHRIs, the requirements for independence and the broad mandate of 
NHRIs. Paris Principles are internationally recognized standards which have been adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in Dec. 20, 1993. 
21 More details on NHRIs’ role and functions for the protection and promotion of human rights will be discussed in 
depth in Chapters Four and Five. . 
22 OHCHR, supra note 19, at 18-9. 
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meetings. The APF and the network of NHRIs in the region, however, are not regional human 
rights arrangements in the sense of other already existing RHRIs in other regions. 
Under the Tehran Framework’s four pillars, the U.N. Workshops have mainly discussed 
cooperation programs focusing on individual governments’ actions to strengthen human rights 
mechanisms at the national level. This is far from what the 1982 Seminar in Colombo and related 
U.N. resolutions originally tried to initiate for regional human rights arrangements. What is more, 
as argued in Chapter Two, in the Asia-Pacific region, government actions alone are not sufficient 
for the promotion and protection of human rights. It is important to set up a forum for 
governments, civil society, the media, academics, NGOs, and all other human rights stakeholders 
to be linked and to act together for human rights development in the region. Yet, the workshops 
have not served a similar function. Therefore, even though the U.N. Workshops have shown 
some positive signs and provided gradual contributions for the protection of human rights at the 
national level, they have not properly worked for the establishment of a regional human rights 
system. No specific items were even discussed during the workshops for the establishment of 
RHRIs, for instance drafting regional human rights charters, adopting time-bound agreements for 
the building of regional human rights institutions, or, at least, bringing high-level government 
officials in order to ensure individual states’ commitment to RHRIs, rather than just adopting 
non-legally binding declarations. As Vitit Muntarbhorn points out, after 1999, even the title of 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission’s annual resolutions on the Asia-Pacific region has changed 
from Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia and 
Pacific Region to Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
the Asian and Pacific Region.23 The title of the workshops also changed after the ninth one in 
                                                          
23 Vitit Muntarbhorn, supra note 12, at 16, 23-5.  
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2001 from Regional Arrangement to Regional Cooperation. One explanation for this is that most 
Asian countries in the workshops have formed underlined tacit consensus that establishing 
RHRIs in the region is still premature and should be done gradually. They have focused more on 
building and strengthening the national capacity for human rights rather than on setting up and 
initiating regional human rights mechanisms. The discussions at the workshops, especially 
during the first 10 years, clearly reveal such a position. At the first regional seminar in Colombo 
(1982), there was consensus among the participants that there was little need for a regional 
human rights arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. Eight years later, in Manila (1990), 
participants were concerned with the derogation of national sovereignty that a regional 
arrangement may cause.24 Three years later in Jakarta, governments identified three issues that 
needed to be discussed before any talk of regional arrangements. These were geographical 
complexity, different levels of development and the absence of high levels of understanding 
between governments.25 At the 1994 Workshop in Seoul, one solid principle was established:  
the development of a regional arrangement should be done through a step-by-step and building-
block approach. 26  Two years later in Kathmandu (1996), the workshop emphasized the 
importance of the development of regional cooperation for the strengthening of national 
capacities in the area of human rights, rather than the development of a regional arrangement.27 
The 1997 Amman Workshop reaffirmed that “any regional arrangement must emerge from and 
be directed to the needs and priorities set by governments of the region, with roles, functional 
tasks, outcomes and achievements determined by consensus by governments of the region” 
                                                          
24 See UN Doc. A/RES/45/168, supra note 3. 
25 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 7, at 113. 
26 Id. 
27 See Report of the Secretary-General on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in the Asian and Pacific region, (Apr. 3, 1996) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/46/Add.1. 
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through the step-by-step and building-block approach.28 The same principles have been reiterated 
at the rest of the workshops, along with a discussion of the 1998 Tehran Framework for 
strengthening national capacities for the protection of human rights. 
Through the U.N. Workshops, there have been dynamic discussions on various human 
rights issues in Asia including extreme poverty, human trafficking, racism, the right to 
development and the relationship among development, human rights, and democracy. They have 
indeed contributed at least to identifying the human rights areas of common concern in the 
region. But, for the last two decades, in the name of the step-by-step and building-blocks 
approach,29 individual governments in the region have demonstrated that they have no sufficient 
and concrete political will to enter into the establishment of regional human rights mechanisms 
in Asia yet. Indeed, some human rights NGOs in the region heavily criticized the U.N. annual 
workshops as “a means for states to avoid establishing any such permanent arrangement under 
the pretext of appearing committed to the ideal.”30  
 
3.1.2. The NGOs Initiatives 
The second subset of initiatives is those by NGOs. In 1993, more than 110 NGOs from 
26 Asian countries formulated the Asia-Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights in Bangkok, 
                                                          
28 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/44, supra note 15. 
29 Report of the Secretary-General on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
the Asian and Pacific region, (Mar. 8, 2002) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WP3. 
30 Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, Establishing a Regional Human Rights Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific 
Region, 2-3, APHRN Paper – Feb. 2004. http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/annual-meetings/8th-nepal-
2004/downloads/ngo-statements/ngo_regional.pdf ; See also, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center 
(HRDC), No Miracles in the Forbidden City Ritual Workshop in Beijing for an Asia Pacific Regional Human Rights 
Arrangement (Mar. 1, 2000) http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF16.htm  
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Thailand and adopted the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights.31 In the absence of 
regional intergovernmental human rights mechanisms, NGOs, such as the Asian Forum for 
Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information 
Center (HURIGHTS Osaka, Japan), the NGO Forum on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the Asia-Pacific Human Rights NGOs Congress, and the Law Association for Asia and 
the Pacific (LAWASIA) have deliberated the establishment of an NGO-led regional human 
rights system in Asia. 32  At the 1995 Expert Meeting organized by HURIGHTS in Osaka, 
participating NGOs identified the obstacles to establishing RHRIs as follows: 1) the low level of 
ratification of human rights treaties, 2) the non-observance of treaty-obligations after ratification, 
and 3) the cultural relativist argument as opposed to the universality of human rights by the 
leadership in the region.33 The NGO Forum on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was 
held the same year in Tokyo, Japan with more than 100 NGO participants, which urged the 
member states of the APEC to ratify and implement all major human rights treaties.34 The 1996 
Asia-Pacific Human Rights NGO Congress was organized in Delhi, India by 117 NGOs from 28 
Asian countries to reaffirm the importance of observing existing international human rights 
norms and the respect for the universality, indivisibility, and non-selectivity of human rights. In 
1998, over 200 NGOs in Asia adopted the Asian Human Rights Charter – A Peoples’ Charter.35 
                                                          
31 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 7, at 117-9. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. The Expert Meeting also proposed three steps for establishing a regional human rights mechanism. They are 1) 
to set up sub-regional NGO-led body to handle research and education, 2) to set up inter-governmental forum, and 3) 
to set up sub-regional or regional human rights mechanism. 
34 Id.  
35 Asian Human Rights Charter, adopted in Kwangju, South Korea, 1998. http://material.ahrchk.net/charter; See also 
Seth R. Harris, Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 17, 2-5 (2000); 
Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asia, Human Rights and the New Millennium: Time for a Regional Human Rights Charter? 8 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 407, 413-5 (1998). 
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It reflects the growing recognition by NGOs of the importance of regional human rights 
institutions and conventions36 against “the official disregard or contempt of human rights in 
many Asian states.”37 Many human rights NGOs have also been deeply involved in and have 
cooperated in intervening and raising awareness by preparing reports, presenting issues, and 
disseminating information during most of the major inter-governmental regional meetings, and 
have urged member states and regional organizations to place human rights at the center of their 
agenda.  
Undoubtedly, the role of human rights NGOs in the region for the support of RHRIs 
cannot be ignored, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter Six. I believe such extensive 
transnational alliances and rich networks make human rights NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region 
the impetus for a regional human rights system. The reason lies in the fact that many NGOs are 
not tied to the boundary of the state in their particular human rights issues and work across 
national borders as agents for a regional civil society and for fostering a human rights culture in 
the region. Indeed, it is encouraging that numerous NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region have 
worked for the establishment of regional human rights mechanisms. There are, however, still 
weak links between NGOs and governments and relatively low support from individual 
governments for NGO initiatives.38 And unfortunately, this has hampered NGOs’ enormous 
efforts to bring about regional human rights arrangements.  
 
                                                          
36 Asian Human Rights Charter, Id., Art.16.1. and 16.2. 
37 Id. Art.1.6.  
38 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 7, at 39-41. 
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3.1.3. The NHRIs Initiatives 
The last subset of initiatives includes the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
initiatives under the framework of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions 
(APF). The APF’s goal is to coordinate the functions of NHRIs in accordance with international 
human rights standards by sharing information on human rights violations, exchanging NHRI 
staff and cooperating for best practices. So far, it is considered “the most cohesive regional 
human rights body in the Asia-Pacific region.”39  
During the First U.N. Regional Workshop in Manila (1990), three heads of NHRIs from 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines discussed the feasibility of a regional organization 
of NHRIs, but decided that at least five countries in the region should join to establish such an 
institution for it to be credible and accountable.40 With the adoption of the 1993 Paris Principles, 
the Asia-Pacific region saw an increasing number of NHRIs. In 1994 and 1995, a detailed 
proposal for the structure of an Asia-Pacific Conference of NHRIs by the Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) provided an opportunity for more concrete 
discussions among several NHRIs, including some from India and Indonesia.41  Finally, in 1996, 
following an agreement among the heads of NHRIs from Australia, India, Indonesia, and New 
Zealand, the APF was established as a regional human rights organization in the Asia-Pacific 
                                                          
39 The Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, Report on Establishing a Regional Human Rights Mechanism for the 
Asia-Pacific Region, 2 Asia. Pac. J.HR. & L. 82, 83 (2004). 
40 Brian Burdekin, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, 98-101 (2007). 
41 Id. 
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region and held its first meeting in Darwin, Australia.42 During the first meeting, they adopted its 
charter, the so-called Larrakia Declaration, which outlines the following objectives of the APF:  
[T]o provide support to governments in the region in the establishment and development of 
national human rights institutions, and 
to expand mutual support, cooperation and joint activity among member institutions.43 
Based on the two basic principles, in 1998, the APF established the Advisory Council of 
Jurists (ACJ) to support the Forum and individual NHRIs by giving advice on the 
implementation and interpretation of international human rights norms and issuing a report on 
the human rights situation in individual member states.44 Currently, the APF has 15 full member 
institutions and two associate members. As a full member, each NHRI should comply with the 
1993 Paris Principles and indeed, the condition of meeting the minimum international standard 
of human rights has strengthened the credibility of the APF.45 So far, the APF has held fifteen 
annual meetings. Their main outcomes are reviewed below:  
The Asia-Pacific Forum Annual 
Meeting 
Time, Place and Participation 
Main Issues and Report  
(emphasis added) 
The 1st APF Annual Meeting 
Darwin, Australia, 1996 
4 NHRIs. 
* Discussed matters of common 
interest to NHRIs: independence, 
functions and powers, education, 
media relations, and 
investigation process. 
* Adopted the Larrakia 
Declaration with an agreement to 
establish the APF. 
                                                          
42 Id., at 98-101. 
43 See The History of the Asia-Pacific Forum, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/history  
44 See Pamela A. Jefferies, Human Rights, Foreign Policy, and Religious Belief: An Asia/Pacific Perspective, 2000 
BYU L. REV. 885, 892 (2000). 
45 Brian Burdekin, supra note 40, at 98-101. 
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The 2nd APF Annual Meeting 
New Delhi, India, 1997 
6 NHRIs. 
* Emphasized that no category of 
rights takes priority over another 
by focusing both on the 
economic, social and cultural 
rights and the civil and political 
rights. 
* Agreed to set up an 
international human rights law 
advisory panel stressing the 
importance of developing human 
rights jurisprudence for the Asia-
Pacific region. 
The 3rd APF Annual Meeting 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1998 
6 NHRIs and 21 governments as 
observers. 
* Changed the name from 
Regional Workshop to Annual 
Meeting to reflect the growth of 
the APF. 
* Established an Advisory 
Council of Jurists. 
* Rejected arguments that human 
rights were out of character with 
Asian Values, and stressed a 
clear commitment to the 
universality of human rights. 
The 4th APF Annual Meeting 
Manila, the Philippines, 1999 
7 NHRIs and 20 governments as 
observers. 
* Addressed the role of NHRIs in 
the fight against gender 
discrimination, especially the 
trafficking in women and 
discussed the death penalty and 
its use. 
* Provided an intervention from 
the NGOs to present joint 
statements to each plenary 
session of the annual meeting. 
The 5th APF Annual Meeting 
Rotorua, New Zealand, 2000 
8 NHRIs and 21 governments as 
observers. 
* Discussed the role of NHRIs in 
the promotion of democracy, and 
against racism. 
* Discussed the use of child 
soldiers and the situation of 
internally-displaced persons in 
the region. 
The 6th APF Annual Meeting 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2001 
9 NHRIs. 
* Addressed the role of NHRIs in 
responding to gender issues and 
HIV-AIDS. 
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* Stressed building co-operative 
relationships with NGOs. 
The 7th APF Annual Meeting 
New Delhi, India, 2002 
12 NHRIs. 
* Addressed the role of NHRIs 
for the prevention of the 
trafficking of women and 
children. 
* Considered the role of NHRIs 
in the development of a proposed 
international convention on the 
rights of people with disabilities. 
* Established the category of 
‘Associate Membership’ of the 
APF. 
The 8th APF Annual Meeting 
Kathmandu, Nepal, 2004 
12 NHRIs as full members. 
* Focused on the rule of law, 
anti-terrorism measures, and the 
role of NHRIs. 
* Discussed the independence of 
NHRIs based on the Paris 
Principles. 
* Discussed the issue of 
trafficking, the death penalty, and 
child pornography. 
The 9th APF Annual Meeting 
Seoul, Korea, 2004 
14 NHRIs as full members. 
* Held prior to the 7th   
International Conference for 
NHRIs. (One-day closed 
business session meeting.) 
* Considered a training 
workshop and seminar for 
NHRIs. 
* Discussed the issue of the 
responsiveness of governments to 
the recommendations and 
findings of NHRIs. 
The 10th APF Annual Meeting 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2005 
15 NHRIs as full members. 
* Discussed the role of NHRIs in 
the prevention of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment. 
* Addressed the role of NHRIs in 
human rights education. 
The 11th APF Annual Meeting 
Suva, Fiji Islands, 2006 
16 NHRIs as full members. 
* Welcomed proposals to 
strengthen the accreditation 
guidelines of the International 
Coordination Committee of 
National Institutions (ICC) and 
recommended that the APF 
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membership procedures be 
reviewed once the ICC 
guidelines were finalized. 
* Addressed the role of NHRIs 
for international labor standards 
focusing on incorporating them 
in domestic codes and applying 
them to issues of trafficking and 
migration. 
* Discussed strategies to protect 
the rights of human rights 
defenders. 
* Discussed ACJ’s report on the 
right to education. 
The 12th APF Annual Meeting 
Sydney, Australia, 2007 
17 NHRIs. (150 representatives 
from NHRIs, governments, 
NGOs, and the U.N.) 
* Discussed the issues of 1) the 
protection of the rights of people 
with disabilities and 2) the 
response to the human rights 
dimensions of climate change. 
* NHRIs from Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines signed a Declaration 
of Cooperation with a 
commitment to work together in 
areas of shared concern. They 
agreed to cooperate in the 
development of a human rights 
mechanism for the ASEAN 
region. 
* NHRIs from Afghanistan, 
Jordan, Palestine, and Qatar also 
expressed strong interest in 
establishing a similar model of 
cooperation for West Asia. 
* NGOs highlighted the 
important role of NHRIs for the 
protection mechanisms for 
human rights defenders. 
The 13th APF Annual Meeting 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008 
17 NHRIs (170 representatives 
from NHRIs, governments, 
NGOs, and the U.N.) 
* Discussed effective approaches 
to engage with the Universal 
Periodic Review process 
established by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council. 
* Stressed the importance of the 
 98 
 
corporate social responsibility 
for the protection of human 
rights. 
* Discussed the situation facing 
human rights defenders across 
the Asia-Pacific region, and 
NGOs suggested practical steps 
to the APF for supporting human 
rights defenders. 
* Noted the APF’s concern with 
the continuing human rights 
violations in Myanmar. 
The 14th APF Annual Meeting 
Amman, Jordan, 2009 
17 NHRIs (150 representatives 
from NHRIs, governments, 
NGOs, and the U.N.) 
* Discussed the role of NHRIs in 
fighting corruption by 
developing a human-rights based 
approach.  
* Regarding the issue of human 
rights and religion, stressed the 
building of inter-faith and intra-
faith dialogue to promote 
understanding the protection of 
human rights, and shared 
member states’ practices.  
* NGOs urged the APF and 
NHRIs to support human rights 
defenders in the region. 
* Noted concerns with human 
rights violations in a number of 
countries across the region, 
especially, Myanmar, Iran and 
the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
The 15th APF Annual Meeting 
Bali, Indonesia, 2010 
17 NHRIs and 3 newly 
established NHRIs in the region 
as observers. 
* Decided that the APF 
Conference is to be held on a 
biennial basis from 2011 in 
conjunction with the APF 
meeting. It will bring a wide 
range of stakeholders together to 
discuss human rights issues in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
* Discussed the drafting of a 
five-year APF Strategic Plan for 
2011-2015. 
Table 2: The Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions Annual Meeting 
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In my estimate, the APF annual meetings have made four significant contributions so far. 
First, they have strengthened the capacity of each NHRI to protect and promote human rights in 
its country by sharing information and best practices. The APF meetings have been held to 
examine the role of NHRIs in human rights issues of common concern in the Asia-Pacific region, 
such as economic, social, and cultural rights, the right to education, human trafficking, gender 
discrimination, anti-corruption, racism, religion, and the rule of law and democracy. In addition, 
with the exchange of experiences, each NHRI can get a sense of what should be a top priority for 
the promotion and protection of human rights in any individual state.  
Second, the annual meetings have supported NHRIs in meeting international standards 
and effectively implementing them by discussing timely issues, such as the rights of people with 
disabilities, the rights of migrant workers, the prevention of torture, and the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR), in conjunction with the newly adopted international human rights conventions 
and treaties, or the new monitoring system of the U.N. For example, the 13th APF meeting in 
2008 reviewed what the role of NHRIs is in the effective implementation of the UPR process 
created in 2006 by the U.N. They also tried to delineate how NHRIs can intervene in 
governments’ drafting and submission of the national reports on human rights to the U.N., and at 
the same time, reflect concern from civil society and human rights NGOs in the report.   
Third, compared to the U.N. Workshops, the APF meetings provided more opportunities 
for NGOs, including the Asian NGOs Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI),46 
to actively participate in and present their concerns in the region.  In particular, at those meetings, 
                                                          
46 The Asian NGOs Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI) has evolved to coordinate NGOs in the 
region to develop effective NGO-NHRI relationships with human rights NGOs from 14 countries across Asia. 
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NGOs stressed the importance of the rights of human-rights defenders and highlighted the 
experiences of these defenders. 
Fourth, the APF meetings facilitated the cooperation of NHRIs at the sub-regional level 
for the establishment of sub-regional human rights institutions. Four NHRIs in the South-East 
Asia region actually adopted a declaration of cooperation during the 12th Annual Meeting and it 
became the driving force behind the establishment of sub-regional human rights bodies in the 
region. As a result, the ASEAN Charter, including the mandate to establish an ASEAN human 
rights body, was ratified in 2008 and the establishment of an ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was adopted and approved in 2009.47 More details of 
the developing human rights system at the sub-regional level through NHRIs48 will be discussed 
in the next two chapters. 
By ensuring that NHRIs meet international standards of independence and accountability, 
the APF has served as “an intermediary in the region between individual state policy and/or 
behavior and their respective monitoring bodies.”49 Furthermore, though it is not a high-level 
inter-governmental institution and its interests are still limited to NHRIs, the APF has fostered 
“an environment which may increasingly become more amenable to the creation of a strong 
regional human rights institution,”50  through its active work and dynamic cooperation with 
member NHRIs. 
                                                          
47 See The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html  
48 See Andrea Durbach,Catherine Renshaw and Andrew Byrnes, A tongue but no teeth? The emergence of a regional 
human rights mechanism in the Asia-Pacific, 31 Sydney Law Review 211 (2009). 
49 The Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, supra note 39, at 83. 
50 Andrea Durbach et. al., supra note 48, at 238.  
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3.1.4. Summary 
In general, the over two decades since the First U.N. Workshop for establishing regional 
human rights arrangements in Manila (1990) and the adoption of the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration,51 have witnessed futile efforts, both through the top-down approach of the U.N. and 
Asian governments and the bottom-up approach of numerous NGOs in Asia, which have failed 
to establish regional human rights mechanisms. Why have both approaches failed? The former 
has not fully cooperated with already existing national and regional human rights institutions and 
has mainly relied on individual governments’ political will, which obviously has no intention of 
establishing a regional human rights system and binding norms. The latter has worked without 
enough support from formal governmental institutions. The NHRIs initiatives, with their 
relatively immediate approach, have worked successfully both with governments and NGOs, and 
have shown some promising signs as examined above. To my mind, however, there are no 
concrete steps toward the establishment of RHRIs yet; only the hope that NHRIs and their 
network through the APF can gradually change the individual governments’ attitudes, as 
demonstrated at the sub-regional level with the establishment of the ASEAN human rights body. 
 
3.2. WHY HAS ASIA NOT HAD REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS SO FAR? 
Above, I reviewed all the major initiatives for the creation of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region categorizing them in three subsets. Based on this analysis, I will suggest five main reasons 
                                                          
51 Bangkok Declaration, REPORT OF THE REGIONAL MEETING FOR ASIA OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, (Bangkok, Mar. 29 – Apr. 2, 1993), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8. Article 26 of the Bangkok 
Declaration clearly “reiterates the need to explore the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Asia.”  Id. at 26. 
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that have hindered the establishment of RHRIs. These are: 1) sovereignty, 2) the failures in the 
recognition of human rights after WWII, 3) the failure of major Asian powers to play a leading 
role in human rights initiatives, 4) the relatively low ratification rate of major U.N. human rights 
treaties, and 5) the Asian values debates. The first four items will be discussed in this section and 
the Asian values arguments will be examined in the next one. 
 
3.2.1. Sovereignty and Human Rights  
Many Asian governments still consider human rights issues an internal affair.52 In this 
context, states are reluctant to join or establish regional human rights arrangements that might 
make a state vulnerable to accusations by individuals, NGOs or even by other countries.53 In 
other words, most Asian governments have considered international human rights norms a threat 
to state sovereignty and nothing more than a politicization of human rights by the Western 
countries in order to intervene in Asian states’ internal affairs. Though the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration on Human Rights emphasized the need to explore the possibility of establishing 
RHRIs in its Article 26, it also stressed “the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all 
human rights and the need to avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of 
human rights and its politicization.”54 Many U.N. members from the Third World countries have 
                                                          
52 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 7, at 130-1.  
53 Id. See also Bilahari Kausikan, The Asian Values Debate: A View from Singapore, in DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 
17-26 (Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner eds., 1998); Bilahari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to Human Rights, 89 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 146 (1995); Christina M. Cerna, East Asian Approaches to Human Rights, 89 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 152 (1995). 
54 Bangkok Declaration, supra note 51. At preamble and Art.7. 
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also shown concern for the politicization of human rights.55 In fact, most developing countries 
consider international human rights “merely notes in the margins of legal and political debate, 
supported with zeal by few and ignored by many.”56 As Antony Anghie maintains, the challenge 
to universality from the Third World countries arose “not because of differences in culture [and 
religions], but differences in interest: the difference between the developed and developing 
states.” 57  He also points out the relationship between international human rights law and 
sovereignty: 
Human rights law is revolutionary because it purports to regulate the behavior of a 
sovereign within its own territory. The emergence of Third World societies, as independent 
sovereign states, was simultaneous with the creation of international human rights law, 
which significantly conditioned the character of that sovereignty.58 
I agree with his argument that “Third World sovereignty is distinctive,” in the sense that 
Western sovereignty has been protected against the development of international law, while non-
Western countries have been subject to international law. But, at the same time, I want to point 
out that the international human rights mechanism was emerged from the ideal to protect the 
people, whose human rights are violated by their governments but who cannot seek remedies 
from their countries. Therefore, while it is important to contest the imperial and post-colonial 
                                                          
55 For example, Tareq Ariful Islam, the delegate from Bangladesh said that “the politicization of human rights was 
an obstacle to the non-selective and universal application of human rights standards.” Nasharudin Mat Isa, the 
delegate from Malaysia stated that “too often political considerations came into play in debates on economic, social 
and cultural rights, and some countries continued to pick and choose among the rights, in terms of whether they 
would highlight those rights and how they would be enjoyed.” The Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and 
Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly, Speakers Warn against Politicization of Human Rights Issues on United 
Nations, Sixty-third General Assembly session, (Oct. 28, 2008) UN Doc. GA/SHC/3929. 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gashc3929.doc.htm  
56 Helen M. Stacy, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CULTURE, 8 (2009). 
See also Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13, 21-78. (2005). 
57 Antony Anghie, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 201 (2004). 
58 Id., at 254. 
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nature of international human rights law, it is also important to further the extension of the 
original ideals of human rights law for the people who face a hostile government, not for the 
authoritarian government itself. 
Using the traditional concept of state sovereignty, China has persistently criticized the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights discussion of its policy and stated that human rights belong 
to its domestic jurisdiction as a sovereign state and it has a policy of noninterference in the 
domestic affairs of other states.59 Therefore, it “is opposed to any action by any country to put 
pressure on other countries by using the human rights issue or politicalizing human rights.”60 The 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has consistently denounced the report by 
the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Council. 61  North Korea maintains that 
“extreme politicization, selectivity and double standards” are prevalent in the U.N.62 It also 
continuously rejects the U.N. General Assembly resolutions63  condemning its human rights 
record. For example, Pak Dok Hun, a spokesman for the foreign ministry of North Korea, 
strongly denounced the resolution as a “product of a political plot to forcibly change North 
Korea's system and ideology” and "a provocation to the North's dignity."64 Most of the Asian 
                                                          
59 Seth Harris, Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant, 17 Asia Pacific Law & Policy Journal 13, 16 
(2000). 
60 The Chinese Foreign Ministry, China Opposes to Politicization of Human Rights Issues, Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in the United States of America (Mar.12, 2002)  http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng//zt/zgrq/t36649.htm  
61 U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Considers reports of Special Rapporteurs on Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar, (Mar. 13, 2008).  
62 Id. 
63 See, for example, Third Committee Draft Resolutions Address Human Rights Violations, (Nov. 21, 2008) UN 
Doc. GA/SHC/3940. 
64 See Report:North Korea rejects U.N. rights resolution, the Associated Press, Nov. 22, 2008; North Korea protests 
proposed UN General Assembly rights resolution, Jurist, (Nov. 22, 2008); North Korea rejects UN human rights 
resolution, International Herald Tribune, (Nov. 24, 2008). 
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developing countries’ concern for the politicization of human rights stems from “the 
conditionalities, or linking development assistance to progress in democratization or human 
rights.”65 As most Asian countries are still in poor economic conditions, it is natural for leaders 
of these nations to put their primary concern to improve the material situation through economic 
development. 66  Therefore, it has been considered acceptable in the name of economic 
development and national integrity to infringe on the civil and political rights of people.67 I, 
however, believe that economic development cannot be an excuse for gross human rights 
violations especially by authoritarian governments in the region. What China, North Korea, and 
other Asian countries with human rights violations express is not apprehension of interference in 
the right to development, but rather of interference by the international community against their 
sovereignty and power to maintain their authority. 
Inoue Tatsuo argues that “the disproportionate emphasis on sovereignty betrays a lack of 
understanding about the close connection between sovereignty and human rights.”68 In addition, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, the constraints on accepting the international human rights 
standards and concepts, in the Asian human rights context, do not come from a lack of 
understanding of fundamental human rights, but from political considerations.69 That is to say, 
concerns over the politicization of the human rights issue are mainly the result of authoritarian 
governments’ interest in keeping control over their people. The protection and promotion of 
                                                          
65 Christina M. Cerna, supra note 53, at 155. 
66 Onuma Yasuaki, In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: “Universal” Vs. “Relative” Human Rights Viewed 
from an Asian Perspective, 1 Asia. Pac. J.HR & L., 53, 60 (2000). 
67 Id. 
68 Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 27, 
31 (Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., 1999). 
69 See Bilahari Kausikan, supra note 53. 
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human rights can be enhanced by the respect for a state’s sovereignty.70 In this new and better 
developed concept of sovereignty, states should be viewed not as deniers of human rights, but as 
protectors and promoters of the human rights of their nationals.71 Indeed, under the regional 
human rights mechanisms in Asia, “mutual cooperation in furtherance of human rights will not 
only strengthen national identities and all that goes with that may indeed help different states to 
discover their true identities and enable them to examine the whole issue of sovereignty in a 
more enlightened context.”72  Moreover, as identified by the U.N. Workshops and the APF 
Annual Meetings, there are common concerns on certain human rights issues that need to be 
settled through the cooperation of neighboring countries in the region and with financial support 
from the U.N., such as human trafficking, development, and rights of migrants. Thus, the 
principle of sovereignty cannot be an excuse against the establishment of RHRIs, because a 
regional compromise is possible, at least in certain areas of human rights, in which each 
government will be comfortable to ratify international human rights treaties and adopt regional 
human rights arrangements. Such cooperation can be the first step toward setting up RHRIs in 
the region and the increasing number of regional arrangements in certain areas of human rights 
will ultimately extend its regional cooperation for human rights in general. 
 
3.2.2. Past Failures in the Recognition of Human Rights  
                                                          
70 Inoue Tatsuo, supra note 68, at 32-4. 
71 Id. 
72 I.A. Rehman, Director of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asian Human Rights Charter: Need for Asian 
Regional Mechanisms to Secure Human Rights, (May. 16, 1998) presented at the Asian Human Rights Charter 
Conference in Kwangju, South Korea http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1998vol08no06/1455   
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It has been argued that a regional human rights mechanism in Asia is hard to establish 
until Japan, the gross human rights violator during WWII, offers redress to its victim countries in 
Asia.73 To-date, post-war compensations and the reparations of war victims have, however, not 
been fully settled in spite of the persistent claims against Japan.  
The recent unsolved contention over comfort women who were forced into prostitution by 
the Japanese military during WWII is a good example. The majority of women were recruited by 
force from Korea and China, but women from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, India, Myanmar, and other Japanese-occupied Asian countries were also forced into 
sexual slavery.74 Another example is the consistent denial of the Nanking Massacre, despite the 
estimate of over 300,000 casualties. Further, the 1946 International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (the Tokyo Tribunal) failed to fully disclose the cases of gross human rights violations 
against civilians in colonized Asian states by the Japanese military officials.75 This unwillingness 
of the Japanese government to offer compensation for its past wrongs  not only made its relations 
with neighboring Asian states worse,76 but, more importantly, if certain Asian countries are 
criticized for their failure to protect human rights, they point out that Japan has not taken full 
responsibility for human rights violations during its colonial rule yet. The consistent mutual 
distrust among countries in the Asia-Pacific region has undoubtedly been a considerable 
                                                          
73 Seong-Phil Hong, The Korean Comfort Women Case: New Claims for the Human Dignity in Asia, 14, ASIL 
Human Rights Interest Group Newsletter, Vol.4 No.2 (1994). 
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impediment for reconciliation in the region.77  Therefore, the task of establishing a regional 
human rights system in Asia is largely entrusted to the government of Japan, which once 
humiliated its neighboring countries by establishing the so-called “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.”78 
One more thing to be noted is that at the same time, this is why it is necessary to establish 
RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. The future of human rights is closely linked to how we 
understand and accommodate the past in the present. In this sense, a large number of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have been created since the early 1990s with the goal of 
achieving national unity and legal justice by revealing long-suppressed truths. Similarly, RHRIs 
in this region can heal the trauma of memory in victim countries and bring regional 
reconciliation and peace by investigating incidents of gross human rights violations and 
massacres during WWII and acknowledging past wrongdoings at the regional level.  
 
3.2.3. Failure of Major Asian Powers to Play a Leading Role for Human Rights 
There has been no initiator or leader to actively work for the establishment of RHRIs in 
the region. If there were a commitment by the influential countries, it will be a driving force to 
persuade other reluctant states to agree to RHRIs in the region. Indeed, the role of major Asian 
power countries is critical to further the establishment of a regional human rights system. But, as 
Onuma Yasuaki argues, India, China, and Japan, which are generally considered the major 
powers in Asia with their regional dominance, economic development and large populations, all 
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have failed to improve the human rights conditions in the Asia-Pacific region.79 On the contrary, 
these countries themselves have many human rights problems of their own.80 
The Chinese government, for instance, has always rejected the idea of the universality of 
human rights as a Western notion and, based on Confucianism, the traditional Chinese culture, 
has been skeptical of the concept of rights due to its legalistic nature.81 It is true that in 2003, 
China amended its constitution by adding the provision that "the state respects and safeguards 
human rights,"82 emphasizing the importance of human rights. Yet, considering that China has 
had and still has a large number of human rights problems especially against ethnic minorities 
and political offenders, the Chinese government’s gradual changes on human rights policy are 
mainly intended to defend their public policy and reduce criticism from the international 
community rather than to genuinely protect and promote human rights. Thus, it is hard to expect 
China to lead other Asian countries in the establishment of RHRIs which will be conceived as 
more harm than good for their domestic human rights situation. 
India, a liberal democratic country with a pluralistic party system and free elections, has a 
generally well-developed human rights protection system at the national level, especially 
regarding civil and political rights. It, however, has failed to guarantee effectively human rights 
to its underprivileged people, a large number of whom are illiterate and live in rural areas.83 As 
Onuma Yasuaki argues, “if one adopts a more comprehensive perspective that includes 
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81 Id., at 61. 
82 Chinese government, Report on Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 2003 (2004). 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content_17972.htm  
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economic, social and cultural rights, India’s overall domestic condition is even less favorable 
than that of China with regard to human rights.”84 In India, there is a huge gap between the elites 
and the other majority of the population in terms of income and education. Also, the broad 
diversity of religions, languages, and cultures has produced various human rights violations, such 
as caste discrimination, problems in Kashmir, human trafficking, religious violence, communal 
violence, and discriminations against minorities.85 Overall, India could not have played a leading 
role in the protection and promotion of human rights in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Finally, Japan, whose economic power has been as high as those of major Western 
countries, has shown little concern for the protection and promotion of human rights in the 
region.86 Not only has it failed to confront the problems of human rights violations during WWII, 
but, with the belief of most Japanese government officials that Japan should not play a leading 
political role either regionally or internationally in the postwar period, it has focused its efforts 
on economic development.87 Moreover, the Japanese government has been criticized for its own 
human rights policy, especially the discrimination against minorities like the Korean residents 
(Zainichi), the Buraku and the Ainu people. 88  Ostensibly, since adopting its 1991 Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) program, the Japanese government has gradually been making 
an effort to protect basic human rights and freedoms in recipient countries as the ODA Charter 
stipulates:  
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Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a 
market-oriented economy and the situation regarding the securing of basic rights and 
freedoms in the recipient country.89 
But, in reality, it is hard to assert that “there has been sufficient consistency and 
transparency in the implementation of the ODA Charter.”90 In addition, though there is large 
number of domestic human rights NGOs in Japan, they are far less influential and effective in 
changing the Japanese government’s human rights policies compared to Western NGOs.91 For 
example, even though there have been decade-long deliberate efforts by NGOs, Japan has not 
established NHRIs yet.92  
Overall, all three countries have failed to play a leading role in the promotion and 
protection of human rights with the goal of establishing RHRIs in the region. What is even worse, 
they all have their own human rights problems. 
Furthermore, all those major Asian power countries have long been confronting 
unresolved border disputes. These have raised the regional tension and distrust among the 
neighboring countries in this region and are also considered an obstacle to the establishment of 
RHRIs. For example, there have been regional conflicts between China and Japan on the 
Senkaku Islands; China, India, and Pakistan in the Aksai Chin / Jammu and Kashmir / Azad 
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Kashmir region; China, Vietnam, and the Philippines on the Macclesfield Bank and Spratly 
Islands; India and Bangladesh in the Boraibari, Lathitila, and Daikhata-Dumabari regions; India 
and Sri Lanka on the Kachatheevu Island; Japan and Korea on the Dokdo island / Liancourt 
Rocks; and Japan and Russia on the South Kuril islands.93 
One more thing is worth mentioning in regard to the role of the major Asian powers. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Europe, the Americas, and Africa have had regional political 
and economic organizations like the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, 
and the African Union, which have served as the home of the regional system. They have 
established their regional human rights institutions based on these functional foundations 
developed over time. Asian states, on the other hand, do not even have such a region-wide 
political organization as yet, mainly because of past conflicts and the threat to major Asian 
powers’ interests. And finally, even in existing regional economic or security arrangements like 
APEC, human rights issues have not been a main agenda item but just one among hundreds of 
others. Here, it might be relevant to introduce what Ernst B. Hass calls the spill-over effect. It is a 
theory of neo-functionalism in international relations which focuses on how the process of 
regional integration in certain areas, mainly economic ones, expands and accelerates other areas 
of integration in the region.94 It parallels the way regionalism has effectively benefited inter-state 
trade through regional trade agreements like the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, at the sub-regional 
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level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently established its human rights 
body almost twenty years after the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a trade bloc agreement, 
was adopted in 1992,95 and this may be considered an example of such a progress. I am, however, 
skeptical to employ this concept to my dissertation since I agree with Amitav Acharya that, “the 
literature on regional integration is heavily Eurocentric with fewer examples of comparative 
studies that applied the different concepts of regional integration to the Third World.”96 In terms 
of economic integration, although there are several sub-regional political and economic 
institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, they have not achieved a level of integration equivalent to 
that in Europe with its “market centralization and generation of welfare,” which can have a spill-
over effect into other forms of regional cooperation, including human rights.97  In the same vein, 
Joseph S. Nye argues that such functionalist approaches are difficult to apply to other regions, 
especially where only a small number of elites have control over their governments, which is 
common in most Third World countries.98 Overall, it is notable that the Asia-Pacific region has 
not even achieved the political and economic integration of other regions and it may partially 
raise practical difficulties for the creation of RHRIs in the region. Even if there were such 
political and economic institutions in Asia, I am still doubtful that they would play a critical role 
in building regional cooperation on human rights, considering the level of economic and political 
development in most Asian countries and the highly politicized discussion on Asian values 
which has been going on for over two decades in this region. This is also the reason why I did 
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not include the spill-over effect as a reason that hampers the creation of RHRIs in the Asia-
Pacific region so far in a separate section, and will focus on NHRIs as a driving force for the 
establishment of RHRIs in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
3.2.4. The Lack of Commitment to Human Rights: Relatively Low Ratification Rate of Major U.N. 
Human Rights Treaties  
Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region still have not signed and ratified international 
human rights treaties. Many scholars and human rights professionals in NGOs argue that this is 
one of main obstacles for the establishment of regional human rights mechanisms in the Asia-
Pacific region.99  
In order to examine this problem thoroughly, I will review all Asian states’ current status 
of ratification of nine core international human rights treaties: the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),100 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),101 the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (OPT 1),102 the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (OPT 2),103 the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),104 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),105the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 106  the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),107 and the Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (MWC).108 
However, before reviewing the statistics on the Asian countries’ ratification rate of major 
international human rights norms let me briefly discuss the efficacy of international human rights 
treaties in terms of states’ compliance, a topic that has been vigorously debated in the recent 
scholarly output.  
In her 2002 article, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Oona Hathaway 
presents arguments against the effect of international human rights treaties.109 Based on her 
research covering the practices of 166 countries over a 40-year period in five areas of 
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international human rights laws, she concludes that the ratification of human rights treaties has 
little or no effect on each individual state’s human rights record: 
Although the ratings of human rights practices of countries that have ratified international 
human rights treaties are generally better than those of countries that have not, 
noncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common. More paradoxically, when I 
take into account the influence of a range of other factors that affect countries’ practices, I 
find that treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse human rights ratings 
than otherwise expected.110 
She also stresses that it is necessary to reassess the current U.N. human rights policy to 
pressure individual states into ratifying the major human rights treaties and to enhance the 
monitoring system of human rights treaties by strengthening each state’s self reporting process, 
best exemplified, I believe, by the Universal Periodic Review.111 
[B]ased on the present analysis, ratification of the treaties by individual countries appears 
more likely to offset pressure for change in human rights practices than to augment it. The 
solution to this dilemma is not the abandonment of human rights treaties, but a renewed 
effort to enhance the monitoring and enforcement of treaty obligations to reduce 
opportunities for countries to use ratification as a symbolic substitute for real improvements 
in their citizens’ lives.112 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks challenge Hathaway’s analysis by arguing that “the 
incorporation of human rights norms [into state practice] is a process… treaty law plays an 
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important role in this process… and Hathaway’s study does not provide a reason to reject these 
views.”113 
Similarly, in her 2009 book, Mobilizing for Human Rights, Beth Simmons argues that 
“international law, and specifically treaty ratification, has made a positive contribution to human 
rights practices around the world.” 114  Using both quantitative case studies and qualitative 
analyses of how treaties have influenced politics and practices in particular countries and how 
government commitments to treaties are translated into better human rights practices (with six 
major human rights treaties in the last fifty years), she stresses: 
 [E]ven the most politically sensitive human rights treaties have significant positive effects 
in those countries where political institutions have been unstable. Treaties alter politics 
through the channel of social mobilization, where domestic actors have the motive and the 
means to form and to demand their effective implementation. In stable autocracies, citizens 
have the motive to mobilize but not the means. In stable democracies, they have the means 
but generally lack the motive.115 
Though governments can ratify human rights treaties for both sincere and insincere 
strategic reasons,116 she demonstrates that the ratification of treaties can lead to better rights 
practices by focusing on rights stakeholders within ratifying countries rather than external 
pressure from the United Nations or international communities.  
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It should hardly be surprising that governments’ solemn commitments to respect rights have 
been taken seriously by individuals and groups who imagine a better life if these promises 
are in fact kept.117  
In the same vein, Eric Neumayer points out that the efficacy of ratification of human 
rights treaties depended on the strength of civil society groups and without them, “treaty 
ratification has no effect and is possibly even associated with more human rights violations.”118  
My interpretation of these discussions on the efficacy of international human rights 
treaties and states’ commitment is the following. The ratification of international human rights 
treaties shows the willingness of individual countries to comply with them. Surely the ratification 
itself cannot be directly linked to the enhancement of human rights in individual states. It, 
however, has been a driving force for all rights stakeholders including civil society to mobilize 
toward better human rights practices. With the ratification, they have a means and motives to 
demand changes on governments’ human rights policies for the effective implementation of 
international human rights norms, even when governments initially intended to ratify them with 
insincere motivation.  
To establish an effective regional human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region, it is 
necessary for most countries in the region to abide by major international human rights norms. 
And as discussed, their intention to comply with international human rights standards can be 
shown through their ratification of international human rights treaties. But looking through the 
ratification of major human rights treaties by Asian states reveals that there still is a consistent 
lack of political will to set up RHRIs in the region. 
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  ICESCR ICCPR OPT 1 OPT 2 CERD CEDAW CRC CAT MWC 
All State 
Parties 160 167 113 73 174 186 193 147 44 
Asia-Pacific 
region (40) 23 21 8 5 24 36 40 17 3 
In the last 
10 years 9 7 1 3 3 10 1 7 1 
Since 1993 9 8 1 3 4 19 21 9 3 
State with 
NHRIs (15) 12 12 7 5 13 14 14 13 3 
Table 3: Ratification Status of Major Human Rights Treaties 
This table indicates that except for the CRC and the CEDAW, most of the treaties are still 
not ratified in Asia. While it seems that there is an increasing recognition of the need to protect 
and promote women’s (CEDAW) and children’s (CRC) rights in the Asia-Pacific region, it is 
clear that there is still a lack of individual governments’ commitment to the promotion and 
protection of the fundamental human rights of their nationals.  
One positive aspect is that states with NHRIs119 have ratified most of the treaties. In 
addition, since the adoption of the 1993 Paris Principles, many countries in Asia have joined or 
ratified major human rights treaties with the establishment of NHRIs. This shows that there 
could be more ratification of treaties if the countries without NHRIs establish them.  
Another positive aspect is that there are increasing numbers of ratifications in the last 10 
years, especially regarding the most important human rights conventions, ICESCR and ICCPR. 
This demonstrates that there has been a growing consideration of human rights in the Asia-
Pacific region even after the 1998 Asian financial crisis when the Asian values debate erupted. 
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  ICESCR ICCPR OPT 1 OPT 2 CERD CEDAW CRC CAT MWC 
South and 
West Asia 
(8) 
7 6 3 1 7 8 8 6 1 
South-East 
Asia (11) 7 6 1 2 7 11 11 5 2 
East Asia (5) 5 4 2 0 4 5 5 4 0 
Pacific (16) 4 4 2 2 6 12 16 2 0 
Asia-Pacific 
region (40) 23 20 8 5 24 36 40 17 3 
Table 4: Ratification Status of Major Human Rights Treaties in the Asia-Pacific region 
This table breaks down the ratification rates by sub-region. Notice the extremely low 
level of ratification in the Pacific region.120 Another notable point is the ratification rate of the 
OPT2. It demonstrates that all East Asian countries oppose the abolition of the death penalty. 
The last notable point is that only three Asian countries have ratified the MWC.121 Considering 
that Asia has the biggest migrant sending and receiving countries, there should be an intensive 
effort to get Asian governments to ratify this convention. 
The ratification rates of major international human rights treaties by many countries in 
this region are still low compared to those in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. A recent overall 
ranking of states by the number of international treaties they have ratified, provided by a team of 
researchers from University College London, shows that countries in the Americas have the 
highest number of ratification rates, followed by European and African countries. The bottom 
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end of the ranking is made up predominantly of most states in the Asia-Pacific region.122 The 
ratification rates of the primary human rights documents in other regions is also high: in Africa, 
all 53 member states of the African Union have ratified the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights; in the Americas, 24 out of 35 member states of the Organization of American 
States have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (though the U.S., Canada and 
Cuba have not ratified any of the human rights treaties of the Inter-American system); in Europe, 
all 47 member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 123  
Overall, such an evidence of the lack of commitment to human rights by most countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region shows that this is one of main obstacles for the creation of RHRIs in 
the region. 
 
3.3. ASIAN VALUES: HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN ASIA  
3.3.1. The Asian Values Argument  
In Asia, the major obstacle for the establishment of RHRIs is the Asian values argument 
which stems from the different perception of human rights. 124 As Joseph Chan points out, most 
of the political vocabulary, constitutional and legal concepts and structures in Asian states were 
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inherited from the West, especially through the colonial period.125 Although they have accepted 
other Western institutions and standards in the economic sphere, most Asian countries, however, 
have been reluctant to adopt and implement international human rights norms.126 The debate on 
Asian values and the different concept on human rights in Asia has been going on for over a 
decade.127 It is generally considered that the idea of Asian values emerged in 1977, when a 
conference was held on “Asian values and modernization” led by Lee Kuan Yew.128 
For a long time, many Asian leaders argued that human rights is a Western concept and 
thus inapplicable to the Asian people. The Asian values argument that has justified authoritarian 
rule has also been strongly supported by many political leaders in Asia. 129  Asian values 
themselves are a vague concept which was actively discussed in the early 1990s.130 Though there 
is no single concept of Asian values, most of the claims include Confucian ideas such as loyalty 
towards family and state, and a sacrifice of individual rights for the nation’s development and 
security.131 For example, Xiaorong Li briefly summarizes the Asian values argument as follows:  
1) Rights are culturally specific.  
2) The community takes precedence over individuals.  
3) Social and economic rights take precedence over civil and political rights.  
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4) Rights are a matter of national sovereignty.132 
As Lee Kwan Yew argues, it is relatively true that traditional Asian values have played a 
crucial role in the economic success of this region over the last few decades.133 But based on 
Asian values, many governments like Singapore’s have maintained that most of the international 
human rights norms should be interpreted for best use by individual Asian countries.134 China, 
too, has contended that Asia should have a different standard of human rights. The Chinese 
government emphasized regional differences and asked the different human rights frameworks to 
allow for regional diversity arguing that individuals must put the rights of states before their 
own. 135  Some East and South-East Asian governments even saw “order and stability as 
preconditions for economic growth, and growth as the necessary foundation of any political 
order that claims to advance human dignity.”136 Overall, through the Asian value debate and a 
non-Western approach to human rights, many Asian governments have rejected the universal 
validity of international human rights norms.137  
However, as Amartya Sen points out, there is no general evidence to support the claims 
that there is a conflict between human rights, especially civil and political rights, and economic 
development.138 Rather, the success of the most East Asian countries’ economies is due to the 
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correct economic policies, which he calls “helpful policies,” including “openness to competition, 
the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and education, successful land reforms, 
and public provision of incentives for investment, exporting, and industrialization,” and not the 
result of a harsher political system that partially sacrifices the country’s basic human rights.139 
Contrary to what Asian values proponents maintain by linking economic development with 
lower recognition of political rights, many African countries with development-oriented 
dictatorships are still struggling with economic difficulties and hardships due to their political 
corruption, instability, and inappropriate intervention by outside actors including international 
financial institutions.140  
Further, as Sen argues, it is very doubtful that there are pre-existing human rights 
standards or values that all Asian states can accept.141 It is hard to define what Asian values are 
and where they come from because there are different value systems in Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Hinduism, and Islam which are all wide-spread in Asia.142 It is also notable that religious and 
cultural diversity in the Asia-Pacific region is not defined by national borders or sub-region. 
China, Indonesia, India, and Malaysia, for example, are all multi-religious, multi-cultural, and 
multi-national, even though they have a very strong voice in the Asian value debate.143 In 
addition, many ideas of Confucianism are harmonious with the concept of international human 
                                                          
139 Id. 
140 See Yemi Sinbajo and Oukonyisola Ajayi, Human Rights and Economic Development in Developing Countries, 
28 The International Lawyer 727 (1994).  
141 Amartya Sen, supra note 138. 
142 Id. 
143 Inoue Tatsuo, supra note 68, at 42-9. 
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rights norms which are arguably based upon Western principles and beliefs.144 That is, Confucius’ 
ideas are not necessarily anti-democratic because the basic tenet of Confucianism is benevolence. 
In fact, Confucius’ heritage has some positive elements consistent with human rights such as 
hard working ethics, emphasis on education, and respect for the elderly.145 On a different note, 
Jack Donnelly contends that it is not uncommon for many authoritarian governments to be 
reluctant to recognize individual human rights and to try and seek refuge in the self-defined 
notion of traditional culture.146 He also writes that: 
Arguments of cultural relativism are far too often made by (or on behalf of) economic and 
political elites that have long since left traditional culture behind. Even when this represents 
an admirable effort to retain or recapture cherished traditional values, it is at least ironic to 
see ‘Westernized’ elites warning against the values and practices they have adopted.147  
The rebuttals of Dae-Jung Kim148 and Aung San Suu Kyi149 against Lee Kuan Yew also 
successfully show that the Asian values argument could be a politically expedient excuse for an 
authoritarian regime. Overall, both the argument on the Asian values as a defense to human 
rights violations and the attempt to create the Asian way of human rights protection with the 
                                                          
144 See Henry Rosemont Jr., Human Rights: A Bill of Worries in CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 54, 55 
(Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming ed., 1998). 
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skepticism of the Western approach to human rights have impeded the development of regional 
human rights mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.150  
 
3.3.2. The Universality of Human Rights in Diverse Cultures  
Dae-Jung Kim, Abdullahi An-Na’im, and many other eminent scholars and activists have 
tried to conceptualize Asian human rights from their ancient forms based on Asian religions and 
other ancient teachings. They argue that the very existence of the traditional concept of human 
dignity rooted in Asian culture is evidence in support of the compatibility of human rights with 
the Asian context.151 Similarly, my broad position is that human rights ideas are heavily indebted 
to Western philosophers and the European cultural heritage, but that the Asian traditions of 
respecting human dignity have also contributed to the development of the human rights concept 
and its legalization in Asia.152  
As argued in the previous chapter, I am, however, skeptical about the question of the 
historical origins of human rights because the validity of the universality of human rights should 
come at the very least as a product of a process, from the fact that most countries in the world are 
now committed to international human rights law by ratifying major international human rights 
conventions and treaties. As Christina Cerna argues, such questions are, indeed, not relevant 
                                                          
150 Amartya Sen, Thinking about Human Rights and Asian Values, HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, 3 (March 1996) cited 
from Seong-Phil Hong, Problems and Prospect: Establishment of Regional Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-
Pacific Region, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  VOL.2., 343 (The Korean Society of International Human 
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151 See Kim Dae-Jung, supra note 148. 
152 See William Theodore de Bary, Constructive Engagement with Asian Values, Columbia East Asian Review (Fall, 
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anymore. 153  This is also related to the cross-cultural dialogue approach which attempts to 
incorporate and accommodate the diversity and particularities of norm development within the 
universality of human rights.154 Well-known cross-cultural approaches include Onuma Yasuaki’s 
proposal for an inter-civilization approach,155 Eva Brem’s framework of inclusive universality,156 
Joseph Chan’s thick and thin accounts of human rights,157 and Jack Donnelly’s weak relativism 
arguments.158 All of these scholars have tried to explain how the universality of human rights 
functions in the diversity of different cultures and regions. 
In the same vein, a number of recent studies have interestingly reported that in many 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, even those that support the Asian values argument, the 
provisions of international human rights law have increasingly been part of their constitutions 
and the “spaces” within national laws and jurisprudence are gradually widened and effectively 
employed for the appropriate application of international human rights standards. 159  After 
reviewing twenty-three Asian countries’ constitution, Baik Tae-Ung also points out that “a 
variety of human rights-related provisions are enumerated in each constitution … [and] … the 
constitutional rights are part of the important human rights norms in the Asian states,” though the 
degree of recognizing the provisions of international human rights standards and the pace of 
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incorporating those rights are all different in each constitution.160 Overall, it is time to focus on 
how to implement effectively international human rights norms in individual Asian-Pacific 
countries which all have different backgrounds and contexts, rather than remain stalled on the 
dichotomy of the universality of human rights vs. the Asian values argument. 
 
3.3.3. Asian Values, but for whom? 
Human rights are both a crucial concern for and a rising challenge to national identities. 
As discussed, Asian values are clearly expressive of a growing need to make one’s own culture 
more explicit in the face of rapidly modernizing and globalizing forces outside the control of 
national elites. In this sense, it is necessary to pay attention to the questions that Sharon Hom 
asks: who benefits from these assertions of difference, who asserts these differences, and on 
whose behalf.161 She argues that to ensure the clarity of the oppositional East-West, universalist-
relativist paradigms, voices of people inside are marginalized and eventually made invisible.162 
And as she concludes, “[h]uman right is too important an issue to be left to governments, at least 
exclusively.”163 Kofi Annan also stresses that, “[i]t was never the people who complained of the 
universality of human rights, nor did the people consider human rights as a Western or Northern 
imposition. It was often their leaders who did so.”164  
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For a long time, the competing frameworks of universalism and cultural relativism 
surrounding Asian values debates have essentially been based on the philosophical and 
epistemological understanding of the nature of human rights. The debates among the two schools 
are mostly focused on abstract concepts and there are few empirical studies of how human rights 
norms can be implemented for the people who are living in individual countries in this region 
and what their functions are.165 As Randall Peerenboom points out, “the second round of debates 
of Asian values” is shifting from abstract theoretical discussions toward more concrete situations 
and I believe that this is not for the interest of the state, but for the rights of the people inside.166 
Constitutional rights and other domesticated human rights norms in Asia are not a simple copy of 
international norms, nor are they a pure continuance of their domestic traditions any longer.167 
Foreign norms are introduced through the “filters” of domestic conditions, and they are 
combined with existing norms to produce a new fusion.168 Therefore, as Tae-Ung Baik suggests, 
this dynamic incorporation process of international human rights norms can be divided into two 
stages. The first stage in the development of human rights in Asia can be described as the 
introduction of Western oriented international norms and standards by the state elites as coercive 
transplanting by colonial powers.169 The next stage can be the internalization and localization 
with an interaction among all rights stakeholders, which may generate national struggles or 
conflicts. Such a process should reflect various aspects which are unique to the Asian human 
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rights context, such as cultural conditions, regional politics, and domestic interests. Therefore, to 
establish intermediate institutions like RHRIs is important in this filtering process. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, they can mediate between the regional culture and the internationally 
recognized standards on human rights, working with the individual governments, civil society, 
and international human rights institutions. However, this filtering process in Asia was 
conducted and manipulated for a long time solely by governments for the effective control over 
their people with the argument of Asian values. And as a result, they have rejected the idea of 
establishing RHRIs in the region. Further, the human rights related domestic policies produced 
without interaction with other rights stakeholders and at the sole discretion of governments have 
often raised internal conflicts and tensions in many Asian countries.170  
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
The main question in this chapter was why Asia has not established regional human 
rights institutions so far. And to answer this question, first, I reviewed all the major initiatives to 
establish RHRIs in this region, which were divided in three categories: the U.N. initiatives, the 
NGOs initiatives and the NHRIs initiatives. After examining these initiatives in chronological 
order, I concluded that though there have been dynamic discussions on various human rights 
issues in Asia, as well as efforts to identify the human rights areas of common concern in the 
region, all the major initiatives have failed to take a concrete and specific step toward 
establishing RHRIs in Asia in the last two decades.  Most governments in the region have 
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obviously shown that they still have no sufficient political will to enter into the establishment of 
RHRIs. There has also been relatively low governmental support for the initiatives by NGOs. 
The NHRIs initiatives have worked successfully both with the governments and NGOs, and 
showed some positive signs. But, they are limited to the regional cooperation among NHRIs.  
Through the analysis of all the major initiatives for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, I, 
then, provided five main reasons that have been the main obstacles for establishing a regional 
human rights system in Asia: 1) sovereignty, 2) the failures in the recognition of human rights 
after WWII, 3) the failure of major Asian powers to play a leading role in human rights in Asia, 
4) the relatively low ratification rate of major U.N. human rights treaties, and 5) the Asian values 
debates. As discussed, I believe that all those obstacles, including the Asian values discourse, 
that have hindered the establishment of RHRIs, have not come from a different understanding of 
fundamental human rights within the already existing international human rights legal system, 
but mainly from political considerations. The analysis of the obstacles led to my focus on 
national human rights institutions (NHRIs), another intermediary similar to RHRIs, only at the 
national level. NHRIs and their network through the APF, at least, have gradually changed each 
government’s human rights policy for better human rights practices, e.g. greater openness toward 
the ratification of major human rights treaties, and provided more appropriate spaces for the 
effective implementation of international human rights norms.  As an intermediate institution, 
they can also actively cooperate with all other rights stakeholders including civil society. 
Furthermore, the way which NHRIs have cooperated at the sub-regional level in the 
establishment of the ASEAN human rights body reveals that they can be eminent actors in 
surmounting the obstacles and ultimately in setting up RHRIs in this region. Therefore, they can 
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be a driving force in the establishment of a regional human rights body in this region. The 
following chapters will provide a further analysis of NHRIs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
Why can NHRIs be a driving force for establishing RHRIs in Asia? 
 
NHRIs can and are seen as both state and non-state actors. This has profound implications 
for how they participate in the U.N. Charter and treaty body mechanisms,1 … Yet, NHRIs 
have so far not made full use of … opportunities available to them. It is in the hands of 
NHRIs to determine their own future.2 
The National Human Rights Commission is the national institution whose role it is to 
constantly criticize the government’s wrongful acts and human rights violations. In its 
nature, it is inevitable for the Commission to have a conflict with the government. If there is 
no more tension between an NHRI and the government, such institution is not an NHRI 
anymore.3 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters, I stressed the necessity of establishing regional human 
rights bodies in the Asia-Pacific region and examined the main obstacles to setting up RHRIs in 
this region. There is a general agreement that it is desirable to have RHRIs in Asia, but all the 
major initiatives, both the top-down approaches by the U.N. and Asian governments and the 
bottom-up ones by NGOs, have not taken any specific steps toward establishing regional human 
rights bodies in the region. As I discussed, this reveals that each Asian government has no 
sufficient political will to build up RHRIs in the region yet. To change this attitude of 
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governments against RHRIs, it is necessary foremost to strengthen the domestic system for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. In this sense, it is not surprising that, after 1990, the 
U.N. Workshops changed their focus from regional arrangements to regional cooperation for 
human rights. The Asian governments’ efforts during the workshops, however, have remained a 
mere ritual only, with non-legally binding promises and ad-hoc discussions, but without any 
concrete actions. They have constantly objected to the establishment of RHRIs based on the step-
by-step approach with the excuse of sovereignty, regional diversity and culture, and the Asian 
way of human rights. Therefore, we need a new actor which can strengthen the human rights 
system at the national level, change a government’s human rights policies, and ultimately lead to 
the establishment of RHRIs in the region. It should be a channeling institution that can mediate 
between the national interest and international human rights norms, similarly to RHRIs that can 
work as intermediate institutions to reflect the regional specificity and meet international human 
rights standards. At the same time, this new actor should gradually raise public awareness of 
human rights through an active cooperation with human rights NGOs and civil society. I believe 
NHRIs can play such a role as a driving force for establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Thus, here and in the next chapter, I will examine why NHRIs can be an eminent actor 
for setting up RHRIs and how they can work together to achieve this goal. To answer these 
questions, I will first review what NHRIs are and examine how they have emerged in the 
development of international human rights law by discussing their role. In addition, by reviewing 
the National Human Rights Commission of Korea as a case study, I will show how NHRIs can 
work and interact with all other rights stakeholders and what issues they may encounter. The 
precondition for NHRIs to be a main actor toward RHRIs is that they should be well constituted 
and managed. Preconditions such as independence, effectiveness, and accountability have 
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already been discussed in a large number of articles by human rights scholars, lawyers and 
activists. Though they are not the main focus of my research, I will briefly review them here, as 
well. 
Later in this chapter, I will provide three reasons why NHRIs can be a driving force for 
the establishment of RHRIs in the region. First, NHRIs can bridge the gap between the 
international community, including the U.N., and the individual government in the Asia-Pacific 
region, on the understanding of international human rights norms. For over a decade, NHRIs 
have been strong critics of the idea of Asian values. Unlike other governmental institutions that 
have argued for the Asian way of human rights with the sole purpose of maintaining their power 
and undemocratic policies, NHRIs can redefine the universality of human rights from the 
perspective of the people. In other words, NHRIs are independent national agencies established 
to protect those who are most vulnerable to violations of their fundamental human rights and 
examine the cause of the problems in light of local culture and traditions. The second reason is 
the nature of NHRIs. They are mediators that can reflect both the national interest and public 
opinion. They exist as both state and non-state institutions; that is, they are governmental 
institutions but their dynamic interaction with civil society makes them work as non-
governmental organizations, too. This characteristic of NHRIs makes them a distinct national 
institution that can strengthen the domestic system for a better human rights practice, together 
with raising public awareness of human rights. The last reason is their cooperation through the 
APF. As discussed in Chapter Three, the networks of NHRIs have shown some positive signs. 
By sharing information, exchanging staff members and identifying human rights issues of 
common concern, they have enhanced the capacity of individual member NHRI for a better 
human rights practice at the national level, and have also encouraged the establishment of NHRIs 
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in Asian countries without them. Notably, their successful cooperation at the sub-regional level, 
for example the ASEAN human rights body, demonstrates why they can be eminent actors for 
setting up RHRIs in the end. 
Overall, I will conclude that NHRIs can be a driving force for the establishment of a 
regional human rights system. Unlike other initiatives toward RHRIs, their cooperation and 
networks will strengthen the human rights protection system at the national and regional level, 
and in the end, change each government’s skeptical attitude towards RHRIs. The next question 
of how NHRIs can work together to take specific steps toward establishing a regional human 
rights mechanism will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
4.2. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (NHRIS) 
4.2.1. Definition of NHRIs and their Role 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) have been defined as “a body which is 
established by a Government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which 
are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights.” 4 The past two 
decades have witnessed the creation of numerous NHRIs in the form of national human rights 
commissions, ombudsman offices, or hybrids of both.5 NHRIs have been established in Africa,6 
                                                          
4 United Nations Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment 
and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Professional Training 
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5 Id. 
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Africa, 39 Cornell Int’l L.J. 181 (2006); Rebecca Wright, Finding an impetus for institutional change at the African 
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Europe, 7  Latin America, 8  the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 9  and Asian 
countries.10 The contemporary development of the human rights discourse from U.N. initiatives11 
like the 1993 Paris Principles12 has been a driving force behind NHRIs. The Paris Principles are 
indeed, internationally recognized standards which were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 20, 1993. They list the roles and functions of NHRIs, and the 
requirements for their independence and broad mandate. 13  
Anna-Elina Pohjolainen relates the emergence of NHRIs to the development of 
international human rights law as “the outcome of a long process, which began over fifty years 
ago and which is closely intertwined with the gradual strengthening of the international human 
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(1999). 
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307 (2004); Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: A NEW 
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commission, 39 Stan. J. Int’l L. 59 (2003); Carole J. Petersen, The Paris Principles and Human Rights Institutions: 
Is Hong Kong slipping further away from the mark?, 33 Hong Kong L. J. 513 (2003); Vijayashri Sripati, India’s 
National Human Rights Commission: A shackled commission? 18 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1 (1997). 
11 Fact Sheet No.19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights at the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The General Assembly has issued G.A. Resolutions on NHRIs 
more than 5 times since 1993. See G.A. Res. 60/154 UN Doc. A/RES/60/154 (Feb. 25, 2006), G.A. Res. 54/176 UN 
Doc. A/RES/54/176 (Feb. 15, 2000), G.A. Res. 52/128 UN Doc. A/RES/52/128 (Feb. 26, 1998), G.A. Res. 50/176 
UN Doc. A/RES/50/176 (Feb. 27, 1996), G.A. Res. 48/134 UN Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993).  
12 U.N. G.A. Resolution 134, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th mtg., (1993) UN DOC. A/RES/48/134  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm  
13 See Id. 
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rights regime.”14 By dividing the evolution of NHRIs into three stages: introduction of the idea 
(1946-1978), “popularization” of the concept of NHRIs (1978-1990) and expansion of NHRIs 
(from 1990 onwards), she points out three important moments in the discussion of NHRIs at the 
U.N.15 The first one is the resolution of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1962,16 
adopted to introduce the idea of establishing national human rights bodies in the form of 
“national advisory committees or local human rights committees” to “study questions relating to 
human rights, examine the situation on the national level, offer advice to the Government, and 
help to create public opinion favoring respect for human rights.”17 At that time, however, most 
governments considered establishing such a national institution a domestic issue to be decided by 
individual governments, and their creation within the jurisdiction of each state rather than 
following a unified model.18 The second important moment was the 1978 Resolution of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights.19 Its objective was to provide a guideline for the structure and 
function of national institutions for the protection of human rights, and it is considered the first 
attempt to create a unified form of national human rights institutions.20 Based on this resolution, 
the first seminar on national institutions (NI) was held in Geneva in 1978 with 25 U.N. member 
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states to discuss the guidelines and share information of already existing NI, such as anti-
discrimination related commissions in most Commonwealth countries since the 1950s and 
ombudsman offices since the late 1970s.21 In the 1980s, however, with the reawakening of the 
Cold War, there were no more discussions on national human rights institutions at the U.N.22  
until the Paris Principles were adopted in 1993 at the U.N. General Assembly by the consensus 
of 171 member states. Finally, governments came to accept the idea of setting up national human 
rights institutions as an essential addition to domestic human rights systems, based on certain 
unified minimum standards and mandates in accordance with the Paris Principles.23  
At present, almost 118 countries have NHRIs or similar bodies. The U.N. suggests the 
major working areas of NHRIs should be “racism and discrimination, disability, rights of 
minorities, indigenous people, standards and principles that relate to anti-terrorism measures, 
conflict prevention, prevention of torture, migration, children, and economic, social and cultural 
rights.” 24  NHRIs have indeed been increasingly active in various fields. From the official 
investigation into the forced disappearances in Mexico 25  to the probe of key past trials in 
Northern Ireland26 and the securing of the rights of the Tsaatans, the smallest ethnic minority in 
Mongolia, 27  to the rescue project for child soldiers in Uganda,28  all NHRIs have played a 
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prominent role in the protection and promotion of human rights. Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco 
O. Ramirez describe the positive contribution of NHRIs in the following way: 
The formation of NHRIs comes closer to the nationalization of international human rights 
standards than the ratification of a human rights treaty or the increase in national 
membership in international human rights organizations. Though not organized at the level 
of national ministries, these NHRIs have the potential of becoming the sites or targets of 
human rights mobilization efforts. This potential stems not only form their mandate of 
receiving and investigating the allegations of human rights abuses, but also from their 
increasing connection with human rights NGOs.29 
NHRIs are, however, new actors in the U.N. structures and there are no U.N. bodies 
which fully guarantee the adoption of NHRIs under the U.N. framework.30 As Rachel Murray 
argues, “it is still very much open to debate what role NHRIs will play” in national, regional, and 
international human rights arenas.31  
Article 3 of the Paris Principles provides the functions and responsibility of NHRIs as a 
minimum guideline. 32  In general, these can be placed in five categories. The first one is 
                                                          
29 Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco O. Ramirez, National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide 
Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966-2004, 87 Social Forces Vol.3 1321, 1342, (Mar. 2009). 
30 RACHEL MURRAY, supra note 2, at 27-44. 
31 Id. at 44. 
32 See The Paris Principles, supra note 12. Annex (Competence and responsibilities) Article 3. 
3. A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities:  
(a) To submit to the Government, Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the 
request of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matter without higher referral, 
opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of 
human rights; the national institution may decide to publicize them; these opinions, recommendations, proposals 
and reports, as well as any prerogative of the national institution, shall relate to the following areas:    
 (i) Any legislative or administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial organizations, 
 intended to preserve and extend the protection of human rights; in that connection, the national 
 institution shall examine the legislation and administrative provisions in force, as well as bills and 
 proposals, and  shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate in order to ensure that these 
 provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights; it shall, if necessary, recommend the 
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investigation and remedy. Anyone whose human rights are violated (mostly by governments), 
can bring their case to an NHRI, which has the power to effectively investigate individual 
complaints concerning human rights violations, though its authority and the types of complaints 
it can investigate depend on the legislative mandate in each individual state.  
The second category is monitoring, research, and advice on compliance of individual 
governments and government agencies with international human rights norms to which the state 
is a party. As stipulated in Article 3 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Paris Principles, NHRIs can issue 
policy recommendations and advice to a government, Congress and/or court. Basically, NHRIs 
can engage, with other governmental agencies, on any human rights related legislation or 
proposed legislation, administrative practices, programs and policies within their jurisdiction, 
with necessary consultations, to enhance the compliance with the obligations of ratified 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and the adoption or amendment of 
 administrative measures;  
 (ii) Any situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up;  
 (iii) The preparation of reports on the national situation with regard to human rights in general, and on 
 more specific matters;  
 (iv) Drawing the attention of the Government to situations in any part of the country where human rights 
 are violated and making proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, where necessary, 
 expressing an opinion on the positions and reactions of the Government;  
(b ) To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the 
international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation;    
(c ) To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure 
their implementation;    
(d) To contribute to the reports which States are required to submit to United Nations bodies and committees, and 
to regional institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations and, where necessary, to express an opinion on the 
subject, with due respect for their independence;  
(e ) To cooperate with the United Nations and any other orgnization in the United Nations system, the regional 
institutions and the national institutions of other countries that are competent in the areas of the protection and 
promotion of human rights;  
(f ) To assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take 
part in their execution in schools, universities and professional circles;  
(g) To publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular racial 
discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through information and education and by making use of 
all press organs.  (emphasis added). 
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international human rights treaties and conventions. Some may argue that existing national 
institutions are enough to do the same work and there is no need to establish NHRIs. NHRIs are, 
however, not designed to compete with the executive, legislative or judiciary powers. Rather, 
they can work effectively solely focusing on human rights related issues without violating the 
independence of those national institutions, as will be shown in detail through the case study in 
Section 4.2.3.  
The third category is cooperation with the U.N. and other international human rights 
institutions and, at the same time, interaction with other national organizations, which is 
stipulated in Article 3 (e) of the Paris Principles. NHRIs can serve as an advisor to government 
delegations to the U.N. Human Rights Council and other international human rights treaty bodies. 
Such involvement makes their governments reveal evidence of human rights violations to 
international human rights institutions because a more transparent and truthful statement can be 
derived from the participation of the NHRIs in the preparation of an individual state report. Also, 
NHRIs can urge their governments to ratify international human rights treaties, while reflecting 
both the national specificity and public opinion.  
The forth category is human rights education and public awareness campaigns as stated 
in Article 3 (f) and (g) of the Paris Principles. NHRIs can provide human rights education 
programs both to formal educational institutions and the general public. Such work is important 
to raise public awareness of human rights because it is a long process to understand what human 
rights is, detect whether there is a human rights violation, and finally know where the remedy for 
violations can be sought, especially for people who have lived under authoritarian governments 
for a long time. NHRIs can also prepare and deliver educational materials and programs to the 
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police, prison officials, the military, the judiciary and other governmental agencies, which should 
be a main obligor of human rights standards.  
The last category is the cooperation with civil society. As the vast majority of human 
rights NGOs and other rights stakeholders in civil society are not directly affiliated with any 
national government, NHRIs can work with and through these NGOs by providing an official 
channel for meeting their needs. Especially in countries with a history of authoritarian rule, the 
transition to a more democratic society requires a broad degree of citizen participation in 
government policymaking, which can be accomplished if NHRIs effectively interact with civil 
society. 
All the functions and responsibilities of NHRIs discussed above show the important role, 
both at the international and national levels, which they can play for the protection and 
promotion of human rights.  
Regarding the role of NHRIs at the international level, they can assist the U.N.-based 
international human rights monitoring system by effectively implementing its goals in the human 
rights area, and at the same time, serving as local counterparts to international human rights 
institutions33 because they can be used as a mechanism for improving human rights enforcement. 
How can NHRIs then work to bring human rights to the mainstream, to protect human rights 
locally and to accept and enforce international human rights norms to individual states? If a state 
ratifies an international treaty, there is an obligation to implement the provisions of the treaty at 
the national level.  There is also an obligation to submit reports periodically to the treaty bodies 
on the ways the state has ensured the enjoyment of the rights provided for in the treaties. After 
                                                          
33 See NHRIs: A Handbook, supra note 4, at 4-6. 
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the submission and examination of the report by the treaty bodies, they present their concerns 
and specific recommendations to individual states that are expected to undertake the necessary 
measures to implement such recommendations. 34  NHRIs can intervene in this process by 
preparing and submitting their own report to the international treaty bodies and also by 
supporting and advising governments during the preparation of the national report. Such an 
intervention and monitoring can enhance the transparency and sincerity of the government report 
and, at the same time, reflect the concerns from local human rights NGOs. As a result, NHRIs 
can play an important role in ensuring that national legislation and related government policies 
are in harmony with international human rights standards.35  
Regarding the role of NHRIs at the national level, it is important to highlight the 
relationship between NHRIs and civil society including local human rights NGOs.36 NHRIs are 
established based on national legislation while such legitimacy is usually not given to human 
rights NGOs. The cooperation between NHRIs and NGOs can give human rights NGOs a public 
legitimacy which cannot otherwise be enjoyed. It can also make it difficult for the government to 
restrain the activities of human rights NGOs, especially in authoritarian countries, where many 
of the NGOs are constantly persecuted. In addition, as there are many different human rights 
NGOs which represent, for example, children, women, prisoners, workers, and migrants, the 
cooperation with various NGOs enables NHRIs to provide a wide spectrum of human rights 
problems to discuss, a process which will ensure an effective protection of fundamental human 
                                                          
34 See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1408-1416 (1999): 
States, NGOs and individuals all can play a role in enforcing international human rights norms. Id. 
35 See Paris Principles, supra note 12, Annex (Competence and responsibilities) Art.3(d), (e) and Annex (Methods of 
Operation) Art.(f), (g). 
36 Developing good relationships with NGOs can provide NHRIs with information on local issues relating to human 
rights, inquiries on their works and partnerships for joint activities. Id. 
 145 
 
rights. Overall, NHRIs can play an important role as an effective communication channel with 
civil society for human rights violations at the national level. 
My argument on NHRIs as a driving force for establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region is based on the assumption that they are well constituted and managed based on the Paris 
Principles. Thus, the question of how NHRIs can effectively work for the protection and 
promotion of human rights is certainly not the main concern of my study. But as this question 
also remains a precondition of my research, I will briefly review the most essential elements in 
determining the effectiveness of NHRIs, as discussed in the academic literature for over a decade 
now. Brian Burdekin provides five most critical factors in determining the effectiveness of an 
NHRI: 1) independence, 2) accessibility, 3) adequate resources, 4) the membership of the 
institution (i.e., appointment process for Commissioners), and 5) cooperation with NGOs.37 
Stephen Livingstone and Rachel Murray divide the major key points for NHRIs’ effectiveness 
into three categories: 1) capacity – independence, legal status, financial resources, 2) 
performance – a clear strategic plan, full powers, authority, and coherent management, and 3) 
legitimacy – the relationship with the government, accountability, interaction with civil society 
and NGOs, accessibility. 38  In its report, Amnesty International also suggests six 
recommendations to NHRIs for effective protection of human rights: 1) independence – founding 
legislation of NHRIs, 2) membership – qualities and representation of members of the NHRI, 3) 
mandate and powers – jurisdiction of NHRI, accountability, 4) innovation and inquiries – 
methodologies of investigation, scope of complaints and complainant, 5) publicity – relationship 
                                                          
37 Brian Burdekin, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, 43-62 (2007). 
38 Stephen Livingstone and Rachel Murray, The Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions in HUMAN 
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT, 137 (Simon 
Halliday and Patrick Schmidt ed., 2004). 
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with the media, and 6) accessibility.39 The U.N. Centre for Human Rights enumerates six main 
effectiveness factors including 1) independence, 2) defined jurisdiction and adequate power, 3) 
accessibility, 4) cooperation, 5) operational efficiency, and 6) accountability.40  
I will summarize the effectiveness factors for NHRIs into five elements. First, a NHRI 
should be established on a strong legal basis with clear mandates and adequate powers. 
Legislation itself may not guarantee the independence of NHRI, but it is the starting point toward 
its independence. Second, there should be transparent appointment procedures for the members 
of an NHRI like commissioners and a chairperson, “to ensure the pluralist representation of the 
social forces involved in the protection and promotion of human rights.”41 The reason for this is 
because professional human rights experts of diverse background will increase its capacity 
without interference from the outside. In addition, an NHRI should have independent power to 
appoint its own staff. Third, there should be independent financial resources for an NHRI which 
is not under direct government control. Fourth, an NHRI must be accessible, i.e., it should be 
ease to reach its office and to submit complaints. Lastly, NHRIs must cooperate with other 
governmental agencies and also work actively with civil society because such interactions can 
enhance their public legitimacy, and at the same time, ensure the reflecting of public concerns. In 
addition, there should be a close relationship with international and regional human rights bodies 
which can strengthen an NHRI’s capacity by setting up international human rights standards, 
sharing information and best practices, facilitating networking among NHRIs and other human 
                                                          
39 Amnesty International, National Human Rights Institutions: Amnesty International’s recommendations for 
effective protection and promotion of human rights (Oct. 2001) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/007/2001  
40 NHRIs: A Handbook, supra note 4, at para.63-138. 
41 The Paris Principles, supra note 12, Annex (Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism) Art.1 
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rights institutions, and granting its membership.42  
 
4.2.2. NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Currently, seventeen countries in the Asia-Pacific region have established NHRIs.43  
They are five countries from the South Asia region (Afghanistan, India, the Maldives, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka), five from the South-East Asia region (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Timor-Leste), two from the East Asia region (Mongolia and the Republic of Korea), two 
from the Pacific region (Australia and New Zealand) and three from the West Asia region 
(Jordan, Qatar, and Palestine).  
While only two out of the sixteen countries in the Pacific region have NHRIs, statistics 
show that more than half of the countries in the other sub-Asia regions: the South, South-East, 
and East Asia regions, have NHRIs (thirteen out of twenty-four) since the adoption of the 1993 
Paris Principles. Furthermore, fifteen countries that have NHRIs are in compliance with the Paris 
Principles. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have an observer status in the International Coordinating 
Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) and, 
in addition, Hong Kong, Iran, and Fiji have NHRIs, albeit not recognized for complying with the 
U.N. standards.44 Based on the report of the U.N. Secretary-General in 2010, the current status of 
national institutions accredited by ICC is the following.45 
                                                          
42 Sonia Cardenas, Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions, 9 Global 
Governance 23, 27-34, (2003). 
43  See also the Website of National Human Rights Institutions Forum.  http://www.nhri.net/nationaldatalist.asp  
44 Id. The International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (ICC) under the U.N. Human Rights Council determines the status of NHRIs. Observer status is given to 
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states which provided insufficient information to make a determination on compliance. See U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Information for National Human Rights Institutions, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/nhri.htm ; See also Brian Burdekin, supra note 37, at 98-101, 120. 
45 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Id. In accordance with the Paris Principles and the Statute of the International 
Coordinating Committee, the following classifications for accreditation are used by ICC:  
A: Compliance with the Paris Principles. 
B: Not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles. 
C: Non-compliance with the Paris Principles. 
National Institution Status APF membership Year established Year reviewed 
Afghanistan: Independent 
Human Rights Commission A Full member, 2005 2002 2007, 2008. 
Australia: Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission 
A Full member, 1996 (Founding member) 1986 1999, 2006. 
India: National Human Rights 
Commission of India A 
Full member, 1996 
(Founding member) 1993 1999, 2006. 
Indonesia: National Human 
Rights Commission of 
Indonesia 
A Full member, 1996 (Founding member) 
1993,  
re-established 
1999 
2000, 2007. 
Jordan: National Centre for 
Human Rights A Full member, 2007 2002 2006, 2007, 2010. 
Malaysia: Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM) 
A Full member, 2002 1999 2002, 2008, 2010 
Mongolia: National Human 
Rights Commission of 
Mongolia 
A Full member, 2001 2000 2002, 2003, 2008. 
Nepal: National Human 
Rights Commission of Nepal A Full member, 2000 2000 
2001, 2002,  
Special review 
started in 2006. 
2007, 2008.  
In Mar. 2010 
recommended to 
be accredited with 
B. 
New Zealand: New Zealand 
Human Rights Commission A 
Full member, 1996 
(Founding member) 1993 1999, 2006. 
Palestine: Palestinian 
Independent Commission for 
Citizen’s Rights 
A Full member, 2004 1993 2005, 2009. 
The Philippines: Philippines 
Commission on Human A 
Full member, 1996 
(Founding member) 1987 1999, 2007. 
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Table 5: Chart of the Status of National Institutions in the Asia-Pacific region 
(accredited by the ICC as of June 2010)46 
                                                          
46 See U.N., Report of the Secretary-General: The role of the Ombudsman, mediator and other national human 
rights institutions in the promotion and protection of human rights, (Sep.1, 2010) UN Doc. A/65/340 http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/501/78/PDF/N1050178.pdf?OpenElement; See also the Asia-Pacific Forum, 
Membership of the APF, http://www.nhri.net/NationalDataList.asp?MODE=1&ID=2; See also National Human 
Rights Institutions Forum, List of NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region 
http://www.nhri.net/NationalDataList.asp?MODE=1&ID=2 
Rights 
Qatar: National Committee 
for Human Rights A Full member, 2005 2002 
2008: deferral to 
March 2009. 
Reviewed in 2010 
(first session), 
March 2010: 
deferral to October 
2010. 
 
Timor-Leste: Provedor for 
Human Rights and Justice A Full member, 2007 2004 2008. 
Republic of Korea: National 
Human Rights Commission 
of the Republic of Korea 
A Full member, 2001 2001 2004, 2008. 
Thailand: National Human 
Rights Commission A Full member, 2002 2001 2004, 2008. 
Maldives: Human Rights 
Commission B 
Associate member, 
2007 2003 2008, 2010. 
Sri Lanka: Human Rights 
Commission of Sri Lanka B 
Associate member 
(Was a Full member 
until 2009) 
1997 
2000,  
A status placed 
under review 
2007. 
Reviewed in 2009. 
Hong Kong, China: Hong 
Kong Equal Opportunities 
Commission 
C  1996 2000 
Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Commission Islamique des 
droits de l’homme 
C   2000 
Fiji: Human Rights 
Commission of Fiji 
Suspen
-ded 
Note: Fiji resigned 
from ICC on 2 April 
2007 
Re-established 
2009 
2000 
Accreditation 
suspended in 
2007.  
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Some argue that NHRIs may just be political tools of oppressive and authoritarian 
governments for legitimizing human rights violations.47  Governments with little respect for 
human rights establish NHRIs to appear legitimately concerned with the protection of human 
rights and to lessen domestic and international pressure.48 Even the states which are overly 
concerned with their sovereignty may support the establishment of NHRIs with similar 
purposes.49 However, as shown in the table above, the International Coordinating Committee of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) under the Human 
Rights Council award an A status to NHRIs which meet the international standard at its annual 
meeting, to prevent such misuse and to establish proper NHRIs that are compliant with the Paris 
Principles.50 The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) also gives full 
membership only to an NHRI which complies with the Paris Principles.51  
The following tables show the legislative mandate and the interpretation of human-rights 
in the establishing legislation of nine NHRIs with an A status in the Asia-Pacific region: New 
Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
                                                          
47 See Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa (2001).  
48 With the finding that the number of countries with NHRIs has increased significantly between 1989 and 2000, 
Human Rights Watch further asserts that there are many NHRIs set up in Africa that ignore the human rights abuses 
in their respective states. Id. 
49 Cecilia E. Jimenez, The Proliferation of National Human Rights Institutions: For Other Ends? in HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS: LESSONS AND PROSPECTS 23 (Philippines Human Rights Information Centre, 1994) In this article, she 
also argues that “… human rights commissions have the potential to become merely cosmetic exercises aimed at 
boosting the government’s human rights image in the eyes of the global community.” Id. 
50 See UN Human Rights Council, Information for National Human Rights Institutions, supra note 44; See also 
Rachel Murray, supra note 2, 30-3. 
51 Art.11.1 of Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions Constitutions. 
11.1 Full members 
(a) Qualifications of full members 
Each full member must be a national human rights institution in the Asia Pacific region which in the opinion of the 
Forum councillors complies with the Paris Principles. 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/governance/downloads/constitution.pdf  
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Mongolia. All nine NHRIs were established based on national legislation or constitutions. In 
accordance with the Paris Principles, they also have the power to receive and investigate 
complaints on human rights violations and the power to advise, assist, and make 
recommendations to a government, Congress and/or court. In addition, the establishing 
legislations of nine NHRIs define human-rights as guaranteed under the Constitution, other 
domestic legislation, and/or ratified international human rights treaties. 
 
New 
Zealand 
The 
Philippines 
South 
Korea Thailand Australia India Indonesia Malaysia Mongolia 
Legal 
Mandate 
Human 
Rights Act 
(No 82), 
1993 
Executive 
Order No. 
163, 1987 
National 
Human 
Rights 
Commissi
on Act 
(No. 
6481), 
2001 
National 
Human 
Rights 
Commissi
on Act, 
B.E. 
2542, 
1999 
Human 
Rights and 
Equal 
Opportunity 
Commissio
n Act, 1986
The 
Protectio
n of 
Human 
Rights 
Act, 1993
Legislatio
n Number 
39 of 1999 
Concernin
g Human 
Rights 
Human 
Rights 
Commissi
on of 
Malaysia 
Act, 1999 
The 
National 
Human 
Rights 
Commission 
of Mongolia 
Act, 2000 
Established in 
the National 
Constitution  
Yes  Yes      
Power to 
receive and 
investigate 
complaints 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Power to 
make 
recommendati
ons to 
government 
and /or 
Parliament 
on laws, 
policies or 
international 
treaties 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Power to 
intervene or 
assist in court 
proceedings 
related to 
human rights 
(with 
permission of 
the court) 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Table 6: Legislative Mandates of Nine NHRIs with an A status in the Asia-Pacific Region52 
 
New 
Zealand 
Does not expressly define the term human rights, but the long title of the Act states that it is an “Act 
to consolidate and amend the Race Relations Act 1971 and the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
and to provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United 
Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights” (The title of the Human Rights Act (No. 82), 
1993). 
South 
Korea 
“[A]ny of human dignity, worth, liberties and rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution and 
Acts of the Republic of Korea or recognized by international human rights treaties entered into and 
ratified by the Republic of Korea and international customary law” (Article 2 of the National Human 
Rights Commission Act (No.6481), 2001). 
Mongolia 
Does not expressly define the term human rights, but states that “The Commission is an institution 
mandated with the promotion and protection of human rights and charged with monitoring over the 
implementation of the provisions on human rights and freedoms, provided in the Constitution of 
Mongolia, laws and international treaties of Mongolia” (Article 3.1. of the National Human Rights 
Commission of Mongolia Act, 2000). 
Thailand 
“Human dignity, right, liberty and equality of people which are guaranteed or protected under the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand or under Thai laws or under treaties which Thailand has 
obligations to comply with” (Section 3 of the National Human Rights Commission Act, B.E. 2542, 
1999). 
India 
“[T]he rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the 
Constitution or embodied in the international Covenants and enforceable by courts in India”
( Section 2 (d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993). 
* International Covenants means the ICCPR and ICESCR.  (Section 2 (f) of the Protection of Human 
Rights Act, 1993). 
Australia 
“[T]he rights and freedoms recognized in the Covenant, declared by the Declarations or recognized 
or declared by any relevant international instrument” (Part I, 3 of Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission Act, 1986). 
Indonesia 
Does not expressly define the term human rights, but defines human rights violations: “Human rights 
violations mean all actions by individuals or groups of individuals, including the state apparatus, 
both intentional and unintentional, that unlawfully diminish, oppress, limit and/or revoke the human 
rights of an individual or group of individuals guaranteed by the provisions set forth in this Act, and 
who do not or may not obtain fair and total legal restitution under the prevailing legal mechanism”
(Article 1(6) of Legislation Number 39 of 1999 Concerning Human Rights). 
                                                          
52 See Brian Burdekin, supra note 37, at 27-42. 
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Malaysia 
“Fundamental liberties as enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution” (Section 2 of Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia Act, 1999) 
* Part II of the Constitution contains: the right to life and liberty of the person, freedom from slavery 
and forced labor, equality, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, assembly and association, 
freedom of religion, and  rights related to property and education. 
The 
Philippines 
Does not expressly define the term human rights, but limits the scope of the investigation powers of 
the Commission to complaints involving civil and political rights: “The Commission on Human 
Rights shall have the following powers and functions: Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any 
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights” (Section 3 of 
Executive Order No. 163, 1987). 
Table 7: Definitions of Human Rights in the Establishing Legislation of Nine NHRIs53 
(emphasis added). 
Most countries in Asia have experienced many similar circumstances such as monarchy, 
authoritarian governments, and economic difficulties. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
these experiences have for a long time made most countries’ legal and social climate hostile to 
the promotion of human rights ideas and their implementation. 54  However, after the 
establishment of the NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, they have played an important role in the 
protection and promotion of human rights even at the risk of their own existence because of the 
confrontational relationship with their governments,55 which will be discussed in the next section. 
Unlike Europe, the Americas, and Africa, Asia does not have any regional human rights 
conventions, commissions, and courts. Therefore, NHRIs can be the best tool to monitor, 
promote and protect human rights in Asia56 because, as Brian Burdekin argues, “[e]ffective 
implementation and monitoring of international human rights standards must primarily be 
                                                          
53 See Brian Burdekin, supra note 37, at 27-42. 
54 See Albert H.Y. Chen, Conclusion: comparative reflections on human rights in Asia in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA, 487-516 (RANDALL 
PEERENBOOM, et.el. ed., 2006) 
55 Park Kyeongseo, Evolution of the National Human Rights Institutions in Asia Pacific region during 10 years after 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, Final Proceeding at Asian Consultation on Vienna plus 10, at 2 (Dec. 
15-6, 2003). 
56 Id. at 4-11. 
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accomplished at the national level.”57 In that sense, the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Framework 
adopted at the U.N. Workshop in Tehran (1998) also stresses that to strengthen national human 
rights capacities is the strongest foundation of effective regional cooperation for the promotion 
and protection of human rights, and the key element for it is to create and support NHRIs in the 
region.58  
 
4.2.3. Case Study: NHRIs and the Experience of Korea 59 
a. Background:   
Korea is a good example of how an NHRI can be a prominent actor for the promotion 
and protection of human rights. It has experienced the drastic transformation of the ‘rule of 
law.’60 For a great deal of its history, the country had a monarchy, and democracy was far from 
                                                          
57 Id, at 5. 
58 Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific Region, 
Report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with Paragraph 27 of Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1997/45 Annex I (Mar. 12, 1998). UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/50; 
[C]ommitted to developing and strengthening national capacities, in accordance with national conditions, for the 
promotion and protection of human rights through regional cooperation and the sharing of experiences, the 
workshop hereby adopts a Framework for Regional Technical Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific to develop, inter alia: 
- National plans of action for the promotion and protection of human rights and the strengthening of national 
capacities;  
- Human rights education;  
- National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights; and  
- Strategies for the realization of the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights; Id. 
59 This case study was mainly conducted in the summer of 2009 during my work at the National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea as a research fellow. 
60 See ChoHyo-je, Human Rights in Korea at the Crossroads: A Critical Overview, Korea Journal, Vol.42, no.1., 
204 (Spring 2002); Hahm Chaihark, Human Rights in Korea in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA, 265 (RANDALL PEERENBOOM, et.al. ed., 2006) ; 
IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN, 68-98 (2002); Jinsok Jun, South Korea: 
Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control in COERCION AND GOVERNANCE: THE DECLINING POLITICAL ROLE OF 
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the Korean collective consciousness.61 During the colonization era, it was nearly impossible for 
Koreans to foster appropriate human rights.62 After it, the Korean War further damaged seriously 
the human rights consciousness in Korea: after all no one expected a poor, starving people to 
protect human rights. 63  Then, there was a military coup by General Jung-hee Park, an 
authoritarian and dictatorial leader. Military governments ruled the country for 30 years, and it 
was not until the end of the 1980s that democracy returned.64 However, due to the financial crisis 
in Asia towards the end of the 1990s, little progress was made in the field of human rights.65 In 
1998, Dae-Jung Kim who was persecuted under the former military regime, was elected 
President and now exemplifies the progression “from a victim of human rights violations to a 
human rights leader.”66 Following President Dae-Jung Kim’s election promises on human rights, 
representatives of the numerous human rights NGOs gathered and established the National NGO 
Coalition for the Establishment of an Independent National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRCK).67 There have been various public hearings to formulate a draft bill for the creation of 
NHRCK by the National NGO Coalition.68 In 2001, the National Human Rights Commission 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
THE MILITARY IN ASIA, 121 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001); SunHyuk Kim, South Korea: Confrontational Legacy 
and Democratic Contributions in CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING 
DEMOCRATIC SPACE, 138 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004). 
61 Ian Neary, Id, at 68-9. 
62 Hahm Chaihark, supra note 60, at 267. 
63 Ian Neary, supra note 60, at 71-2. 
64 Id., at 71-9. See also Byunghoon Oh, Civil Society and the National Human Rights Commission in Republic of 
Korea, 2-4, Santa Clara Summer Human Rights Program (Jun. 27, 2007). 
65 ChoHyo-je, supra note 60, at 214-5. 
66 HURIGHTS OSAKA, Not for the People! National NGO Coalition for the Establishment of an Independent 
NHRC, Asia-Pacific News No.18 (Dec. 1999). http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_18/no18_korea.htm  
67 Id. 
68 The first public hearing on the draft bill of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea was held in October 
1998 by the Ministry of Justice. Mr. Brian Burdekin, the Special Advisor of UNOHCHR on national institutions, 
also met the representatives of the Ministry of Justice and asked whether the draft bill would secure NHRCK’s 
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was finally established under the 2001 National Human Rights Commission Act. As an 
independent national institution with the sole purpose of promoting and protecting human rights, 
the National Human Rights Commission of Korea has had several remarkable achievements and 
contributions.  
b. The legislative process for the establishment of the NHRCK:   
Compared to the other legislative processes in Korea, the process to adopt the 2001 
National Human Rights Commission Act is recognized as a very unusual one because of an 
active participation by and debate between civil society, government officials, and politicians.69 
For example, there were many proposals from various actors which inevitably drew public 
attention, caused tensions between political parties and lastly, took three years until the 2001 
NHRCK Act was adopted.70 This was the first time in the legislative history of Korea that the 
civil society had been actively involved in the legislative process from the draft to the adoption.71 
The first draft bill by the Ministry of Justice to establish the NHRCK under its full jurisdiction 
was given up because of the severe resistance from the Korean civil society.72 It is also unusual 
that many other countries and international human rights organizations had shown their concerns 
and interest in the process.73  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
independence or not. The controversial issues in the first draft bill were: 1) subordination to the Ministry of Justice, 
2) enactment of a Presidential Decree, 3) limited jurisdiction for the investigation of human rights violations, 4) lack 
of power in the commission’s decision and recommendations. Id. 
69 See Woon-Jo, Baek, A STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS BEHIND THE LAW OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Doctoral Dissertation, Inha University (2002). [written in Korean] 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 259. 
72 Byunghoon Oh, supra note 64, at 5. 
73 Id. 
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It is my contention that, at the very least, the whole legislative process for the 
establishment of the NHRCK shows the possibility of social change in the human rights issue in 
Korea. Through their experiences in this active legislative process, the various actors like the 
civil movement activists, politicians, and government officials learned what the achievements 
and limits of the NHRCK in the future might be and also realized the necessity to consolidate in 
the NHRCKs for the efficient protection and promotion of human rights.  
c. Structure of the NHRCK: All-inclusive system:   
The NHRCK has jurisdiction over all types of human rights violations and 
discrimination.74 As Nohyun Kwak, former Secretary General, pointed out, the NHRCK is “an 
all-in-one human rights institution.”75 In 2009, there were 164 staff members in the following 
divisions:76 human rights policy, human rights education, and communication and cooperation 
under the Policy and Education Bureau; investigation coordination, civil rights, anti-
discrimination and disability rights under the Investigation Bureau. There are also three regional 
offices in Busan, Gwangju and Daegu. Because of insufficient staffing, the NHRCK cannot fully 
and efficiently investigate all human rights violations and discrimination cases: since its 
establishment, it has received over 30,000 complaints.77 Its all-inclusive system, however, is 
preferable for countries new to the protection of human rights because it can deliver and apply 
                                                          
74 See The 2001 National Human Rights Commission Act, Art. 2, 19 and 30. 
75 Nohyun Kwak, The Dilemma and Vision of an All-inOne NI: NHRC-Korea’s experience, 1-2, Conference Paper, 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea (Dec. 4, 2006). In countries like Canada, Australia and the U.K., the 
jurisdiction of NHRIs is rather limited as they already have specialized human rights protection systems such as the 
police and the military ombudsman, equal employment opportunity commissions, gender discrimination 
commissions, disability rights commissions, etc. Id. 
76 Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (hereafter The Annual Report). 
77 Id. 
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unified and coherent human rights policy to a wide variety of human rights violation cases. In 
addition, it is more economical than creating several new human rights bodies, especially for 
developing countries.78 
d. Interdependency of the NHRCK:   
As a national institution, it is hard for the NHRCK to directly reflect the opinions from 
the civil society in Korea in its policy-building and decision-making process. It is also difficult 
for it to naively follow the government’s human rights policy, given the fact that most human 
rights violations are still committed by various governmental institutions.79 Thus, the experience 
of the NHRCK since its establishment shows that it is very hard to set up the appropriate 
relationship with the civil society and the government: somehow a tension with both groups 
appears natural. Seonghoon Lee, former Director-General of the NHRCK, also emphasizes 
NHRI’s interdependence with the civil society and government institutions.80 As he puts it, the 
National Assembly, the mass media, the human rights NGOs, and the academia, for example, all 
have different interests and voices. Thus, in reality, what is important for the NHRCK is its 
interdependence with other human rights actors rather than its complete independence. 
Furthermore, the independence of the Commission itself does not mean isolation.81 I also believe 
that one of the important conditions for NHRCK’s effectiveness is not so much its neutrality 
                                                          
78 Nohyun Kwak, supra note 75, at 5. 
79 Byunghoon Oh, supra note 64, at 8. 
80 Interview with Seonghoon Lee, Director-General of NHRCK, conducted in Jun. 12, 2009. 
81 Id. 
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from both the civil society and the government institutions in Korea, but its impartiality to all 
related human rights actors.82 
The NHRCK is subject to another tension: that between the international human rights 
standard under the U.N. structure and Korea’s national interest and public opinion.83 Since its 
establishment, the NHRCK has raised its capacity to creatively interpret and apply international 
human rights conventions and treaties to meet the domestic situation. There have been severe 
criticisms both at the international and the national level, however.84 The NHRCK has dealt with 
many controversial issues, like human rights of migrant workers,85 and has developed an aptitude 
for applying international human rights standards and simultaneously responding to public 
opinion.86 
e. NHRCK’s main achievements:   
Since its establishment in 2001, the NHRCK has been a driving force in enhancing the 
human rights situation in Korea. Some of its most significant achievements are highlighted 
below. First, there have been more than 30,000 complaints submitted and investigated.87 The 
number of cases increased every year as the following table shows. 
                                                          
82 Id. See also Seonghonn Lee, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Commission’s Future, Window: 
Human Rights Policy Dialogue (NHRCK, Sept. 2008); Hyoje Cho, A LANDSCAPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (2008). 
[written in Korea] 
83 Interview with Byunghoon Oh, Senior Consultant on Foreigners, NHRCK, conducted in Jun. 3, 2009. 
84 Interview with Seonghoon Lee, supra note 82.  
85 The Annual Report, supra note 76.  
86 Interview with Seonghoon Lee, supra note 82. 
87 As of November 2008, the total number of complaint cases was 35,163: 27,993 on human rights (civil and 
political rights) violations (79.6%), 5,380 on discrimination (15.3%) and 1,790 on other issues (5.1%).  
See The Annual Report, supra note 76. 
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Year # of Complaint Counseling Guide/Civil Petition Total 
2008 6,309 16,302 30,043 52,654 
2007 6,274 13,387 20,780 40,441 
2006 4,187 10,737 19,558 34,482 
2005 5,617 9,136 18,684 33,437 
Total 35,163 63,889 121,971 221,023 
 Table 8: Complaints, Counseling, Guide and Civil Appeal Cases in the NHRCK by Year (Number of Cases)  88 
It is clear that the NHRCK has provided not only accurate information on legal and 
institutional solutions to victims of human rights violations, but has also actually assisted the 
victims to recover from their sufferings and to get effective remedies. Specifically, it has 
dramatically improved the prisoners’ and detainees’ human rights in detention and protective 
facilities by operating a special task force team to handle in-person complaints on-site.89  
Second, it has issued more than 170 recommendations and opinions since its 
establishment in 2001 to improve the human rights related legislation and government policies.90 
What is more, almost 85% of its recommendations have been accepted.91 For instance, the 
Commission opposed the enactment of the anti-terrorism legislation by the National Assembly.92 
To eliminate any forms of discrimination on the ground of gender, the Commission also 
submitted its opinion to the Constitutional Court to review the unconstitutionality of the 
traditional Family Registry System of Korea (Ho-Ju jedo) which has been debated in Korea for a 
                                                          
88 Id. 
89 See National Human Rights Commission of Korea, FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE, ACHIEVEMENT AND CHALLENGES 
85-144, (Feb. 2007). [written in Korea] 
90 The Annual Report, supra note 76. 
91 Id. 
92 Park Kyeongseo, Evolution of the National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific Region during 10 years 
after Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, 3, Final Proceeding at Asian Consultation on Vienna plus 10 (Dec. 
15-6, 2003). 
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long time.93 In 2006, the NHRCK presented the National Human Rights Commission’s Action 
Plan to Promote Human Rights (2006-2008) to provide founding guidelines to draft the National 
Human Rights Action Plan (NAP)94 and also to publicize in detail its obligation to promote 
human rights in Korea.95 Under its Action Plan, the Human Rights Education Act was enacted in 
2006 and the Anti-discrimination Act against Persons with Disability in 2007.96  
Other major recommendations and opinions by the NHRCK cover controversial issues 
like the death penalty, the amendment to the National Security Law, the inspection of elementary 
school students’ diaries, legislation on non-regular workers, the practice of restricting students’ 
hairstyles, the amendment to the National Education Information System (NEIS), the reservation 
and implementation of Article 21 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the 
legislation of the Anti-discrimination Act, the set-up of a national policy for the protection of 
refugees, the amendment to the AIDS Prevention Act, remedies for the Persons with Disabilities 
Act, the amendment to the Communications Confidentiality Protection Act, the rights of North 
Korean refugees, the amendment to the Migrant Workers Act, etc.97  
In addition, the NHRCK can issue its opinions to courts.98 Though not legally binding, 
they have played an important role and have influenced court decisions99 in public-policy-related 
                                                          
93 Id, at 4. 
94 NAP was finalized in May 2007 by the Ministry of Justice and is currently under implementation.  
95 National Human Rights Commission of Korea, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 27-32. 
96 Id. 
97 See National Human Rights Commission of Korea, ANNUAL REPORTS 2002-2008. 
98 See Art. 28 (Presentation of Opinions to Courts and Constitutional Court) of the 2001 National Human Rights of 
Commission Act: 
(1) In case a trial, which significantly affects the protection and promotion of human rights, is pending, the 
Commission may, if requested by a court or the Constitutional Court or if deemed necessary by the 
Commission, present its opinion on de jure matters to the competent division of the court or the 
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cases in the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court such as the Family Registry System (Ho-
Ju jedo) mentioned above. Overall, at the very least, one thing is clear: legal frameworks and the 
judicial enforcement of Korea’s constitutional rights will contribute to the growth of 
international human rights, and NHRCK’s quasi-judicial nature becomes a part of such a 
contribution. 
Lastly, NHRCK’s most important achievement is the gradual change in the public 
awareness of the issue of human rights. 100  When there are human rights violations by the 
government, now, people have come to think of the Commission as the institution to solve their 
problem.101 While its recommendations and opinions against the government’s human rights 
policy do not have a legally binding power, in most cases they have been respected or, at least 
seriously considered by the government. The reason is not only the strong advocacy by the civil 
society, but also NHRCK’s publishing power to release them to the public through the mass 
media.102  Through its recommendations and opinions, even if they are not accepted by the 
government, people can understand why there is a human rights issue in a certain case and 
gradually recognize what the fundamental human rights are. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Constitutional Court. 
(2) In case a trial with respect to matters investigated or dealt with by the Commission under the provisions of 
Chapter is pending, it may, if requested by a court or the Constitutional Court or if deemed necessary by 
the Commission, present the opinions on de facto and de jure matters to the competent division of the court 
or the Constitutional Court. 
99 See Kwak No-hyun, National Human Rights Commission at Work: A Critical Reflection, Korea Journal, Vol.42, 
No.3, 194-218 (Autumn, 2002). 
100 Interview with Myung-Jai Lee, Director of the Communications and Cooperation Division, NHRCK, conducted 
in Jun. 10, 2009. 
101 Id. 
102 See Art. 25 (4) of the 2001 National Human Rights of Commission Act. 
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f. The NHRCK and International Cooperation:   
The NHRCK has been actively involved in the work of the International Coordinating 
Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (ICC), for example, as a vice Chair in 2007, 
through its participation in the ICC conferences, its assistance in establishing the role of the ICC 
in the Human Rights Council, its attendance to the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation to 
review the accreditation and re-accreditation of other NHRIs. With the firm belief that the Asia-
Pacific Forum of the National Human Rights Institutions (APF) can be an effective networking 
tool that promotes the domestic implementation of international human rights norms by each 
NHRI in Asia-Pacific region, the NHRCK has also eagerly cooperated with the APF. 
Furthermore, networking between NHRIs can give each NHRI a chance to share human 
rights information and practices in other countries. Thus, the NHRCK has regularly exchanged 
staff with other NHRIs to work and conduct research in best practices and has sought appropriate 
ways to apply them to Korea.103 It has invited government officials from other developing 
countries, for example, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, for a training program designed to 
provide an opportunity for the Commission to deliver its experiences and knowledge to NHRIs 
of developing countries or those considering the setting up of an NHRI.104 Such cooperation can 
bring in the grassroots experience of those fighting for human rights and also give other NHRIs 
the added advantage of learning from others’ practices, and thus strengthening the campaign. 
g. Conclusion:   
                                                          
103 Interview with Yunkul Jung, International Cooperation Officer, NHRCK, conducted on Jun. 17, 2009. 
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I believe that just as the civil society movement in 1987 became the tipping point in the 
democratization process in Korea, the establishment of the NHRCK in 2001 was the tipping 
point for human rights. While there are still problems in the Commission, it has gradually 
changed the government’s top-down approach toward human rights policy to a more horizontal 
and cooperative one.105 Overall, the Commission has become an active driver for the promotion 
and protection of human rights in Korea. 
h. Postscript: 
Since I finished my initial case study on NHRCK in 2009, there has been an increasing 
concern about the current Lee Myung-Bak administration’s move to downsize the National 
Human Rights Commission.106 The government reduced the Commission’s staff by 21%, most of 
whom were recruited from civil society and the academics. It is also planning to close three 
regional offices of the NHRCK which will critically limit the accessibility of complaint 
mechanisms. In 2009 before Mr. Kyung-Whan Ahn, the former chairperson of the NHRCK 
resigned, the Commission filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Korea against the 
government’s hostile actions. But the Constitutional Court dismissed the petition on October 28, 
2010 based on the findings that the NHRCK is not a constitutional body and therefore is not 
qualified to file such a petition to the Constitutional Court. It clearly confirmed that the 
Commission was only established based on weak legal grounds, and is regarded as a non-regular 
                                                          
105 Yi-Young Cho, Human Rights Commission’s Controversial Advice, The Dong-A Ilbo (Apr. 15, 2005).  
106 See Forum-Asia, South Korea Government Announces Personnel Reductions for NHRCK, Asian NI Watch, (Mar. 
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state institution that does not even have the power to make a constitutional lawsuit on 
competence dispute with other state agencies.107  
To make matters worse, after Mr. Byung-Chul, Hyun was appointed the new Chairperson 
of the NHRCK in July 2009, the NHRCK has increasingly been subordinated to the government.  
As a result, since then, the NHRCK has kept silent on sensitive human rights violations issues 
that are directly related to the current government. Many national and regional human rights 
organizations including 15 former NHRCK commissioners, 334 legal scholars and lawyers, and 
660 NGOs have expressed their concerns that the new Chairperson is not qualified to take the 
position, and have urged him to resign.108 No-Hyun Kwak describes this appointment as an 
illustration of the President’s clear intention to neglect human rights issues.109 In his Statement of 
Resignation, Nam-Young You, former Commissioner of the National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea, describes the crisis in the NHRCK thus: 
Generally, national human rights institutions are destined to form a relationship of tension 
with any Government for the protection of human rights and at the same time, to cooperate 
with the Government in order to promote human rights. As is clear from the South Korean 
state organs' surveillance activities and infringement on the freedom of expression, however, 
the NHRCK has failed to monitor the government in terms of freedom and human rights.110 
                                                          
107 The Constitutional Court of Korea, Summary of Decision on Case No. 2009HunRa9, (Oct. 28, 2010) 
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He also points out the major problems which have seriously challenged the independence 
of the NHRCK, related to the current Chairperson, Byun-Chul Hyun. These are, first, the fact 
that the Chairperson’s remarks in the National Assembly threatened the Commission's 
independence. He has also unjustly refused to reflect the other existing Commissioners' opinions 
in an official statement of the NHRCK in various human rights violation cases. To strengthen the 
chairperson’s authority, an amendment of the NHRCK's managerial regulations was proposed, 
which allows only the Chairperson to decide which agendas will be presented to the Standing 
Committee or the Plenary Committee of the NHRCK and when.111  
All those problems arose basically from the indifference of the current Lee Myung-Bak’s 
government to human rights. Some Commissioners, including the Chairperson were selected 
without having met the qualifications stipulated in Article 5 (2) of the NHRCK Act: 
"professional knowledge of and experience with human rights matters," basically ignoring the 
provisions of the Paris Principles which require an open and transparent appointment process. 
Overall, the government which has the power to appoint them has intentionally ignored all these 
standards.  
I, however, think it is still too early to evaluate the current crisis within the NHRCK. As 
discussed, there are concerns that all ongoing troubles in the Commission may be a set-back in 
the development of human rights in Korea so far. However, there are also increasing number of 
efforts by all rights stakeholders including civil society and NGOs to regain and ensure the 
Commission’s independence and effectiveness with more dynamic discussions on its credibility 
and legitimacy as a national institution. Such interactions may prove to have a significant effect 
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on raising the capacity of the Commission in the future for a better protection and promotion of 
human rights in Korea. Thus, I will leave the further study of the ongoing crisis in the NHRCK 
for the future. 
 
4.3. WHY NHRIS CAN BE A DRIVING FORCE FOR SETTING-UP RHRIS IN ASIA 
So far, I have examined what NHRIs are, how they have emerged with the development 
of an international human rights monitoring system, what their role, functions and 
responsibilities are, and how they interact with other national institutions, international human 
rights organizations, and civil society including human rights NGOs.  I also reviewed current 
existing NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region and provided a case study on the National Human 
Rights Commission of Korea to reveal essential characteristics of NHRIs. And, in this section, 
based on the discussions above, I will show why NHRIs can be eminent actors for establishing 
RHRIs in this region. 
 
4.3.1. Bridging the Gap: Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights 
As reviewed in Chapter Three, one of the major obstacles for RHRIs is the Asian values 
debate along with the traditional concept of sovereignty. As a first reason for the promise 
contained in NHRIs, I broadly maintain that they can bridge the gap between individual Asian 
governments and the international community on the understanding of fundamental human rights, 
sovereignty and Asian values.  
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Asian values have been advocated mostly by authoritarian governments and their leaders 
in the region as an excuse for their undemocratic policy.112 Most of these governments have 
proclaimed that in Asia, “it is impossible to have full enjoyment of civil and political rights 
without economic development.”113  As Kofi Annan stressed, however, most people do not 
categorize their human rights in terms of Asian vs. international ones114 or, into those that can be 
protected within the boundary of sovereignty and the others that cannot be protected even though 
they are within the framework of international human rights norms. From their personal 
experience, most people come to learn what is needed and should be protected for their living. 
The NHRI is established as an independent national agency with the goal of protecting those 
people who are most vulnerable to basic human rights violations under the international 
standards, at the same time, considering the cause of the problems in light of the local culture 
and tradition.115 Even if each NHRI does not have a domestic legislation to investigate specific 
human rights violations by its government, NHRIs still have a responsibility to monitor 
government compliance with international human rights treaty obligations based on Article 3 of 
the Paris Principles.116 The importance of NHRIs in advocating international human rights norms 
                                                          
112 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA, 140-1 (2004); 
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116 Brian Burdekin, supra note 37, at 24-5. 
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cannot be overstated at least considering such a public accountability. With the progress in 
democratization in Asia, NHRIs have indeed been strong critics of Asian values.117  
The international human rights system challenges state sovereignty in the sense that 
human rights treaties limit what a ratifying state party is permitted to do within its borders and 
sometimes empower other countries to intervene in a state’s internal affairs when there are gross 
human rights violations. Thus, NHRIs, one of whose main roles is to monitor a state’s 
compliance with international human rights norms at the national level, “moreover, inevitably 
challenge state sovereignty.”118 More effective NHRIs will then pose a greater challenge to state 
sovereignty. In the same vein, the Chief Commissioner of the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission states: 
[W]e profess to believe in free markets that have no boundaries, but we place boundaries on 
human rights in the name of sovereignty...... [T]he ignoring of child poverty, youth suicide, 
low participation in elections and democratic processes, and the failure to deliver equal 
social and economic rights is a blight on nations who profess to be leaders in human 
rights.119 
But, as discussed in the previous chapters, I believe that respect for state sovereignty 
should be realized by protecting the fundamental rights of a state’s nationals through the 
                                                          
117 See C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
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domestic legislation, 120  because as Jack Donnelly maintains, “dominant understanding of 
sovereignty (and human rights) has indeed been significantly reshaped…[and]… human rights, 
far from undermining or eroding sovereignty, are embedded within sovereignty.”121Describing 
the Cold War as an era of the internationalization of human rights norms and the post-Cold War 
period as their internalization, Sonia Cardenas also argues that: 
Neither human rights nor NHRIs displaces state sovereignty, or serves as an alternative 
focal point of authority. Rather, human rights and NHRIs constitute historically evolving 
and contested standards, infusing the state’s sovereign legitimacy and authority with new 
meaning in a post-Cold War world.122 
Indeed, state sovereignty should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a guarantee for, the 
realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals.123 Most implementation and 
enforcement of international human rights norms is still made at the national level.124 And, as 
national institutions, NHRIs have a major role to play in such responsibilities. As the following 
diagram demonstrates, in their work, NHRIs can mediate between national sovereignty and 
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428-9 (2000). 
121 Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE, Working Paper no.21 
(2004) cited in Sonia Cardenas, supra note 118, at 37. 
122 Sonia Cardenas, Id., at 27 and 38. 
123 See Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian 
Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1992); Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in 
International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
417 (1999); Jianming Shen, supra note 120, at 434. 
124 States, NGOs and individuals can all play a role in enforcing international human rights norms. See Harold 
Hongju Koh, supra note 34, at 1408-1416.  
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internationally recognized standards and principles of human rights as illustrated by the Paris 
Principles.125  
 
Figure 1. NHRI’s relationship diagram at the international level 
They can be set up to meet not only the national interest and regional priorities, but also 
the international human rights standard.126 Furthermore, in collaboration with its NHRI, each 
individual state can cooperate with other neighboring states in the region in order to carry out 
their obligations based on both state sovereignty and international human rights law.127 As a 
result, this process will gradually decrease individual states’ reluctance to ratify major 
                                                          
125 See NHRIs: a Handbook, supra note 4, at 4-6; See also the Paris Principles, supra note 12, Annex (Competence 
and responsibilities) Art.3(d), (e) and Annex (Methods of operation) Art.(f), (g). 
126They “act as a channel between action at the international level-through international treaty bodies, the special 
procedures, human rights resolutions and other mechanisms-and action at the national  level.” The Copenhagen 
Declaration from the Sixth International Conference of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (Copenhagen and Lund, 10-3 April, 2002), para 2a. cited in Rachel Murray, supra note 2, at 23.  
127 See, for example, Press Release, Questions of Sovereignty, the State System, the Future of the Organization 
Raised by General Debate Speakers, UN Doc. GA/9606 (Sept. 24, 1999) (including Singapore, Iraq, Dominican 
Republic, Kazakhstan, and Iran); Press Release, General Assembly Begins Discussion on Secretary-General's 
Annual Report on Work of Organization, UN Doc. GA/9627, (Oct. 6, 1999) (including Colombia, Kuwait, Mongolia, 
China, Bangladesh, India, Venezuela); Press Release, Importance of State Sovereignty, Need to Address Human 
Rights Violations, Council Reform, Discussed in Assembly, UN Doc. GA/9633 (Oct. 8, 1999) (including Cuba, 
Algeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, and the Sudan). 
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international human rights treaties and also change each government’s attitude against setting up 
RHRIs in the region.  
Overall, the gap between sovereignty and human rights can be filled by NHRIs, which 
can revitalize traditional cultures in individual states and the region by providing clues to 
developing proper human rights norms and political moralities, and ultimately defining Asian 
identities consolidating with international human rights standards.128 NHRIs also can fill the gap 
between individual Asian governments and international human rights institutions in their 
perspectives on the universality of human rights and Asian values, which have hindered the 
establishment of RHRIs for over two decades. As discussed, NHRIs can serve as an advisor to 
government delegations to the U.N. Human Rights Council and other international bodies on the 
major human rights conventions. 129  Such involvement may make their governments reveal 
domestic human-rights conditions and even evidence of human rights violations to international 
human rights bodies because a more transparent and truthful statement can be derived from the 
participation of the NHRIs in the preparation of an individual state’s national report. NHRIs also 
can encourage their government to participate in international and regional human rights 
arrangements. As NHRIs have a special status in the international human rights system, having 
both the characteristics of governmental institutions and agencies of international bodies,130 such 
a unique position can make their opinions more valuable and, as a result, they can enhance the 
implementation of an individual state’s human rights conditions, by both reflecting the 
international standards and the national interest.  
                                                          
128 See Orest Nowosad, National Institutions and the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE 
PROTECTION ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 179-92 (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2005) 
129 See Brian Burdekin, supra note 37, at 89-93; Rachel Murray, supra note 2, at 11-18. 
130 See Brian Buurdekin, Id.; Rachel Murray, Id, at 36-43. 
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There are concerns that some national human rights institutions, especially in developing 
countries, tend to be passive in monitoring the state’s power, and only focus on cultural activities 
or cases that are not against government policies. Then they simply remain as formal institutions 
which pretend that there are no human rights violations. The APF, however, requires its member 
NHRIs to comply both with the Paris Principles and with basic human rights norms.131 Such a 
monitoring system keeps NHRIs immune from corruption and makes it hard for them to 
intertwine with their governments behind the principle of sovereignty. 
 
4.3.2. The Nature of NHRIs: Existing as Mediators 
As illustrated in Chapter Three, the failure of all the initiatives to establish RHRIs in the 
Asia-Pacific region clearly shows there is a lack of individual Asian governments political will 
toward regional human rights arrangements. Below I focus on the second reason why NHRIs can 
be an eminent actor for establishing RHRIs in the region: their very nature as a channeling 
institution that can gradually change a government’s position on RHRIs through the dynamic 
interactions with all rights stakeholders in their country. 
With the increasing number of NHRIs, many human rights activists and scholars have 
focused on whether NHRIs are becoming prominent actors in the national, regional, and 
international human rights arenas, or whether they have any impact on the protection of human 
rights in individual countries.132 They suggest that the nature of NHRIs shows they can be 
                                                          
131 See Brian Buurdekin, Id., at 98-101. 
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prominent actors in the human rights protection mechanism. Rachel Murray describes the nature 
of NHRIs as follows:  
Requiring at the very least the commitment by the state to establish NHRIs in some official 
status, leaving aside whether the state then funds them or appoints their members, NHRIs 
are elevated into a position beyond an NGO. Yet, their effectiveness and their functions 
require them to operate separately from the government and not be subject to its influence 
or control and therefore not to be viewed simply as part of the state machinery. … Unlike 
NGOs, which fit more easily into the mould of a non-state actor, NHRIs can and are seen as 
both state and non-state actors. 133 
Indeed, the Paris Principles articulate this characteristic of NHRIs based on pluralist 
representation, in the sense that they should be composed of human rights experts and activists 
from different sectors of society.  
1. The composition of the national institution and the appointment of its members, whether 
by means of an election or otherwise, shall be established in accordance with a procedure 
which affords all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social 
forces (of civilian society) involved in the promotion and protection of human rights, 
particularly by powers which will enable effective cooperation to be established with, or 
through the presence of, representatives of: 
(a) Non-governmental organizations responsible for human rights and efforts to combat 
racial discrimination, trade unions, concerned social and professional organizations, for 
example, associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists; 
(b) Trends in philosophical or religious thought; 
(c) Universities and qualified experts; 
(d) Parliament;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2000); Linda C. Reif, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (2004); Brian Burdekin, Id., at 22-6; Reenu Paul, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
OF INDIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS EVALUATION, Dissertation  (The London School of Economics & Political Science, 
2003). 
133 Rachel Murray, supra note 2, at 89. 
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(e) Government departments (if these are included, their representatives should 
participate in the deliberations only in an advisory capacity). 134 
That is, in NHRIs, there should be an effective cooperation through the presence of other 
governmental institutions, Congress, academic, and civil society, including human rights NGOs 
as the following diagram describes.  
 
Figure 2. NHRI’s relationship diagram at the national level 
The pluralism of NHRIs can prevent them from becoming politically biased in their work. 
Such a pluralist representation can not only ensure independence from the government, but also 
ensure similar independence from any other interest groups within the society. 135  Morten 
Kjærum explains it as: 
The pluralist representation ensures input from different sectors in society and thus offers an 
opportunity for the institution to detect possible human rights violations as well as different 
perspectives offer an opportunity to broaden the inventiveness in responding to the 
                                                          
134 The Paris Principles, supra note 12, Article 1of Annex (Composition and guarantees of independence and 
pluralism). 
135 Morten Kjærum, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, 12 (the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, 2003). 
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violations. Furthermore, it provides channels for information and education to specific 
target groups.136 
This element of NHRIs is especially important for human rights NGOs, because as most 
of the NGOs should and are not directly related with any national government, NHRIs can 
cooperate with them. NHRIs’ providing an official channel between the government and NGOs 
will enhance NGOs’ capacity for the protection of human rights and also fulfill their needs.137 
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights describes the nature of NHRIs 
regarding this aspect as follows: 
[C]lose links with national institutions and NGOs, not only within that country but also 
internationally, is a very important aspect of the work of the national institutions because 
they can give support to the work of the NGOs and work in collaboration with them and 
NGOs can also strengthen work by national institutions and all this can be done in an 
atmosphere of dialogue and respect of competence of institutions and NGOs.138 
Overall, NHRIs can play a role as a formal institution to reflect and apply voices from 
below to change a government’s policies and practices for better human rights practices by 
“courting [all rights] stakeholders to take an increasingly active role in the creation and operation 
of NHRIs.”139 I believe that such changes will ultimately lead individual governments’ political 
positions to be converted not against but in favor of establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
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In addition, two other characteristics of NHRIs, as a promoter of human rights education 
and a quasi-judicial institution for the protection of human rights, can raise public awareness of 
human rights, which will finally mobilize civil society to pressure a government moving forward 
to establish RHRIs in the region. It is a long process to understand what human rights are, detect 
why there are human rights violations and finally be able to mount a sustainable campaign 
against these violations. As discussed in the previous section on the role of NHRIs, they can 
integrate human rights education into primary, secondary, and university curricula and into 
informal education, which will increase public understanding of human rights issues.140 Further, 
they can provide human rights education programs for government officials, judges, the police, 
and prison and detention facilities officers to deepen the human rights capacity among the 
administration and the judiciary.141 The quasi-judicial nature of NHRIs can also enhance the 
facilitation of human rights protection and promotion, because, for the public, they can provide 
quicker and cheaper redress for human rights violations through the adoption of easier to access, 
lower cost, and speedier resolutions compared to the traditional judicial system.142 In that sense, 
the Asian Human Rights NGO Charter also stresses the significance of NHRIs as stipulated in 
Article 15.4 (c):  
All states should establish Human Rights Commissions and specialized institutions for the 
protection of rights, particularly of vulnerable members of society. They can provide easy, 
friendly and inexpensive access to justice for victims of human rights violations. These 
bodies can supplement the role of the judiciary. They enjoy special advantages: they can 
help establish standards for the implementation of human rights norms; they can 
disseminate information about human rights; they can investigate allegations of violation of 
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rights; they can promote conciliation and mediation; and they can seek to enforce human 
rights through administrative or judicial means. They can act on their own initiative, as well 
on complaints from members of the public. 143 
 
4.3.3. Cooperation of NHRIs and the APF 
The third reason for NHRIs being an eminent actor toward establishing RHRIs in the 
region is the way in which they work and cooperate within the framework of the APF. So far, the 
networks of NHRIs in this region have elected to focus on cooperation among NHRIs to 
strengthen their role at the national level. Yet, they have a potential power at the regional level to 
take concrete steps to set up regional human rights arrangements, too. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, NHRIs and their network through the APF have not only enhanced the capacity of 
individual NHRIs, but also shown some positive signs at least at the sub-regional level to 
establish human rights bodies with their active cooperation.  As Vitit Muntarbhorn points out, 
“the APF and its network of national human rights institutions are the closest that the Asia-
Pacific region has come to a regional arrangement or machinery for the promotion and protection 
of human rights.”144 
Regarding the role of the networking among NHRIs at the national level, it has provided 
each individual NHRI a chance to share human rights information and practices with those in 
other countries. Such a forum can bring in the grassroots experiences of those fighting for human 
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rights and also give other NHRIs the added advantage of learning from others’ practices, and 
thus strengthen the campaign.  
Regarding the role of the networks of NHRIs at the regional and international level, its 
importance in the Asia-Pacific region was already emphasized at several U.N. Annual 
Workshops on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the 
Asia-Pacific Region as discussed in Chapter Three.145 Indeed, the APF was created as a regional 
network of NHRIs to enhance cooperation among NHRIs for the best human rights practices and 
address common issues of human rights which cannot be handled by a single NHRI. Since its 
first annual meeting in 1996, the role of the APF has been expanding and it has gradually 
become a more prominent actor in the development of regional human rights mechanisms in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The network of NHRIs under the APF has facilitated the implementation of 
international human rights standards, at the same time, considering national and regional 
specificity and culture, enhanced member states’ compliance with international norms, and 
deepened regional cooperation among states with NHRIs on common issues of human rights. In 
addition, the APF has brought together not only member NHRIs, but also all other stakeholders 
in the region, such as the U.N. agencies, government delegations, and international, regional and 
local human rights NGOs at its annual meeting. Thus, the APF annual meeting has been a place 
“to discuss and share expertise on the pressing human rights issues facing the region” through 
the dynamic cooperation among all stakeholders on human rights in the Asia-Pacific region.146 
Anne-Marie Slaughter emphasizes the role of transgovernmental networks as eminent 
actors in the promotion of global governance and a new world order in an era where more and 
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more global problems and pressing issues are emerging that no single government can address on 
its own. 147  In the area of human rights, the network of NHRIs within the APF has been 
“especially promising transgovernmental networks that have the potential to diffuse human 
rights norms and standards” in this region.148  
Overall, the APF can be an effective networking tool that promotes the domestic 
implementation of international human rights norms by each NHRI in the region. And ultimately, 
with the increasing number of NHRIs in the future, it will facilitate the establishment of regional 
human rights arrangements, as Andrea Durbach, Catherine Renshaw and Andrew Byrnes 
conclude: 
In continuing and perhaps expanding its role, the APF, through its various core activities, 
can cultivate an environment which may increasingly become more amenable to the creation 
of a strong regional human rights institution which does not retreat from the major 
international human rights treaties, offering citizens of the region a human rights body with 
a tongue and all of its teeth.149 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, I examined 1) what NHRIs are, 2) their role, responsibility, and functions 
at the national, regional and international level, and 3) NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region and 
their network in the APF. Then, I reviewed, as a case study, the National Human Rights 
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Commission of Korea to show the basic characteristics of NHRIs. Lastly, based upon my 
analysis on them, I provided three reasons why NHRIs can be a driving force for establishing 
RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region: 1) NHRIs as bridging the gap between sovereignty and human 
rights, 2) NHRIs as mediators, and 3) NHRIs’ networks. 
Noha Shawki categorizes the basic functions of NHRIs as regulative one and constitutive 
one: 
[R]egulative functions include promoting the ratification of international human rights 
treaties, legal assistance to victims of human rights violations, conducting investigations 
and inspections, and documenting the human rights record. In short, the focus of regulative 
functions is on protection from human rights violations. Constitutive functions, by contrast, 
are geared towards promoting a political culture that is favorable to upholding of human 
rights issues, to cooperate with and strengthen NGOs, and to conduct research at the 
national level. They also include efforts to network and cooperate with other NHRIs at the 
international level.150 
As discussed, I believe that these important functions of NHRIs make them a driving 
force for establishing RHRIs in this region, especially considering that they can make social 
changes through strengthening the domestic human rights system by bridging the gap between 
sovereignty and human rights, and also political changes through working together with all 
human rights related actors as intermediate institutions. Because NHRIs are national institutions 
established by the domestic legislation or the constitution, their work for promoting and 
protecting human rights is less likely to raise the issue of sovereignty compared to that of 
international actors. Along the same lines, NHRIs in the region can mitigate Asian states’ 
overwhelming concern with the universality of human rights related to Asian values, because 
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their voices for international human rights norms and against Asian values do not come from the 
outside, but from the inside of the Asia-Pacific region. NHRIs and their networks in this region 
are indeed in a good position to diffuse international human standards and increase the 
commitment of individual Asian countries to these standards. They can translate international 
principles into domestic policies and practices that are compatible with national and regional 
cultures and values, and, at the same time, reflect all rights stakeholders’ concerns of human 
rights issues both at the national and the regional level. Overall, if NHRIs are properly 
constituted and managed, they have a far-reaching potential to protect human rights in individual 
states in Asia. And their work will be a touchstone for Asian countries’ growing willingness to 
establish regional human rights arrangements. Furthermore, even if regional arrangements were 
established based on a state-central outlook, for example, lacking accountability, transparency 
and effectiveness, NHRIs will expose these institutional deficiencies.  
There may be a concern that it is too early to prove any systematic link between NHRIs 
and the establishment of regional arrangements. There are, however, some positive signs. First, 
the U.N. and the international community have supported and promoted the creation of NHRIs 
and their networks for a long time. As reviewed in the previous chapters, the U.N. Annual 
Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the 
Asia-Pacific Region has frequently recognized the development of NHRIs as an important factor 
in the growth of institutionalized regional cooperation in the field of human rights.151 Second, the 
increasing number of NHRIs in Asia has stimulated each government to make a commitment to 
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be bound by international human rights norms, and, as a result, the ratification rates of major 
international human rights treaties have increased in the region.152 Third, the active cooperation 
among NHRIs at the sub-regional level has led to the establishment of the ASEAN human rights 
body and also the ongoing movement toward sub-regional human rights arrangements in the 
South Asia and the Pacific region, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five. 
I conclude that NHRIs and their networks can be prominent actors in the establishment of 
a regional human rights protection mechanism in Asia. As the very nature, role and functions of 
NHRIs show, the way in which NHRIs work and cooperate at the national, regional, and 
international level has profound implications for the resolution of the problems that hinder 
regional human rights arrangements in this region. The next question then is: how can NHRIs 
work together to take specific steps toward establishing RHRIs in this region? It will be 
answered in the next chapter. 
                                                          
152 See Chapter Three, Section 3.2.4. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
How can NHRIs be a driving force for establishing RHRIs in Asia? 
 
The question of whether or not one is moving progressively towards an inter-governmental 
Asian human rights charter cannot be truly answered unless Asia responds to this challenge 
comprehensively and holistically… such regional or sub-regional developments will be 
legitimate only if they help to support or enrich, rather than undermine, international human 
rights standards and mechanisms.1 
Still today, the Asia Pacific region faces very particular challenges in terms of human rights, 
as well as in terms of the existing structures available to address human rights violations … 
Moreover, structures of support, either at the national or regional level are often absent in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The region … has no comprehensive human rights instrument and 
no human rights mechanism yet. Governments in the region are often reluctant to cooperate 
with the international human rights system … Therefore we strongly support national human 
rights institutions to play an effective role in developing and consolidating credible human 
rights systems in the region. … Once firmly in place, national human rights institutions 
should as much as possible seek to develop regional and sub-regional ties with sister 
institutions.2 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Four, I reviewed the reasons why NHRIs can be a driving force for 
establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. Their functions, responsibilities and the very 
nature of NHRIs show that they can overcome major difficulties that have prevented the creation 
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of regional human rights system in this region.  Then, in this chapter, I will suggest four specific 
ways in which NHRIs can work together for the establishment of RHRIs.  
The first one is to support setting up regional arrangements on human rights issues of 
common concern. If it is hard to build up regional human rights arrangements that govern all 
human rights areas at once, it would be a good idea to establish legally binding agreements on 
specific human rights issues, at first. Through the U.N. workshops and the APF annual meetings, 
there has been an effort to identify human rights issues of common concern, which should be 
handled together with neighboring countries. In order to propose the most viable solutions to 
identified regional human rights problems, NHRIs have cooperated together to research, share 
information and report those issues to their governments and international communities. Such a 
process will lead to the adoption of regional agreements on human rights issues of common 
concern, which meet international human rights standards and at the same time, reflect regional 
specificity and needs. I believe that the increasing number of such agreements will ultimately 
lead to the adoption of a regional human rights charter.   
The second suggestion is to establish sub-regional human rights bodies in advance. The 
APF and member NHRIs have already worked together and supported the setting up of sub-
regional human rights arrangements in the South-East Asia, South Asia, and Pacific regions. For 
this, they have cooperated with already existing sub-regional organizations like the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), even though these sub-regional bodies were 
originally established for political and economic cooperation. I maintain that sub-regional 
mechanisms will be a good starting point for establishing RHRIs in the region, because once sub-
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regional organizations are created, it would be much easier for them to build an institution from 
the sub-regional to the regional level. That is, they can facilitate the integration of several sub-
regions under the unified regional human rights mechanism.  
My third suggestion is to strengthen the role of the APF. As reviewed above, the APF has 
emerged as the most cohesive regional human rights body in the region so far. Since Asia has no 
RHRIs comparable to Europe, the Americas and Africa, NHRIs still represent the best tools to 
monitor, investigate and seek remedies for human rights violations in this region. Thus, it is 
difficult to overstate the important role of the APF, which is to enhance the functions of NHRIs 
to meet international standards and coordinate their operation to accord with the best human 
rights practices. In this section, I will present three ways to enhance the role of the APF. By 
strengthening its own mandate, the APF should raise member NHRIs’ operational powers and 
capacities based on the standards of the Paris Principles. Also, the APF annual meeting should 
not remain as a forum for NHRIs only, but be developed as a place that can bring all rights 
stakeholders in this region together to discuss human rights issues. Lastly, through the APF, 
NHRIs should urge their governments to adopt legally binding regional human rights 
arrangements. At the initial stage, NHRIs can draft human rights declarations on common issues 
during the APF annual meetings. Such statements can be developed, as a soft law, in the form of 
informal and non-legally binding agreements when representatives of individual NHRIs sign 
them. As NHRIs are national institutions, such agreements can finally be developed into formal 
and legally binding resolutions when ratified by high ranking officials from countries with 
member NHRIs.  
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The fourth suggestion is to start establishing RHRIs among the countries, which favour 
them in the first place. Realistically, the odds of Asia having a single unified human rights 
system that all Asian states across the region participate in are rather low. But, the APF and a 
network of NHRIs have shown that there are many human rights issues of common concern 
which cannot be handled by any individual state alone. So, it could be an alternative solution to 
establish RHRIs with small number of countries with NHRIs that understand the necessity to 
solve complicated human rights issues together. Once they are established, their practices will 
attract other countries in the region, because it is not at all impossible to encourage other states to 
accept the regional human rights system by increasing the benefits of membership. Thus, the 
founding countries can, in the long run, extend membership in these small but strong human 
rights bodies in the Asia-Pacific region to other neighbouring countries.   
The quest for establishing a regional human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region is a 
significant timely issue in progress. I believe that with the following four suggestions, NHRIs 
and their network in the APF can play a vital role as a breakthrough for moving forward to 
setting up RHRIs in this region.  
 
5.2. ENCOURAGING REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON COMMON ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
As reviewed in Chapter Three, at the participants in the U.N. workshops and the APF 
annual meetings have attempted to identify human rights areas of common concern, such as 
human trafficking, gender and racial discrimination, the prevention of torture, the fight against 
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corruption, climate change, the death penalty, the rule of law and terrorism, child pornography, 
HIV, the right to development, and the rights of women, people with disabilities, human rights 
defenders, and migrant workers. These issues have been actively discussed with the 
understanding that they cannot be solved by individual countries alone, and should be addressed 
through the cooperation among neighboring countries. Thus, even though it is hard to establish 
unified regional human rights arrangements, most Asian countries are willing to make regional 
arrangements on specific areas of human rights in their need to cooperate. Then, the increasing 
number of regional human rights arrangements on common issues will ultimately lead to 
integrated regional arrangements on human rights, because the growing cooperation among 
states will gradually lessen their reluctance to accept human rights arrangement in the region as a 
whole. 
For example, the Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ), established by the APF to provide 
jurisprudential guidance to the Forum and member NHRIs, 3  has published reports, issued 
recommendations, and introduced international principles on basic human rights issues of 
common concern. Based on the work of the ACJ and through the discussions at the annual 
meetings, the APF encourages member NHRIs to urge their governments to ratify related 
international human rights conventions, adopt regional declarations on human rights issues, and 
finally mount sustainable regional arrangements to bolster those rights.  
In this section, I will illustrate how the APF and NHRIs have worked together in eight 
selected areas of human rights of common concern, with the potential to take practical steps for 
                                                          
3 See the Advisory Council of Jurists of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/acj ; “ACJ reports present a thorough examination of each issue, as well as 
practical recommendations to assist APF members protect and promote human rights in their own countries and in 
partnership across the region.” Id.; See also Reference of the ACJ, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/acj/references  
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regional arrangements. These areas are human trafficking; women’s rights; the rights of people 
with disabilities; the rights of human rights defenders; the prevention of torture; the rights of 
internally displaced persons; the rights of migrants; and the environment. 
 
5.2.1. Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is a widespread problem across national borders in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Every year, thousands of men, women and children in Asia are exploited, coerced and 
suffer under this “contemporary form of slavery.”4 The U.S. Department of State Report on 
Human Trafficking points out that the ratio of trafficking victims in the Asia-Pacific region is 3: 
1,000 inhabitants, significantly over the global average of 1.8:1,000 inhabitants.5  
Article 3 (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
defines trafficking as: 
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
                                                          
4 Kyung-Wha Kang, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement at a Special Human Rights 
Council Panel Discussion: Giving Voice to the Victims and Survivors of Human Trafficking (Jun.7, 2010) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/SurvivorstraffickingBreakingthesilence.aspx  
5 The U.S. Department of State, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, 7 (Jun. 2010) 
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/  cited in  Suraina Pasha, Regional Cooperation to Prevent Human 
Trafficking in Asia: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions, 2, The Asia-Pacific Forum (Seoul International 
Conference Against Trafficking in Migrant Women, Jun. 28, 2010). 
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prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.6 
The most commonly cited factors contributing to trafficking include poverty, gender 
discrimination in the family and the community, violence against women, lack of appropriate 
migration policies and restrictive immigration legislation, and internal conflict.7 Unsurprisingly, 
all those factors are not irrelevant in most countries in this region.  
For a long time, most Asian countries have focused on criminalizing traffickers rather 
than protecting victims. In her report, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Trafficking in Persons, however, claims that national and regional efforts against trafficking 
should be grounded in a human-rights based approach and should focus more on preventing 
victimization and assisting victims because “it is only by properly protecting and assisting 
victims that you can effectively prosecute traffickers.”8 She also maintains that “regional and 
sub-regional mechanisms play a key role in providing a response that is both multilateral and 
sufficiently close to countries’ realities and specificities within a certain region.”9 In that sense, 
NHRIs and their network can play a critical role. They can provide training programs, 
recommendations and guidelines to other key players including public officials such as police, 
prosecutors, the judiciary, the consulate staff and immigration officials. They also can share 
information with local NGOs, monitor relevant domestic laws, promote the adoption of anti-
                                                          
6 Art.3, para.(a ) of The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children supplementing the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, (2001), UN Doc. 
A/RES/55/25.  
7 Anne Gallagher, The Role of National Institutions in Advancing the Human Rights of Women: A Case Study on 
Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific Region, 3, The Fourth APF Annual Meeting, (The Philippines, 1999). 
8 See Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, The U.N. Human Rights Council, (May. 4, 2010), UN Doc. A/HRC/14/32.  
9 Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, supra note 8. 
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trafficking legislation, and investigate human rights issues linked to trafficking. 10  Indeed, 
member NHRIs in the region have actively addressed this issue and emphasized their regional 
cooperation against trafficking within the APF framework at the annual meetings: the Fourth 
(Manila, 1999),11 the Sixth (Colombo, 2001),12 the Seventh (New Delhi, 2002),13 the Ninth 
(Seoul, 2004)14 and the Fourteenth (Amman, 2009). At two regional conferences on trafficking 
in Australia (2005) and Korea (2010), member NHRIs discussed ways to contribute to the 
combat against trafficking both at the national and regional level. At these conferences and the 
annual meetings, the NHRIs not only adopted the regional report and recommendations on 
human trafficking, but also promoted the cooperation of member NHRIs at the bilateral and sub-
regional level.15 Along the same lines, , in 2002 the SAARC adopted a Regional Convention on 
Combating the Crime of Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution in South Asia. In 
2004, the ASEAN also adopted the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children with a Work Plan to Implement the Declaration for South-East 
Asia.16 
                                                          
10 Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, Tackling Trafficking: Progress Paper on the Role of NHRIs, 2-3, (Feb. 
2004).  
11 See Anne Gallagher, supra note 7. Participants discussed the role of NHRIs in addressing trafficking of women 
and children. Id. 
12 See The APF, Gender Issues for National Institutions: Trafficking, The Sixth APF Annual Meeting (Sep. 2001). 
Participants decided to hold a regional workshop on human trafficking and develop related practical projects. Id. 
13 See The APF, Summary of the Advisory Council of Jurists: Background Paper on Trafficking (Nov. 2002). 
Participants adopted the trafficking report and recommendations by the ACJ and agreed to strengthen regional 
cooperation on trafficking. Id.  
14 See Suraina Pasha, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
15 Id. 
16 Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
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Overall, the role of NHRIs and their cooperation are vital for the protection and 
promotion of the rights of victims of trafficking, because, as Suraina Pasha describes, “[b]y its 
very nature, trafficking is a cross-border problem which will require not only actions at the 
national level, but also cooperation at the regional and international levels.” 
 
5.2.2. Women’s Rights 
In the Asia-Pacific region, women have continuously suffered and been discriminated 
against in most societies and have especially been the main victim of domestic violence and 
trafficking. The APF recognizes “addressing the unequal status of women [as] one of the 
region’s most important human rights challenges… [and as] one of the primary responsibilities 
of national human rights institutions.”17 Similarly, the Committee of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) emphasizes the role of 
NHRIs in the effective implementation of the Convention at the national level by enhancing 
public awareness of women’s rights through education programs and through monitoring 
individual governments’ legislation and public policies in compliance with the standards of the 
Convention.18 The Committee, moreover, stresses its relationship with NHRIs as: 
National human rights institutions may also provide assistance to alleged victims of human 
rights violations under the Convention to submit individual communications to the 
Committee or, when the situation arises, provide reliable information in relation to the 
mandate of the Committee to conduct an inquiry…  National human rights institutions may 
                                                          
17 See The APF, Issues: Women’s Rights, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/issues/womens-rights  
18 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Statement by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women on its Relationship with National Human Rights Institutions, (Jan 14, 2008) UN 
Doc. CEDAW/C/2008/I/CRP.1 
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also physically attend and provide information orally in the meetings allocated to them in 
the pre-session working groups and sessions of the Committee.19 
The issue of women’s rights as a regional human rights issue has been actively discussed 
at the APF annual meetings in order to develop best practices. . At the Third Annual Meeting, 
member NHRIs suggested a range of activities to protect and promote the rights of women, for 
example, ensuring that their governments ratify the CEDAW and subsequent monitoring of 
compliance.20 At its Fourth Annual meeting, the APF elaborated further on how NHRIs can work 
individually and collectively to enhance the human rights of women by stressing the 
vulnerability of women in the wake of the Asian economic crisis and the women’s right to 
education at a level equal to that of men.21 Member NHRIs also agreed to hold a workshop on 
the advancement of women’s human rights in consultation with human rights NGOs in 2000,22 
and at the Fifth Annual Meeting, they discussed the recommendations of the workshop.23 Since 
then, the APF and member NHRIs have worked cooperatively to strengthen women’s rights both 
at the national and regional level, for example, improving women’s legal status and raising 
public awareness for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights in collaboration with 
human rights NGOs. At the same time, they have made an effort to increase their direct and 
independent participation in international human rights regimes “for a voice on women’s rights,” 
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 See The APF, Background Paper: The Role of National Institutions in Addressing Discrimination against Women, 
(Jakarta, 1998). 
21 See The APF, The Role of National Institutions in Advancing the Human Rights of Women (Manila, 1999). 
22 Id. 
23 See The APF, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Advancing the International Human Rights of 
Women (Rotorua, 2000). 
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such as, at the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Committee of CEDAW, and especially at the 
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).24 
 
5.2.3. Rights of People with Disabilities  
About ten percent of the world's population as a whole and around twenty percent of the 
world's poorest people live with some kind of disability, and are thus regarded as the most 
disadvantaged and vulnerable to human rights abuse.25 They are considered “the world's largest 
minority.” 26  For a long time, however, there were no comprehensive and legally binding 
international norms for the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. Most major U.N. 
human rights treaties indirectly relate to these rights except the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), which explicitly stipulates, in its Articles 2 and 23, the principle of non-
discrimination irrespective of disability and the rights of the disabled child.27 The U.N. adopted 
the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons in 1975 and the Standard Rules on 
Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities in 1993, but those international 
instruments are not legally binding. In 2000, international NGOs working for people with 
disabilities issued the Beijing Declaration on the Rights of People with Disabilities to call on the 
U.N. and governments to support and adopt an international convention to protect the rights of 
                                                          
24 See The APF, NHRIs to lobby for a voice on women’s rights, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/news/nhris-to-
lobby-for-a-voice-on-women2019s-rights.html  See also Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission of 
Australia, Report on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the United Nations Commission on the Status 
of Women (2008). 
25 U.N. Enable, Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=18  
26 Id. 
27 The APF, Report on the Proposed UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 2 (New Delhi, 2002). 
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people with disabilities.28 The following year, the U.N. established an Ad Hoc Committee “to 
consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral convention to promote and protect the rights 
and dignity of persons with disabilities, based on the holistic approach.”29 To keep up with such 
developments, the APF and member NHRIs have included disability issues as one of the main 
agenda items since the Seventh Annual Meeting in 2002, and in 2003, held the International 
Workshop on Promoting the Rights of People with Disabilities to develop a consensus position 
for the newly proposed U.N. Convention. They have also been actively involved at the Ad Hoc 
Committee in drafting the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 30  The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was adopted in 2006 and came 
into force in 2008 with 147 signatories and 98 state parties. The APF, especially, played a crucial 
role in including a specific Article on national implementation and monitoring in the Convention, 
which emphasizes the existence of NHRIs as “an acceptance … of the importance of national 
monitoring mechanisms as a part of the implementation of human rights obligations entered into 
by those States [with NHRIs].”31 Article 33 of the CRPD stipulates national implementation and 
monitoring as: 
1. States Parties, in accordance with their system of organization, shall designate one or 
more focal points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the 
present Convention, and shall give due consideration to the establishment or designation of 
a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in different sectors 
and at different levels.  
                                                          
28 Id. 
29 U.N. G.A. Resolution for Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, (Dec. 19, 2001), UN Doc. A/RES/56/168. 
30 See The APF, Issues: Disability, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/issues/disability  
31 The APF, Disability Issues Paper: NHRIs and National Implementation & Monitoring of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 3-4, (Sydney, 2007). 
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2. States Parties shall, in accordance with their legal and administrative systems, maintain, 
strengthen, designate or establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or 
more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor 
implementation of the present Convention. When designating or establishing such a 
mechanism, States Parties shall take into account the principles relating to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights.  
3. Civil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, 
shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring process.32 (emphasis added). 
As set out in this Article, though implementation is the responsibility of each government, 
the protection, promotion and monitoring functions should be undertaken within a framework of 
independent national institutions. The Article requires this national institution to promote the 
involvement and participation of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process. As the Paris 
Principles clearly mandate the guarantees for the independence and pluralism of NHRIs, the 
latter are ideally placed to perform this role.  
 
5.2.4. Rights of Human Rights Defenders 
The term human rights defenders describes any individuals or groups of people who 
promote and protect human rights.33 In the Asia-Pacific region, human rights defenders have 
continuously been “subjected to assassinations, disappearances, illegal arrest and detention, and 
torture,”34 even in democratic countries with the excuse of national security and public order.35 
                                                          
32 Art. 33 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (Dec. 13, 2006), UN Doc. A/61/611. 
33 UNOHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders: Who are Human Rights Defenders? 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/who.htm ; See also, The U.N., Human Rights Day 2010: What is a 
Human Rights Defender? http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/2010/about.shtml  
34 U.N. General Assembly, Annual Reports by the Special Rapporteur, 9, (Jul. 2002), UN Doc. A/57/182. 
35 See Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, Background Paper: Human Rights Defenders (Feb. 2004). 
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In 1999, the U.N. adopted the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (aka the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders).36 However, the 
Declaration is not a legally binding instrument and is not widely recognized in most Asian 
countries.37 There is not even a regional system to defend human rights defenders in this region 
yet. 
The issue of the rights of human rights defenders first appeared at the APF's Regional 
Workshop on National Institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations: Working in 
Partnership which was held in Kandy, Sri Lanka in 1999.38 The Workshop was designed to 
promote the development of partnerships between the APF, NHRIs and the regional human 
rights NGOs and recognized the protection of the rights of human rights defenders as one of the 
main areas that need an active cooperation with NGOs. The 2006 APF Annual Meeting included 
interactive discussions between member NHRIs and human rights NGOs on the rights of human 
rights defenders in order to explore strategies for the protection and promotion of the rights of 
defenders more effectively at the regional and national levels.39 At the Twelfth APF Annual 
Meeting in 2007, the participating twenty-five NGOs urged member NHRIs to take actions to 
improve their protection mechanisms for human rights defenders, noting that there was an 
                                                          
36 U.N. Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and 
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (Mar. 8, 1999), UN Doc. A/RES/53/144. 
37 See Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, supra note 35. 
38 See The APF, Thematic Regional Workshops: Cooperation between NGOs and NHRIs, 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/services/training/regional-workshops/non-government-organisations  
39 The APF, Concluding Statement of the 11th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions (Aug. 2006). 
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increase in attacks against human rights defenders in at least half of the APF member countries.40 
In parallel with this APF Annual Meeting, an International Human Rights Defenders Seminar 
was held to promote practical knowledge about international, regional and national mechanisms 
for the protection of human rights defenders in the Asia-Pacific region and to explore the role 
that NHRIs can play as protection mechanisms for human rights defenders.41 The following year, 
at the Thirteenth APF Annual Meeting, more than forty NGOs joined together to discuss the 
situation facing human rights defenders in the Asia-Pacific region by sharing specific 
information about member states. NGO representatives requested the APF to take practical steps 
to integrate the issue of human rights defenders into reference topics made to the ACJ as well as 
to cooperate with the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders for NHRIs effective 
engagement with her mandate.42 They also stressed the need to strengthen NHRIs’ capacity for 
providing immediate protection against human rights violations at the national level. Further, at 
the Fourteenth APF Annual Meeting, NGOs expressed their concerns and shared information 
about the precarious situation of human rights defenders in specific countries in the region, such 
as Iran, Fiji, Sri Lanka, the Palestine, Myanmar, Syria, Lebanon, Cambodia, Yemen, Tibet, and 
Malaysia. They requested the APF to cooperate with member NHRIs and international 
institutions and investigate and report incidents of human rights violations against human rights 
defenders, including those that had been killed, injured, imprisoned, or had disappeared. .43 In 
response, the APF organized human rights defenders training programs for member NHRIs at the 
                                                          
40 The APF, Concluding Statement of the 12th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions (Sep. 2007). 
41 Id. 
42 The APF, Report of the 13th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, 24 
(Jul. 2008). 
43 See The APF, NGO Statement of Human Rights Defenders at the 14th Annual Meeting (Aug. 2009). 
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sub-regional level, workshops for South East Asia NHRIs (2007), for West Asia NHRIs (2008), 
and for South Asia NHRIs (2009).44 
All those active discussions and cooperation under the APF show that it is necessary to 
promote cooperation and exchange of information between NHRIs and human rights NGOs on 
issues related to human rights defenders and that this is the key for improving the protection of 
defenders in this region. 
 
5.2.5. Prevention of Torture 
Torture is prohibited in a number of international human rights treaties including the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT),45 which contains a series of provisions on prevention measures. Except for Asia, other 
regional human rights arrangements, like the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
America Convention on Human Rights, and the Africa Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 
include specific provisions that prohibit torture. Currently, more than 140 nations are parties to 
CAT, which places an absolute prohibition on torture. Article 2 of CAT stipulates that “[n]o 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”46  
                                                          
44 See The APF, Training Program: Human Rights Defenders http://www.asiapacificforum.net/services/training/hr-
defenders  
45 U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,  
General Assembly Resolution 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). 
46 Id. 
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In reality, however, torture is widespread in many Asian countries, especially, in their 
detention facilities. Anti-terrorism related legislations and national security laws have also 
undermined the prohibition against torture in the region. In Asia, NHRIs and the APF have 
played an important role in opposing torture. In 2003, at the Eighth Annual Meeting, the APF 
and member NHRIs agreed to develop a reference on the prevention of torture during detention 
by the Advisory Council of Jurists. Two years later, at the Tenth Annual Meeting, based on the 
ACJ’s report and recommendations, they discussed the role of national human rights institutions 
in the prevention of torture as the major theme of the meeting.47  
The APF emphasized the role that NHRIs can play against torture in seven areas.48 First, 
NHRIs can promote the ratification of relevant international human rights treaties including the 
CAT and its Optional Protocol designed to establish an international inspection system for places 
of detention. By advocating the ratification and participating in such international instruments, 
NHRIs can contribute to the establishment of appropriate National Prevention Mechanisms 
(NPMs). Second, they can promote their government’s legislative implementation of 
international obligations in domestic law, such as adopting national legislations against torture. 
They can also promote reform of detention procedures. Third, they can investigate allegations of 
torture and conduct interviews with victims. All information gathered by NHRIs should be 
provided to the relevant government authorities. Fourth, they can be involved in developing 
training programs on torture prevention for public officials including armed forces personnel, the 
police, the military, senior public officials, the judiciary and legislators. Fifth, NHRIs can 
                                                          
47 See The APF, Report of the 10th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions 
(Aug. 2005). 
48 See The APF, PREVENTING TORTURE: AN OPERATIONAL GUIDE FOR NHRIS (May. 2010); See also The ACJ, Final 
Report: Reference on Torture (Dec. 2005). 
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cooperate with the international bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights Council, and the 
Committee against Torture, by providing independent and credible information on an individual 
state. Sixth, NHRIs can take an active role in monitoring detention facilities through regular 
visits. In order to facilitate this role, the ACJ stresses that NHRIs should have free access to all 
detention facilities and be able to interview detainees in private. Finally, NHRIs can promote 
public awareness of the prevention of torture with their public education campaigns. 
In addition, the APF has organized several regional workshops and developed practical 
training programs for the prevention of torture in collaboration with an international NGO, the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), to provide member NHRIs with the knowledge, 
skills and processes to effectively monitor places of detention, interview detainees and 
investigate allegations of torture.49  
 
5.2.6. Internally Displaced Persons 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are defined as: 
 [P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
State border.50  
                                                          
49 See The APF, Training Program: Prevention of Torture,  
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/services/training/prevention-of-torture  
50 Para.2 of Introduction of The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Feb. 11, 1998), UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
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Compared to the legal status of refugees who have crossed national borders to seek an 
asylum, IDPs have remained inside their countries even though they have fled their homes for 
similar reasons as refugees. This mere difference, however, bars IDPs from being protected 
under any international human rights treaties including the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.51  They remain under the legal protection of their own government, even 
though the government itself might be the cause of their flight. Recognizing this gap, the U.N. 
adopted the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1999, but, again, it is a non-legally 
binding instrument. 
There are more than 27 million IDPs around the world.  With more than 4.3 million IDPs, 
South and South-East Asia are the regions with the largest relative increase in the number of 
IDPs in recent years. 52  For example, the biggest new displacement in 2009 came in the 
Philippines, where an estimated 0.4 million people fled fighting between the government and 
Muslim armed groups in Mindanao.53  
The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum Asia), one of the major 
regional human rights NGOs in Asia, organized a Regional Conference on Internal Displacement 
in Asia, with the support from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). While a large number of human rights NGOs in the region took part in the 
conference, no delegations from the intergovernmental regional organizations, such as, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the South Asian Association for Regional 
                                                          
51 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (Jul. 28, 1951), the U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 189, at 137. 
52 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF 
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2009, 72-5 (2009); See also The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), Internally Displaced People Figures http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html 
53 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), id., at 83. 
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Cooperation (SAARC), participated. However, as Roberta Cohen points out, their absence was 
not unexpected because most Asian governments consider the issue of IDPs a purely domestic 
one, and at the same line, those intergovernmental regional organizations try to avoid taking 
positions on internal affairs of member states.54 During the conference, the participants agreed to 
set up a regional network of NGOs to work together for the rights of IDPs and stressed that the 
problems of IDPs should be included in the agendas of the ASEAN and SAARC.55 They also 
pointed out the potential role of NHRIs in preventing situations of forced displacement and 
promoting equitable return and reintegration.56  
The same year, the APF discussed for the first time the situation of internally displaced 
persons in the Asia-Pacific region at its Fifth Annual Meeting in Rotorua, New Zealand. At the 
Tenth APF Annual Meeting, IDPs were introduced as one of the main agenda items and the 
discussion was developed through the 2005 Regional Workshop on National Human Rights 
Institutions and Internally Displaced Persons, organized jointly by the APF and the Brookings 
Institution. The APF and the participants in the workshop emphasized that NHRIs should have 
“a comprehensive approach to the problem of internal displacement, that is one that extends to 
persons displaced by conflict, by natural disasters and by development projects,” because 
“[p]ersons forcibly uprooted, whatever the cause, must compel the attention of NHRIs, and this 
attention must encompass the full range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.”57  
                                                          
54 See Roberta Cohen, Addressing Internal Displacement in Asia: A Role for Regional Organizations in REFUGEE 
AND MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS RESEARCH UNIT (C. Abrar & M. Lama, eds., 2003) 
55 See Summary Report, Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in Asia, (Bangkok, Feb. 22-24, 2000). 
56 Id. 
57 Roberta Cohen, Concluding Statement at the APF Regional Workshop on NHRIs and Internally Displaced 
Persons, Sri Lanka (Oct. 28, 2005) http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2005/1028_nhris.aspx See also, The APF, 
 204 
 
The role of NHRIs in recognizing IDPs as a human rights issue within their mandate is 
important especially because the issue of IDPs is a serious human rights problem in Asia and 
IDPs are not often recognized as a category of persons requiring protection and assistance from 
governments. Therefore, for the protection of the human rights of IDPs, it is necessary to have an 
active cooperation among NHRIs at the regional level, as well as cooperation with local NGOs, 
which can be an essential source of information on IDPs. 
 
5.2.7. Migrants 
There are over 190 million migrants including migrant workers, permanent immigrants 
and others who live and work in a country other than their homeland. The figure represents three 
percent of the world’s population.58 The U.N. International Migration Report in 2006 shows that 
Asia is home to hosts more than 53 million of these global migrants.59  
Compared to the 1970s and 80s, when migration was mainly from Asia to North America, 
Australia, and the Middle East, since the 1990s, there has been a dramatic increasing in 
migration within Asia, mostly “from less-developed countries with massive labor surpluses to 
fast-growing newly industrializing countries.”60 Most Asian governments maintain temporary-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thematic Regional Workshops: Internally Displaced Persons 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/services/training/regional-workshops/idp  
58 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Keynote Speech: Strategies for Preventing Violations of the Human Rights of Migrant 
Workers, International Conference on Human Rights of Migrants and Multicultural Society (Seoul. Nov. 2008). 
59 U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration Report 2006: A global Assessment 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/report.htm  
60 Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller, Migration Information Source:  Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
Migration Policy Institute (MPI), (Jul. 2009). 
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labor-migration policies which strictly control the right of migration and forbid permanent 
settlement and family visits, thus denying basic human rights.61 Even in countries where migrant 
workers receive legal protection, their “marginalized status” makes them vulnerable to “to be 
abused by their employers, trafficked for sexual exploitation, and denied their wages for long 
periods.”62 In 1990, the U.N. adopted the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (entered into force in 2003: 
MWC)63 to foster respect for migrants’ human rights from a more comprehensive perspective. 
However, only three countries in the Asia-Pacific region have ratified the convention so far. 
Since the First APF Annual Meeting in 1996, the APF and member NHRIs have 
recognized the necessity for the effective protection of migrants’ rights. 64  Through the 
subsequent APF annual meetings, and specifically, the Third, Eleventh, and Thirteenth, the APF 
has discussed migrants’ rights and the role of NHRIs in encouraging their governments to 
address these issues more effectively, considering the relevance of the ILO and its conventions to 
their work, and setting up regional standards on the human rights of migrants.65 As a result, the 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) initiated the 2008 International 
Conference on the Human Rights of Migrants, where participants adopted the Seoul Guidelines 
on the Cooperation of NHRIs for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants in 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 Amnesty International, Report 2010: Asia and the Pacific http://thereport.amnesty.org/regions/asia-pacific  
63 U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, UN Doc. A/45/49 (1990).  
64 The APF, Concluding Statement of the First APF Annual Meeting (Australia, 1996). The decisions of this 
statement emphasize the cooperation and joint activity through “responding promptly and effectively to requests 
from other national institutions to investigate violations of the human rights of their nationals present in a country 
that has a national institution.” Id. 
65 Suraina Pasha, Presentation: Asia-Pacific Forum for National Human Rights Institutions (APF) Perspectives and 
Experiences, International Conference on Human Rights of Migrants and Multicultural Society (Seoul. Nov. 2008). 
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Asia (the Seoul Guidelines).66 They include  practical steps for NHRIs to take for the protection 
of migrants’ rights: urging their government to ratify the MWC, undertaking joint research 
projects among NHRIs on “causes, processes and consequences of migration” in Asia, 
developing remedies to address human rights violations especially against “undocumented and 
irregular migrants,” conducting human rights training programs for immigration officers, the 
police and other law enforcement agencies, and providing education program for migrants “at 
pre-departure in their country of origin and post-arrival in their country of destination.”67 Based 
on the Guidelines, the APF and member NHRIs also agreed to establish a Working Group on 
Migration with the APF and have worked to refine the terms of reference for this working group 
at the two most recent APF meetings. 
The protection and promotion of the rights of migrants in the Asia-Pacific region requires 
greater collaboration between source and destination countries at the regional level, both bi- and 
multi-laterally. At the same time, building capacity by adopting strategies and related legislation 
for the rights of migrants in the receiving countries and the countries of origin is needed at the 
national level, too. These should be in compliance with international norms like the ILO 
standards and should engage with the U.N. monitoring instruments such as the treaty body 
reporting process and the UPR. As the Soul Guidelines show, a network of NHRIs and the APF 
can and have played an important role for the protection and promotion of migrants’ human 
rights both at the regional and national level. Moreover, such an agreement among NHRIs can be 
                                                          
66 Seoul Guidelines on the Cooperation of NHRIs for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants in 
Asia, International Conference on Human Rights of Migrants and Multicultural Society: Dignity and Justice for All 
Migrants, Seoul, Korea (Nov. 12, 2008).  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Seoul-Guidelines.html  
67 Id. 
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a starting point for building legally binding regional arrangements on the rights of migrants in 
Asia in the future. 
 
5.2.8. The Environment 
Beginning with the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm 
Conference), the following establishment of the U.N. Environmental Program (UNEP), and the 
subsequent resolutions and declarations, including the 1989 Hague Declaration on the 
Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration, and the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration, 68  the 
international environmental law has significantly developed. 69  At the same time, the close 
relationship between environmental protection and the protection of human rights, mostly the 
economic, social and cultural rights, has been gradually recognized. In other words, a rights-
based approach has been affirmatively introduced in the international environment law to help 
most vulnerable populations speak out, take action and influence responses for their basic human 
rights, i.e., right to life, food, adequate housing, clean water, health, and even the right of self-
determination.70 At the regional level, there are a number of arrangements dealing with human 
rights in Europe, Africa,71 and the Americas.72 There are, however, no regional instruments 
applicable in the Asia-Pacific region that contain a human right to environment provision. 
                                                          
68 See The Advisory Council of Jurists, Background Paper: Human Rights and the Environment, The Asia-Pacific 
Forum (Sep. 2007). 
69 William Beardslee, International Law and the Environment: The Need for an Aggregate Organization, 5 J. Int’L 
L& Prac. 379, 380 (1996). 
70 See The APF, Issues: Environment, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/issues/environment  
71 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights stipulates environmental rights in its Article 24 as “All 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.” African Charter 
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At the Eleventh Annual Meeting in 2006, the APF and member NHRIs agreed to 
formulate an ACJ reference on the issue of human rights and the environment in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The following year, at the Twelfth Annual Meeting, the ACJ report highlighted human 
rights challenges in the region, especially due to pollution and climate change:  
Rising sea levels have the potential to displace up to three million people in the Asia Pacific, 
while polluted air and unsafe water currently contribute to almost a third of deaths and 
diseases in some developing countries [in the region].73 
The ACJ also emphasized the role NHRIs play in encouraging their governments to adopt 
specific rights to the environment in domestic legislation. While the environment is still not on 
the main agenda of human rights issues in this region, by pursuing the human rights dimensions 
of the environment, NHRIs can both protect the human rights of affected populations and ensure 
that their governments establish appropriate policies and legislation. 
 
5.2.9. Summary 
So far I have reviewed eight human rights issues of common concern in this region, 
which have a potential to be developed into a legally binding regional arrangement. In some 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1986). 
72 The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the Protocol of San Salvador) stipulates the right to environment in its Article 11 as “Everyone shall 
have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services… The States Parties shall 
promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment.” Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Protocol of San Salvador), 
OAS Treaty Series 69. 
73 See The APF, Annual Meetings: 12th Annual Meeting, Sydney, Australia, 2007 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/annual-meetings/12th-australia-2007  
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areas, NHRIs and the APF have already taken practical steps to encourage their governments to 
adopt regional instruments, but in most cases, they have only focused on strengthening their own 
capacity and cooperating with other NHRIs both at the national and regional level to protect and 
promote those human rights issues.  
The first step should be to recognize the problem and refine the related international 
human rights instruments. The next step is to research and share relevant information and 
experiences in active collaboration with local and regional human rights NGOs. Through such a 
report, then, NHRIs can discuss their role in the effective implementation of already existing 
international norms, as well as best practices at the national level. Recognizing that most issues 
cannot be solved by individual countries alone, NHRIs and the APF, as a final step, should 
actively advocate for their governments to cooperate with other governments in the region, or at 
least, at the sub- regional level, for the inclusion of those issues on the main agenda of the inter-
governmental organizations.   
I believe such an effort by NHRIs and the APF will result in the adoption of regional 
instruments leading to the establishment of integrated regional human rights arrangements in this 
region. 
 
5.3. ESTABLISHING RHRIS AT THE SUB-REGIONAL LEVEL 
My second suggestion for how NHRIs can be a driving force for the establishment of 
RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region is for them to work together for setting up initially of sub-
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regional human rights arrangements.74 Once there are sub-regional arrangements, I believe, they 
can build a human rights institution from the sub-regional to the regional level.  
Indeed, Asia may be too large to have a regional human rights institution.75 As Virginia 
Leary points out, an “approach which considers the whole of Asia as one region for the purpose 
of international human rights institutions is unrealistic.”76 Or, as Clarence Dias argues, it might 
be true that “there is no such thing as Asia but there are different sub-regions,”77 and each sub-
region has a common context in terms of history, religion, culture, or level of economic 
development.78 Therefore, as a starting point, the establishment of sub-regional human rights 
mechanisms is important for the protection of human rights in this region.79 In Asia as a whole, 
there is no all-encompassing regional political organization such as the European Union, the 
Organization of American States, or the Organization of African Unity. However, there are sub-
regional organizations: the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)80 in 
                                                          
74 Some scholars argue that the emergence of NHRIs throughout the Asia-Pacific region could eventually result in - 
what Rawls describes as an- “overlapping consensus” on human rights in the region, which will lead to the 
establishment of at least a sub-regional human rights mechanism. See Abul Hasnat Monjurul Kabir, Establishing 
National Human Rights Commissions in South Asia: A Critical Analysis of the Processes and the Prospects, 2 Asia. 
Pac. J.HR & L. 1, 52 (2001). See also Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, 124 
in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) 
75 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA, 134-5 (2004). 
76 Virginia Leary, The Asian Region and the International Human Rights Movement in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 16 (Virginia A. Leary and Claude E. Wlech eds., 1990). 
77 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 75, at 134-5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. See also Dinah L. Shelton, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1055-6 (2008).  
80 The SAARC is a political and economic organization established in 1985. Currently there are eight member states: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and nine observers: Australia, 
China, the E.U., the U.S., Iran, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar.  http://www.saarc-sec.org  
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South Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)81 in South-East Asia, and the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)82 in the Pacific region. In addition to the geographical proximity, 
their shared historical and cultural heritage, combined with increasing economic ties, has been 
intensifying the interdependence of the states through these sub-regional organizations.83  
In the sections below, I will review how each sub-regional organization has worked, in 
cooperation with NHRIs, for the establishment of a sub-regional human rights body, which can 
be the most positive and important development for a human rights protection mechanism in this 
region. 
 
5.3.1. The South-East Asia Region 
In 2009, with the long and active cooperation of the ASEAN member states, NHRIs and 
human rights NGOs, the ASEAN established a human rights body in South-East Asia: the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Its genesis began in 1993 
at the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, with its Joint Communiqué to 
“agree that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism 
                                                          
81 The ASEAN is a political and economic organization established in 1967. Currently there are ten member states: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 
addition, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was set up under the ASEAN in 2005. This is a forum held after the annual 
ASEAN summit. It includes 16 countries: the 10 ASEAN member states, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  http://www.aseansec.org  
82 The PIF is a political and economic organization established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. The name was 
changed to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. Currently, there are 16 member states: Australia, the Cook Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.  http://www.forumsec.org  
83 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 75, at 134-5. 
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on human rights”.84 Based on this statement, the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism (Working Group) was established in 1995 and was acknowledged by the Foreign 
Ministers in ASEAN at the Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, 1998.85 The 
Working Group is “a coalition of national working groups from ASEAN states composed of 
representatives of government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, the academy 
and NGOs,” and its aim is to recommend the structure, form and content of intergovernmental 
human rights commission for ASEAN.86 Specifically, it provided three options for the ASEAN 
human rights body: 1) a declaration of principles, 2) a commission with monitoring, promotional, 
and recommendatory functions, and. 3) a court with rendering binding decisions.87 Since 2001, a 
workshop on an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism has been held annually with representatives 
of the member states, NHRIs, and NGOs in this region.88 The ASEAN, however, has long faced 
disagreements on how to cooperate on human rights, because of its increased political diversity 
as four new countries joined: Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia 
(1999).89 In 2007, member states finally adopted the ASEAN Charter at the thirteenth ASEAN 
Summit,90 which contains a commitment to establish a regional human rights body as an organ of 
ASEAN under Article 14 of its Charter: 
                                                          
84 Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Para.18, Singapore (Jul. 23-4, 1993).  
85 Joint Communique of the Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Para.28, Manila, Philippines (Jul. 24-5, 1998).  
86 See Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism,  http://www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html  
87 Id. 
88 The workshop was held in Jakarta (2001), Manila (2002), Bnagkok (2003), Jakarta (2004), Kuala Lumpur (2006), 
Manila (2007), Singapore (2008) and Bangkok (2009). See website of Working Group for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/index.html  
89 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, 10 Facts about ASEAN Human Rights Cooperation, ASEAN 
http://www.aseansec.org/HLP-OtherDoc-1.pdf  
90 ASEAN finalises historic charter, BBC News (Nov. 19, 2007).  
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1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.  
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to 
be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.91 (emphasis added). 
In 2008, the Charter came into force with the full ratification by all ten ASEAN member 
states. A High Level Panel (HLP) was appointed to refine the term of references (ToR) for an 
ASEAN human rights body (AHRB).92 The HLP proposed the AHRB to be institutionalized as a 
commission and as a result, in 2009, during the ASEAN Summit, member states launched the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) by appointing their 
representatives to the Commission.  
It should be noted that NHRIs have been actively involved in the establishment of the 
human rights body in the South-East Asia region since 1993,93 when there were four ASEAN 
countries with NHRIs. 94  In 2007, they made an official commitment, the Declaration of 
Cooperation, to work together in the enforcement of the promotion and protection of human 
rights and the establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism through active work with 
their respective governments.95  The Declaration includes the role of NHRIs to advise their 
                                                          
91 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, THE ASEAN CHARTER, (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). 
http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf  
92 ASEAN Secretariat: ASEAN Charter Fully Ratified, The China View, (Oct. 21, 2008). 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/21/content_10229587.htm  
93 See Summary of Proceedings, First Workshop for an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Para.4, 12.l) 
vi), 13.iii), Jakarta, (Jul. 5-6, 2001). See also ASEAN National Working Groups, 
http://www.aseanhrmech.org/nwgs/index.html  
94 The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have NHRIs. They were established respectively in 1987, 
1993, 1998 and 1999.  
95 See Declaration of Cooperation for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in  South East Asia, (Jun. 26, 
2007) http://www.aseannhriforum.org/en/home/declarations.html  See also Position Paper of the National Human 
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governments on the steps that can be taken in establishing an ASEAN human rights 
mechanism.96 Based on it, those four NHRIs have held periodic meetings under the name of 
ASEAN NHRI Forum, to develop the concepts for sub-regional human rights mechanism under 
a project entitled Enhancing the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Development 
of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.97 The Working Group also emphasized the role of 
NHRIs in establishing an ASEAN human rights arrangement at its annual meetings98 by stating 
that the “Working Group believes that cooperation among NHRIs is a precursor to an 
intergovernmental human rights mechanism.”99 Indeed, from the draft of the ASEAN Charter to 
the mandate of AICHR, those four NHRIs have actively interacted with the HLP to convey their 
common position stipulated in the Charter and later in the term of references for an AHRB.100 
It is too early to evaluate the role of AICHR under the ASEAN for the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the South-East Asia region. There have been concerns from the 
civil society and human rights NGOs during the process of establishing this sub-regional human 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rights Institutions of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand on Human Rights Aspects of the ASEAN 
Charter, (Jun. 26, 2007).  
96 Id. 
97 See The ASEAN National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) Forum, http://www.aseannhriforum.org/en/about-
us.html ; See also Vitit Muntarbhorn, In Search of the Rights Track: Evolving a Regional Framework for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, UNOHCHR (2005). 
98 See i.e., Summary of Proceedings, Sixth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, 
Para.7, Manila, Philippines (Jul. 16-7, 2007).  
99 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, The promise of an ASEAN human rights mechanism, 
http://www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html  
100 For example, four NHRIs in ASEAN jointly wrote and finalized a draft ToR for an AHRB at the Technical 
Working Group (TWG) Meeting of ASEAN NHRI Forum in 2008 and 2009. The proposed ToR for an AHRB were 
submitted to the High Level Panel (HLP), in which they emphasizes that the AHRB should have a complementary 
role and work in partnership with existing NHRIs particularly in monitoring human rights situations and treaty 
compliance at the national level. See ASEAN NHRI Forum, Position Paper on Terms of Reference of the ASEAN 
Human Rights Body, http://www.aseannhriforum.org/en/home/joint-statements.html  
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rights body on two points: Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter and the functions and mandate of 
the AICHR.  
First, the ASEAN Charter does not stipulate the details of the human rights body such as 
its functions, mandate, or authority. However, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to 
the Secretary-General of ASEAN, disappointingly defends that position:  
AHRB is never intended to be any independent watchdog … [it] shall operate through 
consultation and consensus, with firm respect for sovereign equality of all Member states… 
no biting is ever required. ASEAN would not have come this far if its Member states want to 
bite one another with sharp teeth just to get things done their own way.101 
In that sense, many human rights NGOs have criticized Article 14 of the Charter as “the 
legitimization of the continuous use of ASEAN’s existing values, norms, and principles, 
including non-intervention, Asian values, and others, in the ASEAN Charter.”102 Furthermore, in 
spite of the adoption of the Charter, the creditability of the ASEAN on human rights issues has 
been criticized in connection to constant human rights violations in one of its members, 
Myanmar.103  
Second, the term of reference of the AICHR stipulates its functions and mandate as: to 
develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, enhance public awareness of human rights, 
promote capacity building to government agencies and ASEAN bodies, encourage member states 
to ratify international human rights instruments, obtain information from member states on the 
                                                          
101 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, supra note 89, at 4. 
102 Alexander C. Chandra and Rafendi Djamin, ASEAN ‘People’s Charter’ to Advance Civil Society, The Jakarta 
Post (Nov. 19, 2007). 
103 Id. See also, Burma Warned over ASEAN Charter, BBC News (Nov. 19, 2007); Amnesty International, ASEAN: 
Human Rights in the Charter and Beyond (Nov. 21, 2007). 
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promotion and protection of human rights, conducting studies on thematic issues as well as 
preparing reports to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.104 Its mandate clearly shows that the 
main function of the AICHR is focused on the promotion of human rights rather than their 
protection, because the Commission has no power to investigate or implicate individuals or 
countries that have committed human rights violations for which victims need redress. It means 
that the principle of non-intervention along with the so-called Asian values may still remain in 
this region as the main obstacles, as Azmi Sharon describes: “The ASEAN way is where we 
don't disturb each other, and just love others.” 105 Similarly, stressing that “the ASEAN is after 
all intergovernmental…not inter-people,” 106 Vitit Muntarbhorn maintains that while 
governmental channels are important, inter-government actions alone are not sufficient to 
promote and protect human rights, and that a broad range of actors and institutions such as 
independent institutions, civil society, the judiciary, parliamentary committees and the media 
also have important roles to play.107 
It is, however, undeniable that launching the AICHR is a milestone for the establishment 
of regional human rights mechanisms in the South-East Asia region and Asia in general. There 
had never been such a blueprint in the region. As the Working Group stated, it is a 
                                                          
104 See Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, Mandate and 
Functions http://www.aseansec.org/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf  
105 Pravit Rojanaphruk, Human Rights in ASEAN Seen as a Paper Tiger, The Nation (Oct. 15, 2010). 
106 Id. 
107 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Discussion Paper on Exploring the Window of Opportunities: Evolving a Framework for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, UNOHCHR, (Jul. 2007). This paper is for 
the Fourteenth U.N. Annual Workshop of the Framework of Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, Bali (2007). Id. 
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transformation “into a rules-based, legal entity through the adoption of an ASEAN Charter,”108 
because human rights issues in the region are now totally legitimate.109 As hard as the work to 
adopt this framework for a regional human rights body has been, there should be more active 
cooperation among governments, NGOs and NHRIs for an effective implementation of human 
rights in the future.110 I believe that even though there might be an insincere motivation among 
the ASEAN member states for the establishment of the AICHR, once it is established, it can now 
be used as an effective tool for all rights stakeholders in the region to intervene in their 
governments’ human rights policies and practices and also be an accessible channel to reflect 
their voices from below. To make this happen, therefore, the role of NHRIs and their network is 
more important than ever. 
 
5.3.2. The South Asia Region 
Though in South Asia there has not been any commitment for the establishment of a sub-
regional human rights mechanism or adoption of general human rights treaties yet, the South 
Asian Association on Regional Cooperation (SSARC) has moved towards specifying more 
concrete areas of human rights by adopting a number of regional treaties. In 2002, the SAARC 
adopted the Regional Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and 
Children for Prostitution and the Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of 
                                                          
108 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism Statement on the ASEAN Charter (Nov. 21, 2007).  
http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/working-group-statement-on-asean-charter.html  
109 Pravit Rojanaphruk, supra note 105. 
110 See Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go before I 
sleep” 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 1 (1999). 
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Child Welfare in South Asia.111 The former stresses cross-border cooperation of member states 
for the care, treatment, rehabilitation and repatriation of the victims with the possibility of 
bilateral arrangements in its Articles 8 and 9.112 The latter provides for regional arrangements 
among member states in the arena of child rights and development in its Article 5.113 In 2004, the 
SAARC adopted the SAARC Social Charter, which addresses poverty and development issues in 
the context of global targets such as the Millennium Development Goals.114 In particular, Article 
2 (xii) opens the door for setting up sub-regional mechanisms on general human rights issues in 
the future: 
xii. Promote universal respect for and observance and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, in particular the right to development; promote the effective 
exercise of rights and the discharge of responsibilities in a balanced manner at all levels of 
society; promote gender equity; promote the welfare and interest of children and youth; 
promote social integration and strengthen civil society.115 
In addition, for the effective implementation of the Charter, its Article 10 stresses that 
member states should build National Coordination Committees (NCCs) to complement national 
implementation efforts and “mobilize civil society organizations to achieve this end.”116 
                                                          
111 See South Asian Association on Regional Cooperation, SAARC Conventions http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-
Conventions/63/  
112 SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-traffiking.pdf  
113 SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-children.pdf  
114 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Discussion Paper on Exploring the Window of Opportunities, supra  note 107, at 3. 
115 SAARC Social Charter, http://www.eias.org/luncheons/saarc220104/socialcharter.pdf  
116 See SAARC, Area of Cooperation: SAARC Social Charter http://www.saarc-
sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=7 
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The first non-governmental sub-regional Workshop on a South Asian Human Rights 
Mechanism was held in 2010 with 70 NGO participants.117 During the Workshop, they adopted 
the Kathmandu Declaration calling on the governments of South Asia to establish an 
independent, effective and accountable regional human rights mechanism in this region.118 In 
particular, for the development of regional human rights system, the declaration calls for 
cooperation among NHRIs in the region and for the establishment of NHRIs in SAARC member 
states which do not have one yet. It calls: 
…on the national human rights institutions in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives and Afghanistan to forge closer and more systematic cooperation among 
themselves to address cross border human rights violations and support the development of 
regional human rights mechanism in South Asia; 
… on Pakistan and Bhutan to form as soon as possible national human rights institutions in 
conformity with the Paris Principles.119 
I believe such a positive development of civil society movements in this region will lead 
to convincing the SAARC to adopt its regional human rights mechanism in the future. It is 
indeed important to point out that while intergovernmental engagement is essential, NGOs and 
civil societies should actively participate in the formulation of a regional mechanism, and that it 
can be realized only with the sufficient coordination among and solidarity from NHRIs in 
member states across the region.  
 
                                                          
117 Forum-Asia, SAARC must set up a human rights mechanism in South Asia (Mar. 25, 2010).  
118 Forum-Asia, Kathmandu Declaration 2010 (Mar. 25, 2010). This Declaration is the outcome document of the 
First Sub-Regional Workshop on a South Asian Human Rights Mechanism held in Kathmandu, Nepal on 24-25 
March 2010. Id. 
119 Id. 
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5.3.3. The Pacific Region 
In the Pacific region, there are no sub-regional human rights arrangements yet. What is 
more, no A-status-accredited NHRIs exist in small Pacific countries. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, this region also has the lowest level of ratification of major international human rights 
treaties in the world by far.  
The first attempt to explore the possibilities of establishing regional human rights 
arrangements in the Pacific region was started by LAWASIA, international NGOs of lawyers in 
the Asia-Pacific region120 in 1985 at a meeting in Fiji. A draft Pacific Charter of Human Rights 
was adopted at a subsequent meeting in Samoa in 1989.121 However, there has not been any 
strong or unified political support from the Pacific countries for a regional charter for decades, 
though the last ten years have seen some small changes in this region.  
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), a regional economic and political intergovernmental 
organization founded in 1971,122 has become more open to sub-regional and national human 
rights mechanism since its adoption of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration and the 2004 Auckland 
Declaration. In those declarations, the Forum specifically included human rights and 
acknowledged that the protection and promotion of human rights is clearly critical to the region. 
The Biketawa Declaration expressed: 
Belief in the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for all citizens regardless 
of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief and in the individual’s inalienable right to 
                                                          
120 The Law Association for Asia and the Pacific, http://lawasia.asn.au/  
121 See Fernand de Varennes ed., Pacific Charter of Human Rights, ASIA-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND 
RESOURCES VOL. 1, (1998).  
122 The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, http://www.forumsec.org.fj/  
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participate by means of free and democratic political process in framing the society in which 
he or she lives.123 
The Auckland Declaration stated: 
We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable 
management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and for its defense 
and promotion of human rights.124 
Furthermore, the 2004 Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum 
encouraged member states to establish national human rights machinery, specifically in 
cooperation with the APF.125 In 2005, the Forum endorsed the Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Cooperation and Integration, which clearly supported the development of regional 
human rights machinery as the Forum’s strategic objective.126 
Similarly, the APF organized the 2004 Pacific Human Rights Consultation with the 
cooperation of UNOHCHR, UNDP and the Commonwealth Secretariat. It was attended by more 
than eighty regional participants including representatives of Pacific Island governments, NHRIs 
and NGOs.127 The meeting emphasized the importance of developing a regional human rights 
arrangement for the Pacific, at the same time recognizing that there are some traditional and 
cultural practices and customary rights unique to the Pacific, which may impact the enjoyment of 
                                                          
123 The Biketawa Declaration, Kiribati (Oct. 2000).  
124 The Auckland Declaration, Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, Auckland (Apr. 6, 2004). 
125 The Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum (Apr. 2004).  
126 The Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration, 18-9 (Nov. 2007). 
127 The APF, Pacific Islands Human Rights Consultation http://www.asiapacificforum.net/services/training/regional-
workshops/pacific-islands  
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human rights negatively. 128  In 2009, the APF organized the Regional Workshop on the 
Establishment of National Human Rights Mechanisms in the Pacific with the support of the PIF. 
During the Workshop, a number of participating countries like Nauru, Palau, the Solomon 
Islands, and Samoa, sought concrete advice on how to promote the establishment of NHRI in 
their countries and requested APF’s technical assistance.129  
All those recent developments show that there have been two main obstacles for the 
development of human rights in this region: 1) the limited availability of financial and human 
resources to establish and operate an NHRI and 2) the customary rights based on tradition and 
culture which are unique in the Pacific. With the support of the APF and other member NHRIs, 
an increasing number of Pacific countries, however, are exploring the establishment of NHRIs, 
recognizing that they are key actors in strengthening human rights protection at the national level 
and that, further, a strong national human rights system will foster strong regional human rights 
mechanisms in the future. There have also been discussions and research projects by the APF 
and member NHRIs to find a way for custom and tradition in the region to be harmonized with 
existing human rights norms and at the same time, not denigrate international minimum human 
rights standards. Compared to the time when LAWASIA adopted a Draft Pacific Charter of 
Human Rights, there has been a gradual movement on human rights issues in the region both by 
the governments and the civil society actors. As Petra Butler maintains, “the time might be ripe 
                                                          
128 Pacific Islands Human Rights Consultation, Concluding Statement and Recommendations, Suva, Fiji Islands, 
(Jun. 2004). 
129 See Benjamin Lee, Regional Workshop on the Establishment of National Human Rights Mechanisms in the 
Pacific: Aims and Outcomes, 40 Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev. 413 (2009). 
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to unite human rights efforts of each individual Pacific Island State and for them to learn and to 
help each other” for a regional human rights arrangement in the Pacific region.130 
 
5.4. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE APF 
My third suggestion of how NHRIs can be a driving force for the establishment of RHRIs 
in this region is strengthening the role of the APF and its network of NHRIs, which are 
considered “the closest that the Asia-Pacific region has come to a regional arrangement or 
machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights.”131  
Indeed, as reviewed in Chapter Four, the APF has emerged as the most cohesive regional 
human rights body in the region so far. The functions of a regional human rights mechanism are 
distinct from those of the regional network of NHRIs and the APF.  The fact that, compared to 
other regions, Asia has no RHRIs, however, makes NHRIs and their network the best 
complementary tools for the protection and promotion of human rights at both the national and 
regional level. As individual NHRIs can monitor, investigate and seek remedies for human rights 
violations in their countries with the active cooperation of civil societies and local human rights 
NGOs, the network of NHRIs and their formal meetings can be a place to report, discuss and 
share information of human rights violation in the region, based on international human rights 
standards. Further, they can be a forum for all stakeholders to intervene and reflect their concern 
                                                          
130 Petra Butler, A Human Rights Charter for the Pacific, Human Rights Research Journal Vol.3, (Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2005). 
131 Report on Activities Presented by the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Effective 
Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms: National Institutions and Regional Arrangements, 15-6, The U.N. 
Commission of Human Rights (Mar. 24, 2006) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/NI/1.   
 224 
 
on human rights problems across the region, something that is hard to handle by Asian countries 
individually, and to develop strategies for best human rights practices. Therefore, the important 
role of the APF cannot be overstated, because it was established to provide a framework in 
which member NHRIs can work together and learn from each other, and as a result, improve 
their own capacity for human rights protection, monitoring and promotion. In addition, another 
main task of the APF is to promote and support Asian countries in building NHRIs where none 
exist.  
My broad argument is that strengthening the capacity of the APF is directly linked to the 
enhancement of individual member NHRIs’ effectiveness, which will lead to a better domestic 
human rights system and ultimately move their governments to establish RHRIs in the region. 
The development of the APF and its network of member NHRIs will also mobilize civil societies 
across the region to recognize the need for RHRIs and to achieve regional consensus for 
establishing human rights arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region.  
In that sense, there are three ways to enhance the role of the APF. First, by strengthening 
its own mandate, the APF should raise member NHRIs’ operational powers and capacities in 
compliance with the standards of the Paris Principles. As the annual reports of the Asian NGOs 
Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI) point out, 132  NHRIs in most Asian 
countries have not fully worked as independent institutions, especially in their selection and 
appointment processes. That is, in most countries, members of NHRIs are appointed exclusively 
by the government without any transparency and sufficient consultation with civil society, which 
                                                          
132 ANNI Report on the Performance and Establishment of National Human Rights Institutions in Asia; Annual 
Report of ANNI -2008, 2009 and 2010 - can be accessed through the website of Asian Forum for Human Rights 
Development, Publications: Reports,  http://www.forum-
asia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=0&Itemid=95  
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results in ignoring the mandate of the Paris Principles: pluralism in the composition of the NHRI. 
The ANNI also reveals that most NHRIs in the region have not handled complaints effectively, 
even though the number of these complaints has risen significantly since their establishment. In 
order to develop and establish effective and independent NHRIs, a need which cannot be 
emphasized enough in this region, the APF should cooperate with its member NHRIs and 
provide a strategy for them to ensure compliance with the Paris Principles. 
Second, the APF annual meeting should not remain a forum for NHRIs only, but be 
developed as a place for all rights stakeholders across the region to participate in and to raise 
their concerns and problems. Along these lines, the APF recently announced that starting in 2011, 
it will host a conference, “which brings together a wide range of stakeholders to discuss human 
rights issues in the Asia Pacific region” on a biennial basis, separate from the APF annual 
meetings which will focus on enhancing effectiveness of member NHRIs by discussing their 
work, sharing experiences and developing relationships among peer institutions.133 There have 
been opportunities for human rights NGOs, international organizations, and other government 
delegations to observe and intervene during the APF annual meetings, but under this newly 
established APF conference, the APF can more actively promote regional cooperation and 
coordination for human rights issues in the region, with additional financial and institutional 
support from relevant actors.  
Third, through the APF, NHRIs should promote the adoption of legally binding regional 
human rights arrangements by their governments. Since its establishment, the APF and its 
member NHRIs have drafted and adopted various declarations, statements, and resolutions on 
                                                          
133 The APF, APF Members to Consider Five-year Strategic Plan, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/news/apf-
members-to-consider-five-year-strategic-plan.html   
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human rights issues at the APF annual meetings and thematic workshops. When signed by 
representatives of individual NHRIs, such agreements exist as a soft law in the form of informal 
and non-legally binding documents.  However, as NHRIs are national institutions, they can 
interact with their governments for the implementation of those agreed-upon instruments and 
invite high level government representatives to their meetings to get feedback.  I believe that 
such an active and dynamic process can, in the long run, make these initiatives formal and 
legally binding through the ratification by high ranking officials from countries with member 
NHRIs.  
 
5.5. BEGINNING WITH COUNTRIES IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING RHRIS 
My last suggestion on how NHRIs can be eminent actors in the establishment of regional 
human rights arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region is to initiate regional human rights 
instruments with a few favourably disposed countries at first. The main reason for that is that it is 
unlikely to achieve a single integrated human rights arrangement for all Asian countries at once.  
As discussed, there is growing recognition that there are many human rights issues of 
common concern which cannot be handled by individual states alone, and need to be dealt with 
by the cooperation among neighbouring countries across the region. Therefore, building RHRIs 
among the countries, which understand the necessity to solve complicated human rights issues 
together, can be a good starting point that emulates the way Europe evolved its regional human 
rights system under the auspices of the Council of Europe. It started with ten founding member 
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countries but now all forty-seven member states are parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Once RHRIs are established and can show how effectively those small but strong 
regional mechanisms can handle regional human rights problems, the increasing benefit of 
membership will attract other countries and as a result, those multilateral arrangements can be 
developed as unified RHRIs in the region. 
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the way in which NHRIs and their network can be a driving 
force for the establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, and provided four specific 
suggestions toward it.  
The first one is the creation of regional arrangements on common issues of human rights 
in the region.  I reviewed eight human rights issues of common concern, which have the potential 
to be developed into a legally binding regional arrangement: the rights of women, people with 
disabilities, human rights defenders, internally displaced persons, and migrants, as well as human 
trafficking, the environment, and prevention of torture. Recognizing that most human rights 
issues in the region cannot be solved by a single country on its own, NHRIs should actively 
advocate for their governments to cooperate with other governments in the region. Such efforts 
will result in the adoption of regional instruments on the issues above. I believe that increasing 
the number of such instruments will lead to the establishment of integrated regional human rights 
arrangements in this region.  
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The second one is establishing RHRIs at the sub-regional level through the active 
cooperation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in South-East Asia, and the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) in the Pacific region. As a starting point, the establishment of sub-regional human 
rights mechanisms is important for the protection of human rights in the region, and once there 
are sub-regional arrangements, they can work toward a human rights institution on the regional 
level.  
The third one is strengthening the role of the APF. The APF was established to enhance 
the capacity of member NHRIs for better human rights practices at the national level and a 
strengthened domestic environment for effective implementation of international human rights 
standards. It will ultimately move governments to establish RHRIs in the region. The 
development of the APF and its network of member NHRIs will also mobilize civil societies 
across the region to reach regional consensus for establishing RHRIs and the recognition that it is 
necessary to have a regional human rights protection system.  
The last suggestion is to begin establishing RHRIs with a small number of countries with 
NHRIs that understand the necessity of solving complicated human rights issues together. Once 
established, the practices of these small but strong human rights bodies will provide an incentive 
for other countries in the region to participate in these instruments because of the increased 
benefits of membership.  
Since their establishments, NHRIs have worked as a key player in strengthening domestic 
human rights protection systems by supporting and enriching international human rights 
standards and at the same time, reflecting local culture, tradition, and national specificities. Their 
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networks have also played an important role in urging Asian countries to cooperate with the 
international human rights mechanism and also with neighboring states for the better protection 
and promotion of human rights in the region. Based on the suggestions above, NHRIs can be 
eminent actors in developing a credible regional human rights system, and in the long run, 
establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
RHRIs, NHRIs and Human Rights NGOs 
 
Governments and NGOs need each other: governments, because they can use the 
information supplied by NGOs; NGOs, because their objective – the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the world – can only be attained through the activities of 
governments. They are, as it were, two sides of the same coin.1 
[R]eaffirmed faith in the crucial importance of cooperation between national human rights 
institutions and NGOs and recognized they should work together on the basis of their 
common commitment to the universality and indivisibility of human rights as expressed in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights instruments and the 
Vienna Declaration… also recognized that national human rights institutions and NGOs 
have different roles in the promotion and protection of human rights and that the 
independence and autonomy of civil society and NGOs and of national human rights 
institutions must be respected and upheld.2 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is no more a new phenomenon, and indeed, undeniable fact that human rights NGOs 
have played a crucial role for the promotion and protection of human rights in the world. 
Especially, since the 1990s, their transnational character3 and increasing intervention on and 
participation in human rights issues at the national, regional and international level has been 
                                                          
1 Peter R. Baehr, NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 124, 
(2009). 
2 The APF, The Kandy Program of Action: Cooperation Between National Institutions and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, Para.1.5., Workshop on National Institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations: Working in 
Partnership (Jul. 28, 1999).  
3 See Mary Kaldor, Transnational Civil Society in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 195 (Tim Dunne and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999).  
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emphasized in a large number of studies. 4  That is, civil societies, including NGOs, have 
externalized their human rights claims by seeking support from regional and international allies, 
when they are frustrated with their inability to attain redress from their own governments,5 and 
their transnational activism has been empowered and legitimized by the international human 
rights norms.6 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call such an externalization of their claims by 
networks of NGOs the boomerang effect: 
[W]hen channels between state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern 
of influence characteristic of transnational actors may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their 
state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from 
outside. This is most obviously the case in human rights campaigns.7 
Keck and Kathryn, however, focus on only one form of pressure, namely informational 
politics, in which external allies “diffuse information about abuses to sympathetic governments 
and public opinion abroad … then boomerang into pressure on repressive states,” and leave 
unspecified other pathways of externalization, including the use of institutionalized access, in 
which NGOs bring domestic human rights claims to external institutions in authority and those 
institutions can transform the complaints received into binding rules for the correction of 
abuses.8 I believe RHRIs, which are the main focus of my dissertation, can play such a role as an 
                                                          
4 See generally Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink eds., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE, (1999). See also Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, (1998); H. Steiner, P. Alston 
and R. Goodman, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, 1421 (Third Edition, 
2008). 
5 Sidney Tarrow, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, 145 (2006). 
6 See Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith, Infrastructures for Change:  Transnational Organizations: 1953-1993 in 
RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: THE POWER OF TRANSNATIONAL AGENCY AND NORMS, 24-44 (Sanjeev 
Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002). 
7 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, supra note 4, at 12-3. 
8 Sidney Tarrow, supra note 5, at 146, 158-160. 
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intermediate institution to link regional human rights NGOs’ advocacy network to social change 
and legal mobilization at the national level for better human rights practices.  
At the same time, while the transnational human rights movement by NGOs plays a 
critical role in the national and regional human rights mechanisms, the traditional role of national 
governments still “remains central to the lives of citizens,”9 because, as Sidney Tarrow maintains, 
“sustainable change will only be achieved when national governments are continually pushed to 
live up to their claims and when the pressure from below and from above continues.”10 Therefore, 
NHRIs and their networks are also vital as a channeling institution with an active cooperation 
and collaboration both with international and regional human rights institutions and human rights 
NGOs.  
In this chapter, I will review the characteristics of human rights NGOs and their evolving 
role within the existing international and regional human rights mechanisms, and further, in Asia, 
the way in which they have worked together for better human rights practices and the 
establishment of RHRIs in this region. Then, I will examine the role of human rights NGOs in 
strengthening human rights protection systems at the national level, especially in cooperation 
with NHRIs. In addition, the process of establishing NHRIs in selected countries in Asia and 
more specifically, how human rights NGOs have influenced this process will be briefly discussed. 
 
                                                          
9 Helen M. Stacy, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE, 118, (2009). 
10 Sidney Tarrow, supra note 5, at 159; See also Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, supra note 4, 
at 33. 
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6.2. NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
The number of NGOs has dramatically increased for the last century, i.e., from 1,083 in 
1914 to more than 37,000 in 2000, with about one quarter of them established after 1990.11 There 
are over 300 international human rights NGOs which operate across national borders and two-
thirds of them are based in Western countries: forty-six percent in Western Europe and seventeen 
percent in North America.12 While Western-based major international NGOs are more focused 
on civil and political rights, NGOs from the Third World (or the Global South) are generally 
reported to work more on development and social, economic, and cultural rights.13 Southern 
human rights NGOs are also more likely to cooperate with other NGOs and to influence 
domestic institutions.14  As Henry Steiner points out, this shows the regional differences in 
priorities and even reflects understandable tensions within the international human rights 
movement.15 However, the margin of differences is, while significant, nominal, and the growing 
emergence of human rights NGOs in the Third World has contributed to strengthening the 
indivisibility of international human rights norms because most of them “assume the universality 
                                                          
11 Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, 4 (2001) cited in Peter R. Baehr, 
supra note 1, at 6.  
12 Peter R. Baehr, id., at 7. See also Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco and George A. Lopez, Globalizing Human Rights: 
The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 379, 387 (1998). 
13 Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco and George A. Lopez, id.,  
14 Id., at 411. 
15 See Henry J. Steiner, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, THE REPORT OF A RETREAT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS (1991). 
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of human rights as a point of departure... [and] this assumption provides them with the right to 
challenge governments’ performance in the field of human rights.”16  
Given this background, the section below examines how human rights NGOs can be 
defined and what their role has been within the development of the international human rights 
system.  
 
6.2.1. Human Rights NGOs: What are they? 
There is no international law which provides an authoritative definition of non-
governmental organizations in general and there is even no generally agreed upon definition of 
human rights NGOs among scholars, either.17 I broadly maintain that human rights NGOs should 
have four basic elements, i.e. they should be: 1) non-profit, 2) independent – specifically without 
interference from governments, 3) people-based, and 4) devoted for the promotion and protection 
of human rights. The first three aspects are not necessarily limited to human rights NGOs, but 
apply to NGOs in general. The first element is clearly suggested in the 1994 report of the 
Secretary-General for the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which was prepared to 
                                                          
16 Peter R. Baehr, supra note 1, at 120.  At the same time, he also recognizes the different perspectives between 
Western-based NGOs and those from Southern countries and describes their tension as: “[a]t the U.N. World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, differences of view arose between large, well-organized NGOs, usually 
based in Western countries, on the one hand, and relatively poor, less well-organized organizations often from 
Southern countries, on the other. The latter showed some irritation that the former assumed that they could speak on 
behalf of all NGOs. The claim of different cultural approaches, as well as different interests, does not seem to be 
limited to governments alone.” Id., at 5. 
17 Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System? 
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93, 95 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
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make suitable arrangements for consultation with NGOs based on Article 71 of the U.N. 
Charter18 and further, to decide which organizations are granted consultative status with the U.N.: 
An NGO is a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one 
or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members 
in response to the needs of the members or of one or more communities with which the NGO 
cooperates.19 
Such a non-profit aspect is an essential element that constitutes NGOs as credible and 
accountable entities pursuing non-material goals. The second element comes from the very title 
of NGOs. That is, they are not governmental institutions, but independent and impartial 
organizations. Most NGOs, indeed, reject support from government sources in the belief that 
states cannot adequately represent the interests of local groups and individuals. The third aspect 
is closely related to the social movement, which is the foundation of NGOs, as defined by Dianne 
Otto: 
[O]rganizations that aim to represent values and aspirations associated with peoples rather 
than with states, including the promotion of human rights, gender and race equality, 
environmental protection, sustainable development, indigenous rights, nonviolent conflict 
resolution, participatory democracy, social diversity, and social and economic justice.20 
The last element comes from human rights NGOs’ own activities and their aims: the 
promotion and protection of human rights. There can be general human rights organizations and 
                                                          
18 Article 71 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that “[t]he Economic and Social Council may make suitable 
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.” 
19 U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report of the Secretary-General: General Review of Arrangements for 
Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations, para.9, UN DOC. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994), cited in Dianne 
Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil 
Society, 18 Hum. Rts. Q. 107, 111 (1996). 
20 Dianne Otto, supra note 19, at 112. 
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ones that specialize in a particular human rights issue. Laurie Wiseberg clearly distinguishes 
them from other NGOs by defining human rights NGO as: 
… a private organization which devotes significant resources to the promotion and 
protection of human rights, which is independent of both governmental and political groups 
that seek direct political power, and which itself does not seek such power.21 
Overall, while there is no authoritative definition, human rights NGOs should be 
understood - based on their activities, aims, transnational networks, and social movements - as 
independent, non-profit, and peoples-based organizations, which seek to make individual 
governments at least reconsider their people’s rights and interests that previously have been 
neglected.  
 
6.2.2. Role of Human Rights NGOs in the International Human Rights Mechanism 
As Hidetoshi Hashimoto maintains, “NGOs have strengths where governments have 
weaknesses.”22 As impartial and credible people-based organizations, they freely criticize the 
individual countries’ human rights situations at the international level and their criticism is taken 
ever more seriously by international human rights monitoring bodies. Indeed, human rights 
NGOs are increasingly recognized as important independent actors in the international human 
rights system and have extended the discourse of international human rights norms “beyond the 
interests of states to hear the many voices currently excluded.”23 Here, I define the areas in which 
                                                          
21 Laurie Wiseberg, Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What More Can Be Done? 13 Hum. Rts. Q. 524, 
529 (1991). 
22 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA, 39 (2004). 
23 Dianne Otto, supra note 19, at 107-9, and 140-1. 
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human rights NGOs have had a significant impact in the international human rights mechanism 
in four categories. 
The first one is that human rights NGOs monitor individual countries’ compliance with 
ratified international human rights treaties, and report on the domestic human rights situation to 
the international community using for example, the Internet, mass media and social media. They 
also expose each government’s human rights violations to international civil societies in order to 
mobilize them for active prevention of such abuses.  
The second one is that they provide reliable, objective, and up-to-date essential human 
rights information at the local, national and regional level to the U.N., including human rights 
treaty bodies for effective implementation of international human rights norms. Their oral and 
written interventions through NGO briefs, petitions, documentary evidence, and reports, have 
played a crucial role as “the eyes and ears” of the U.N. human rights system.24 The Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), 25  the International Labor Organization (ILO), 26  and the 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),27 for example, offer human rights 
NGOs consultative status, which allows them to attend meetings, and make and circulate their 
own statements.  
                                                          
24 Irwin Cotler, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
a Revolutionary Age: The Helsinki Process as a Case Study in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, 463 (Irwin Cotler and F. Pearl Eliadis eds., 1992). 
25 See Dianne Otto, supra note 19. 
26 See Nicolas Valticos, The International Labor Organization in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 363-400 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982). 
27 See Hanna Saba, UNESCO and Human Rights in Karel Vasak, Id., at 401-426. 
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The third one is that human rights NGOs contribute to setting up international norms in 
various human rights areas through their constant efforts to identify still unveiled human rights 
areas and require the adoption of related international treaties and resolutions. Further, in many 
cases, they participate in or provide input into the process of drafting international human rights 
standards like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,28 the Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment29 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.30  
The last point is that when there are gross human rights violations in certain countries, 
human rights NGOs can provide humanitarian assistance to target states and, if possible, 
indirectly intervene to mobilize public opinion against their governments, because the U.N. and 
member states rarely take any concrete action to intervene in most of the cases with their 
complicated political and diplomatic interests. In addition, NGOs can report and reveal the 
human rights situation in target countries, especially when the U.N. cannot conduct fact-finding 
missions in the countries because of limited accessibility.31 
Overall, human rights NGOs have contributed to strengthening the international human 
rights system and effectively implementing international norms at the national and regional level.  
                                                          
28 Theo Van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Human Rights Standard-Setting: 
A Prerequisite of Democracy, 20 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 207, 211 (1990). 
29 Id., at 217-220. See also Virginia Leary, A New Role for Non-Governmental Organizations in Human Rights: A 
Case Study of Non-Governmental Participation in the Development of International Norms on Torture in U.N. LAW, 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 197-210 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979). 
30 Theo Van Boven, supra note 28, at 217-220. See also Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in the Drafting of the Convention of the Child, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 137 (1990). 
31 See David Weissbrodt and James McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International Nongovernmental Human Rights 
Organizations, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1981). 
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However, they also face many challenges. First of all, many governments, and not only 
authoritarian ones, have hampered human rights NGOs’ activities which expose governments’ 
wrong-doings to the international community and pressure them to change their human rights 
policies.32 Most NGOs in Third World countries also struggle with limited financial resources, 
and if they are funded by Western donors, a common practice, governments restrict their 
activities in suspicion of the foreign funders’ motivation. 33  Moreover, with the increasing 
number of NGOs, it has been difficult to effectively reflect their concerns and address their 
interests at the U.N.34 and other international institutions, as Michael Posner describes: 
[B]ecause so many governments and NGOs want to speak, NGOs are frequently allotted the 
least popular time, late at night, when the great majority of government representatives have 
gone home. As a result, the impact of months of research and information-gathering of 
NGOs may be virtually nil.35 
 All those challenges show that it is necessary to have institutions as medium -NHRIs and 
RHRIs- for human rights NGOs to effectively play their role for the promotion and protection of 
human rights. The former can work as an official channel between governments and NGOs to 
lessen their conflict and enhance their relationship because NHRIs have both governmental and 
non-governmental characteristics as discussed in Chapters Four and Five. The latter can provide 
much more opportunities for NGOs to present their concerns and cases and a relatively easier 
accessibility for them than international institutions. Therefore, in the following two sections, I 
                                                          
32 See the Section 4.2.4. Rights of Human Rights Defenders in Ch. 4. 
33 See Clarence J. Dias, Relationships between Human Rights NGOs in the Third World in HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE AND CHALLENGES: IN 1990 AND BEYOND, 105-128 (K.P. Saksena ed., 1994). 
34 For example, the number of NGOs that receive consultative status at the U.N. increased from several in 1945 to 
3,249 today.  See The U.N. Department for Economic and Social Affairs 2009 Report. 
35 Michael Posner, The Establishment of the Right of Nongovernmental Human Rights Groups to Operate in HUMAN 
RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 415 (Louis Henkin and John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994). 
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will review the role of human rights NGOs at the regional and national level and their 
relationship with RHRIs and NHRIs. 
 
6.3. RHRIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS  
Human rights NGOs are increasingly becoming not only international but also regional. 
Their activities are not limited within the boundary of national borders in order to pursue the 
promotion and protection of human rights issues in common concern in the region as “sovereign-
free-actors.” 36  That is, to achieve their aims, they promote regional integration, active 
transnational cooperation, and collaboration with other NGOs across national borders. Thus, in 
this section, I will first examine the role of human rights NGOs and their impact on the existing 
regional human rights system in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. Then I will focus on  how 
human rights NGOs have worked together to foster a human rights culture in the Asia-Pacific 
region and the way in which they take concrete steps towards establishing RHRIs in this region.  
 
6.3.1. Role of Human Rights NGOs in Regional Human Rights Mechanisms 
In the European human rights system, human rights NGOs have made significant 
contributions in the following five main ways.  
First, they have been actively involved in drafting regional human rights treaties like the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the European Convention for the 
                                                          
36 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 22, at 43. 
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Prevention of Torture, the European Cultural Convention and the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages.37 For example, the text of the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture was prepared by two human rights NGOs: the Swiss Committee against Torture and the 
International Commission of Jurists.38 Further, following guidelines for granting consultative 
status to a group of NGOs in 1954 under the Committee of Ministers’ Resolution, the Council of 
Europe has offered NGOs consultative status. With it, they can address their concerns and 
activities to the Council of Europe and at the same time, the Parliamentary Assembly and its 
committees can seek advice from them. 39  Currently, around 400 NGOs have been granted 
consultative status.40  Second, they can file direct complaints before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) based on Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).41 In other words, similarly to private individuals, human rights NGOs have the right to 
lodge an application before the ECtHR, if they are victims of violations of the Convention.  
Moreover, they can act as witnesses before the Court. For example, in 1968, when the European 
Commission of Human Rights reviewed the case submitted by member states in the Council of 
Europe against widespread torture in Greece, representatives of Amnesty International, which 
had conducted a fact-finding mission to Greece a year before, presented as witnesses during the 
                                                          
37 See The Council of Europe, The Council of Europe Open to Voluntary Organizations http://www.coe.ro/nog.html  
38 See The Council of Europe, Historical background and main features of the European Torture Convention, CoE 
Doc. CPT/Inf/C (89) 2 (1989). http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/historical-background.htm  
39 Id. 
40 Id., See also Marek Antoni Nowicki, NGOs before the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights, 14 
Neth Q Hum Right 289, 292 (1996). 
41 Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates: 
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.  
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proceedings.42 Third, human rights NGOs can provide legal advice to the victims who wish to 
bring their cases before the ECtHR by completing their application, consulting the ECHR 
procedures, and assisting them in formulating competent arguments. In addition, they can stand 
before the Court as lawyers to represent the victims or find adequate attorneys for them. Fourth, 
as Article 36 (2) of the Convention allows, human rights NGOs can get involved in the 
proceedings by third-party intervention, namely, Amicus Curiae briefs.43 This is the only way 
NGOs can participate in sensitive human rights cases not as the original parties to the cases. 
Through such participation, they can address unrepresented public interests in the case and also 
raise public awareness of related human rights issues.44 Lastly, they can disseminate knowledge 
of the European Human Rights Convention and the Court to newly-joined member countries, 
especially from Central and Eastern Europe.45  
While the European system does not permit access to non-victim representatives, in the 
Inter-America human rights system, human rights NGOs can bring their cases - even if they are 
not the victims of violations - before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights based on 
Article 44 of the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR).46  Though there is no specific 
                                                          
42 Dean Zagorac, International Courts and Compliance Bodies: The Experience of Amnesty International in CIVIL 
SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE BODIES, 11, 18 (Tullio Treves et al eds., 2005). 
43 Article 36 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates: 
The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting 
Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written 
comments or take part in hearings. 
44 Luisa Vierucci, NGOs before International Courts and Tribunals in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY 
IN FLEXIBILITY?  155, 165-6 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008). See also Dinah Shelton, The 
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AJIL 611, 630-40 
(1994). 
45 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 22, at 94. 
46 Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights stipulates: 
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provision regulating their submission, they can also file Amicus Curiae briefs to advisory 
proceedings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, just as the ECHR permits.47 For 
example, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), one of the most active human 
rights NGOs in the region, directly intervened in more than two hundred cases before the Inter-
American Commission and Court of Human Rights to represent over ten thousand victims, 
including human rights violations such as forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, due 
process violations, conditions of detention, freedom of expression, and inhumane treatment.48 
Further, many human rights NGOs in the Inter-America region have actively worked for the 
documentation of the human rights situation there through visiting countries regularly, collecting 
information on human rights violations by member states, and publishing periodic state reports.49 
In contrast to Europe or the Americas, in the African human rights system, human rights 
NGOs cannot bring individual cases of human rights violations because the case must reveal the 
“existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights” as Article 58 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights points out. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, however, grants observer status to NGOs, which provides them 
with the opportunity to be present in public sessions of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies, 
and propose items for the Commission’s agenda.50 Every two years, they also submit a report to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of 
the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of 
this Convention by a State Party. 
47 Dinah Shelton, supra note 44. 
48 The Center for Justice and International Law, http://cejil.org/  
49 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 22, at 96. 
50 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution on the Criteria Granting and Enjoying 
Observer Status to Non-Governmental Organizations Working in the Field of Human Rights with the African 
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the Commission on their human rights activities, which can provide an alternative view to the 
official state reports. 51  As discussed in Chapter Two, 52  the African human rights system, 
however, is based on state-centric perspectives with the consistent respect for the principle of 
national sovereignty. Thus, compared to other regional systems, which have advanced a judicial 
settlement, in the African region, human rights violations cases are handled mainly through 
diplomatic settlement and, as a result, so far there has not been much room for human rights 
NGOs to intervene in the cases directly or indirectly. 
Overall, all three regional human rights systems are more readily accepted and accessible 
for human rights NGOs to address their concerns and problems in the region than the 
international system. Within the system, NGOs have contributed to enhancing the human rights 
situation in their regions through their active participation and cooperation.  
There is one more thing to be noted here: all three regional systems also share the same 
limitations. That is, the primary responsibility for implementation of international human rights 
norms rests on individual member states and the regional system can serve a complimentary role 
only, after local remedies have been exhausted. . This leads to the conclusion that, for NGOs to 
contribute to the further development of human rights in the region, it is important for them first 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 25th Ordinary Session, in Bujumbura, Burundi, (May. 5, 1999). 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/observer_en.html ; Chapter II of its Annex stipulates: 
All observers shall be invited to be present at the opening and closing sessions of all Sessions of the African 
Commission… 
Observers may be authorized by the Chairman of the African Commission to make a statement on an issue that 
concerns them, subject to the text of the statement having been provided, with sufficient lead-time, to the Chairman 
of the Commission through the Secretary to the Commission… 
Observers may request to have issues of a particular interest to them included in the provisional agenda of the 
African Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure. 
51 Id., Chapter III of Annex: Relations between the African Commission and Observers.  
52 See Section 2.4 of Chapter Two. 
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to strengthen the domestic human rights systems and consequently,  to cooperate with NHRIs at 
the national level. I will discuss this point further in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3.2. Human Rights NGOs in the Asia-Pacific Region 
As reviewed in Chapter Three, in the absence of a regional human rights system in the 
Asia-Pacific region, NGOs have discussed the establishment of an NGO-led regional human 
rights system in the region for over two decades.53 Once RHRIs are established in the Asia-
Pacific region, NGOs can play a crucial role for them. What is more, these NGOs’ own 
initiatives are extremely important in the sense that their capacity is indeed a vital consideration 
in setting up RHRIs in the region. That is, human rights NGOs are in a position to witness and 
advocate for victims of abuses and are best placed to accurately report and discern the latest 
human rights violations in the target states. Similarly, the adequate cooperation among individual 
governments and human rights NGOs toward the establishment of RHRIs can make regional 
bodies more legitimate, independent and effective institutions for the promotion and protection 
of human rights.  
Human rights NGOs in the region have also constantly maintained the universality of 
international human rights norms, and pressured individual governments to ratify major 
international human rights treaties and to comply with them. For example, before the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights, numerous NGOs in Asia gathered and expressed their 
position in the Non-Governmental Bangkok Declaration as: 
                                                          
53 See Section 3.1.2 of Chapter Three. 
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Universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures. We affirm the basis of 
universality of human rights which afford protection to all of humanity, including special 
groups such as women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples, workers, refugees and 
displaced persons, the disabled and the elderly. While advocating cultural pluralism, those 
cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights including 
women’s rights, must not be tolerated. As human rights are of universal concern and are 
universal in value, the advocacy of human rights cannot be considered to be an 
encroachment upon national sovereignty.54 
In the same vein, numerous Asian NGOs actively discussed and worked together for the 
drafting of the regional human rights charter for three years prior to 1998, when more than 200 
human rights NGOs in the region gathered in Kwangju, South Korea, and declared the Asian 
Human Rights Charter: Our Common Humanity.55 The Charter rejects Asian values debates and 
strongly stresses the indivisibility and universality of human rights. It especially emphasizes the 
role of human rights NGOs related to establishing RHRIs in the region as Article 16.2 of the 
Charter stipulates: 
16.2 Asian states should adopt regional or sub-regional institutions for the promotion and 
protection of rights. There should be an inter-state Convention on Human Rights, 
formulated in regional forums with the collaboration of national and regional NGOs. The 
Convention must address the realities of Asia, particularly the obstacles that impede the 
enjoyment of rights. At the same time it must be fully consistent with international norms and 
standards. It should cover violations of rights by groups and corporations in addition to 
state institutions. An independent commission or a court must be established to enforce the 
                                                          
54 Asian Cultural Forum on Development, OUR VOICE: BANGKOK NGO DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 199 
(1993). 
55 Amnesty International,  Charter Reflects Growing Strength and Determination of Human Rights Movement in 
Asia and Pacific, Public Statement on the Occasion of Declaration of Asian Human Rights Charter (May. 15, 1998); 
See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Progress Report on the Right of Peoples to Peace by Advisory Committee, 
Para.14,, (Dec. 22, 2010) UN Doc. A/HRC/AC/6/CRP.3. 
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Convention. Access to the commission or the court must be open to NGOs and other social 
organizations.56 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter Five,57 human rights NGOs have effectively operated 
at the regional level particularly for the human rights problems of common concern in the region 
like human trafficking, prevention of torture, rights of women, people with disabilities, internally 
displaced persons, migrant workers, and human rights defenders.  
Overall, NGOs’ initiatives, input and endeavors have become the foundation for 
formulating regional human rights arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the 
emergence of an increasing number of human rights NGOs accelerates the development of a 
human rights culture and of strong civil societies in this region. 
 
6.4. NHRIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS  
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, NHRIs can play a crucial role in promoting and 
protecting human rights within the domestic human rights system, and their very nature shows 
they hold a unique position among all stakeholders including the government, civil society and 
human rights NGOs. Especially, as the Paris Principles stress, the cooperation among NGOs is 
vital for the effectiveness of NHRIs, because NGOs can monitor the institutions’ performance 
and at the same time, NHRIs benefits from using the knowledge, experience and expertise of 
human rights NGOs. Thus, this section will show how both actors can mutually benefit within 
their cooperative relationship. 
                                                          
56 See Asian Human Rights Commission, The Asian Human Rights Charter, http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/  
57 See Section 5.2 of Chapter Five. 
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First, the cooperation between NHRIs and NGOs can give human rights NGOs a public 
legitimacy which cannot otherwise be enjoyed, because NHRIs are established based on national 
legislation and such legitimacy is usually not given to human rights NGOs.58  
Second, in authoritarian governments, there exist numerous human rights NGOs under 
constant persecution. Local human rights advocates and activists are detained for years and 
sometimes deported to foreign countries. International human rights delegations also find it hard 
to enter countries which prevent an effective human rights protection. But cooperation with 
NHRIs can make it difficult for the government to restrain the activities of human rights NGOs 
and international human rights bodies.59  
Third, NGOs can recommend and advise the government on the initial establishment of 
NHRIs which may give them public accountability.60 In fact, NGOs have been a touchstone for 
the creation of NHRIs in individual states. As Dong Wook Kim argues, “human rights NGOs 
have systematic and robust effects on the occurrence and depth of the global diffusion of 
NHRIs.”61 Borrowing the concepts of rooted cosmopolitans from Sidney Tarrow’s 2005 book, 
New Transnational Activism, Kim analyzes ninety-six cases of NHRIs creation from 1978 to 
2004, and then concludes that human rights NGOs significantly influenced the individual 
                                                          
58 See Brian Burdekin, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, 60-62 (2007); Rachel 
Murray, THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF AFRICA, 59-68 (2007). See also International Council on Human Rights Policy, PERFORMANCE 
& LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, 97-99 (2004). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Dong Wook Kim, INSTITUTIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED NATIONS, NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, 232-7, PhD Dissertation, (University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2009). 
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governments’ decision to establish NHRIs and at the same time, contributed to ensuring the 
independence and accountability of NHRIs.62  
Fourth, human rights NGOs can be a source of information for NHRIs by providing 
expertise on the human rights conditions in the local communities.63 In addition, there are many 
different human rights NGOs which represent children, women, prisoners, workers, migrants, 
minority groups, and so on. Cooperation between these various NGOs and NHRIs can provide a 
wide spectrum of human rights problems to discuss and such a process ensures an effective 
protection of fundamental human rights.64  
Lastly, for the people in remote regions of large countries, sometimes it is hard to access 
and submit their complaints to NHRIs. In this case, the local NGOs can be an effective 
communication channel for human rights violations.65  
However, as pointed out through the case study of the National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea (NHRCK) in Chapter Four, it is also necessary for NHRIs to be 
independent from NGOs and civil societies and thus, not overly influenced by certain interest 
groups, as well as to balance and reflect all stakeholders’ interests and concerns on various 
domestic human rights issues, as Anne Smith stresses: 
[I]n establishing a close relationship with NGOs, NHRIs should be conscious that NGOs are 
not representative of the public, they are not appointed by the people or parliament, and as 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 See Brian Buurdekin, supra note 58, at 60-62; Rachel Murray, supra note 58, at 59-68. See also International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 58, at 97-99. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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such may be perceived as lacking some form of the legitimacy that a NHRIs may have … 
[and at the same time] civil society groups need to continue to be vocal, criticizing a NHRI’s 
action that undermines human rights protection and promotion, without interfering with the 
NHRIs’ independence.66 
Overall, human rights NGOs’ collaboration with NHRIs is indispensable in making them 
operate effectively. Such a close relationship between NHRIs and NGOs can ultimately 
contribute to the strengthening of the national system for the protection and promotion of human 
rights. 
 
6.4.1. The APF, NHRIs and Human Rights NGOs in the Asia-Pacific Region 
In the Asia-Pacific region, ever since its establishment, the Asia Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institution (APF) has stressed the important role of human rights NGOs 
and their engagement with the member NHRIs,  a point that was  especially emphasized at the 
1999 Workshop on National Institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations: Working in 
Partnership.67  
As reviewed in Chapter Five, the APF actively cooperates with human rights NGOs to 
deal with various human rights issues of common concern in the Asia-Pacific region. The APF 
also facilitates NGO participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of member 
NHRIs activities, for example, by providing on opportunity for the Asian NGOs Network on 
                                                          
66 Anne Smith, The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing? 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 904, 
941, 945 (2006). 
67 See The APF, The Kandy Program of Action: Cooperation Between National Institutions and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, supra note 2. 
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National Institutions (ANNI) to present their annual Report on the Performance and 
Establishment of NHRIs in Asia at the APF annual meetings. Further, the APF encourages 
member NHRIs to collaborate with NGOs in monitoring their respective governments’ 
implementation of the ratified human rights norms and publishing shadow reports for the human 
rights treaty bodies and other international human rights institutions as a complement to the state 
report. Lastly, in active consultation with NGOs, the APF urges countries with no NHRI to 
create it and supports countries in the process of establishing an NHRI.  
 
6.4.2. Case Study: The Establishment of NHRIs in Asian Countries and Human Rights NGOs 
In this section, I will briefly review the process of establishing NHRIs in individual 
countries in Asia and how civil society, including human rights NGOs, in these states and the 
human rights culture formulated by them, have influenced this process. Focusing on the 
interaction between NHRIs and human rights NGOs, I will also examine what, if anything, they 
have achieved in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
For this, I selected seven countries with or without NHRIs and grouped them into three 
categories based mainly on the relationship of human rights NGOs and individual governments: 
Legitimate Civil Society, Controlled and Communalized Civil Society, and Repressed Civil 
Society.68 This categorization is based on Muthiah Alagappa’s 2004 book, Civil Society and 
Political Change in Asia. He describes the first category, Legitimate Civil Society, as countries 
                                                          
68 Muthiah Alagappa ed., CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING 
DEMOCRATIC SPACE, 1-19 (2004). See also Muthiah Alagappa ed., COERCION AND GOVERNANCE: THE DECLINING 
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASIA (2001). 
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with “a growing acknowledgment … of the legitimacy of the non-state public realm;” the second 
category, Controlled and Communalized Civil Society, as states in “quasi-democracies with 
relatively stable political systems that display strong authoritarian features;” and the third 
category, Repressed Civil Society, as countries with a military regime where civil society is 
severely suppressed in limited political liberalization.69  
a. Legitimate Civil Society 
1. Thailand 
Since the early 2000s, Thailand has achieved great economic success at least in Southeast 
Asia. 70  There have also been noticeable human rights movements against poverty and 
unemployment.71 The history of human rights in Thailand is closely linked to the history of its 
continuous contention for democracy. Between the overturn of the monarchy in 1932 and 1992, 
there were fifteen constitutions, mainly under the military government.72 For sixty years, military 
governments held power by periodic coups. Following the May 1992 bloody demonstrations 
against the military government and the subsequent social and academic movements especially 
between 1996 and 1997, a civilian government was established through a national election.73  
The sixteenth constitution, enacted in 1997, is the most democratic one. 74  It stipulates all 
                                                          
69 Id., at 18-9. 
70 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand Inc.” in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA, 320 (Randall Peerenboom, et.el. ed., 2006). 
71 Id. 
72 James Ockey, Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations in COERCION AND GOVERNANCE: THE 
DECLINING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASIA, 187, 190-8 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2001).  
73 Id., at 196-200. 
74 Vitit Muntarbhorn, supra note 70, at 321. 
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internationally recognized basic human rights as well as people’s fundamental freedoms. 75 
Despite the democratically elected government and the democratic constitution in Thailand, it 
has been argued that, in itself, this “does not automatically imply that it will promote and protect 
human rights in a comprehensive manner.”76 Increasingly, there has been a public push from the 
civil society for the necessity of an independent institution established by the constitution which 
can provide checks against abuses of state power.77 
Finally, in 1999, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) was 
established under the National Human Rights Commission Act and Sections 199 & 200 of the 
1997 Constitution. Since then, as stated in the 1999 NHRC Act, the NHRCT has worked to 
maximize the checks and balances against the power of the state with the intense cooperation of 
NGOs and local community leaders.78 Further, the Commission is trusted by many human rights 
NGOs which partly stems from the fact that half the number of Commissioners had worked with 
NGOs prior to their appointment. 
In 2006, there was a military coup to overthrow Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 
administration which was followed by numerous protests and demonstrations. The Commission 
had to face human rights issues related to the persistent and occasionally violent mass anti-
government demonstrations questioning the legality and legitimacy of successive governments. 
In 2007, 2008, and April 2009, the NHRCT issued recommendations against the government 
opposing the enforcement of the 2005 Emergency Decree on Public Administration which 
                                                          
75 Id., at 322-325. 
76 Id., at 325-344. 
77 Id. 
78 See The Asia-Pacific Forum: Thailand, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/apf-member-categories/full-
members/thailand  
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authorizes the use of massive violence to disperse demonstrators. 79  In the statement, the 
Commission criticized the government and stated that “the application of the state of emergency 
overrides the role and responsibility of the Parliament and politicians in checking and balancing 
the administrative power to ensure that it uses the state power legitimately in accordance with the 
spirit of the Constitution,” and as a result, it was able to hinder the government’s harsh 
repression of the demonstrators.80  
The NHRCT also faced the issue of its own status following the coup. The new military 
government abrogated the 1997 Constitution which had mandated the establishment of the 
NHRCT including the number, qualifications, and selection process of Commissioners.81 Then, 
the present Constitution, ratified by a referendum in 2007, introduced important changes in the 
selection procedure for Commissioners of the NHRCT. Many human rights NGOs criticized the 
selection of the new Commissioners in 2009 under the new Constitution as seriously flawed in 
both process and results.82 Thus, the effectiveness and independence of the new Commission in 
the future remains an open question. 
2. India 
India became independent in 1950 after a long period of colonial rule.83 It has more than 
one billion people, eighteen major languages, twenty eight states, and more than six major 
                                                          
79 See Office of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand: News http://www.nhrc.or.th/index.php  
80 Id. 
81 See ANNI Annual Report 2008: Turbulence in Thailand, and 2009: Thailand in a Period of Polarization. 
82 See ANNI Annual Report 2010: Setbacks in Thai Democracy Impact NHRCT. 
83 Amitabh Behar and Aseem Prakash, India: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space in CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
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ed., 2004). 
 255 
 
religions.84 With such a diversity and plurality, in 60 years, India has achieved a remarkable 
success in technology and economic development. 85  There is, however, a comprehensive 
inequality in India “between rural and urban areas, within communities and castes, and between 
women and men.”86 For example, more than half of the children under the age of five remain 
anorexic, two thirds of women are illiterate and 34% of the total population still lives below the 
poverty line.87 Overall, this reflects the difficulties in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in India in spite of its noticeable economic growth,88 even though the country is generally 
not considered a state of human rights concern compared to other countries in South Asia.89 
Since the early 1980s, India has established a number of national human rights 
institutions such as the National Commission for Women, the Minorities Commission, and a 
Child Rights Commission.90 In 1993, the National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRCI) 
was established under the 1993 Protection of Human Rights Act.91 Such an NHRIs network has 
lessened the judicatory burdens of the Supreme Court of India by handing over human rights 
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violations cases.92 For example, in 2008, more than 94,000 complaints against human rights 
violations were submitted to the NHRCI.93  
The Commission formed a National Core Group of NGOs. It has coordinated their 
monitoring of human rights violations and ensuring the credible and accurate reports on human 
rights abuses. The Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 stresses in its Section 12(i) that the 
NHRCI has the responsibility to “encourage the efforts of non-governmental organizations and 
institutions working in the field of human rights.” 
Some human rights NGOs criticized the NHRCI as a “toothless tiger and a mere post 
office to provide a certificate of good behavior to the Government for its wrong-doings rather 
than to ensure better protection of human rights,”94 in the sense that the NHRCI has operated as a 
recommendation rather than a binding orders body.95 However, numerous cases show that the 
Commission has made de facto changes and reforms needed, especially, in the police and the 
prison system.96 Further, with the increasing number of human rights violation complaints and 
the growing complementarities between the judiciary and the NHRCI, the Commission has 
become, as Justice A.S. Annand argues, the conscience of the nation.97 Currently more than 150 
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statutory human rights institutions are operational in India and in the future, the NHRCI should 
be able to provide effective leadership for them in active cooperation with civil society groups.98 
3. The Philippines 
The Philippines were one of the wealthiest countries in Asia in the 1960s. The human 
rights situation in the country, however, has worsened since 1972 after President Ferdinand 
Marcos enforced martial law to seek his third term.99 International human rights NGOs such as 
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists issued a report against the 
increasing human rights violations by the Philippine government.100 After a series of public 
demonstrations in 1986 (the so-called EDSA Revolution or People Power Revolution of 1986), 
Corazon Aquino was elected President and the authoritarian government was overthrown.101 In 
1987, the current constitution was adopted under the Aquino administration. It codifies the 
democratic goals and clearly takes a stand against former President Marcos’ trailing economic 
and social rights as an excuse for the cutback on political liberties.102 In 2001, there was another 
peaceful public demonstration (so-called EDSA 2 or the Second People Power Revolution of 
2001) against the corruption of President Jeseph Estrada’s administration, led by numerous 
human rights activists and NGOs. Gloria Arroyo became President following the impeachment 
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of the Estrada administration. 103  Overall, the continuous historical resistance against 
authoritarian governments and their human rights abuses has increased the discussion of human 
rights in the Philippines.104 
The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHRP) was established in 1987 
under the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article XIII, Section 17) with the operative decree of 
Executive Order No.163.105 The CHRP was one of the founding member state institutions of the 
Paris Principles and the Asia-Pacific Forum.106 Its focus areas are not only the protection of 
human rights itself but also the interconnection with all stakeholders including the government, 
civil society, and the media.107 It had the important role of drafting human rights legislation such 
as the Anti-Trafficking in Prison Act of 2003 and the Anti-Violence against Women and their 
Children Act of 2004. 108  It also worked actively to enact legislation against human rights 
violations during the 2001 demonstrations in which at least 900 human rights activists and 
members of left-wing groups were supposedly killed and tortured and 300 are still missing.109 
Despite its lack of prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions, the CHRP also made use of its 
investigative power to bring human rights violations to the fore through holding public inquiries, 
fact-finding missions, and special operations on cases like extra-judicial killings, enforced 
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disappearances, and illegal and arbitrary arrests.110 When several natural disasters hit the country, 
the Commission also released an Advisory reminding the government to demonstrate its positive 
obligation to prepare, respond, and rehabilitate when disasters occur.111 Further, the Commission 
proactively launched a campaign for the right to political participation of vulnerable groups 
including youth, internally displaced persons, indigenous peoples, and persons with 
disabilities.112  
No specific provisions on the cooperation and consultation with NGOs are provided in 
the CHRP’s operative decree of Executive Order No.163. There has not been any periodic 
regular consultation with human rights NGOs even though consultative meetings are sometimes 
held on certain issues.113 While the CHRP has an NGO, Civil Society and Media Linkages 
Cooperation Office, operationally, this office is not involved in consultation for policy or 
program formulations and serves as a public relations unit of the Commission to popularize its 
advocacy messages through the collaboration with NGOs. Compared to the Commission’s active 
involvement in the area of international and regional cooperation, the CHRP’s rocky relationship 
with human rights NGOs has been considered one of its weakest points,114 though the current 
Commission has gradually forged close working relationships with civil society.115 
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4. Japan 
Under the name of fundamental human rights, the basic rights of the Japanese people are 
protected under the 1946 Japanese Constitution.116  Various legal scholars of Japan see the 
current human rights system in Japan as having been heavily influenced by American 
constitutionalism after WWII but also argue that the Japanese Constitution “is inappropriate for 
Japanese society where individual freedom and individual wishes must yield to group 
harmony.”117 There are more than a thousand registered NGOs in Japan.118 They are working in 
various human rights fields including one of the biggest human rights problems in Japan, the 
minority discrimination against the Zainichi, 119 the Burakumin,120 and the Ainu.121  
The movement toward the establishment of an NHRI started during the late 1990s, and it 
was initiated both by international institutions and domestic human rights NGOs.122 They argue 
that while there are existing human rights protection systems in Japan like the Human Rights 
Bureau and human rights volunteers under the Ministry of Justice, those systems are neither 
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independent, nor effective, and it is necessary to create an NHRI in Japan.123 In early 2002, the 
Human Rights Protection Bill to set up a national human rights commission was drafted and 
submitted to the Japanese government.124 This draft bill, however, was dropped under the strong 
opposition of NGOs, the media, and lawyers.125 Their main concerns can be summarized in the 
following way: first, the lack of independence of the human rights commission which is 
stipulated under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice; second, the lack of procedures against 
human rights abuses by public officials; and lastly, the omission of a clear definition of human 
rights.126 In 2005, a modified draft Human Rights Protection Bill was proposed but, again, many 
human rights NGOs and the media strongly objected to the submission of the bill, because the 
key issues that had been criticized, had not been changed.127 In 2008, the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations, one of the major human rights NGOs, proposed the Outline of National Human 
Rights Institution (JFBA Outline) which lays down the framework and principles of the NHRI to 
be created in Japan: independence, mandate, scope of covering violations, functions, 
composition, resources, efficiency, and accessibility. 128  This outline was publicized and 
submitted to the Minister of Justice too. The following year, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
took power away from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which had been the ruling party for 
fifty- four years, and the new Minister of Justice Keiko Chiba emphasized in her inaugural 
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statement that the establishment of NHRI is one of the crucial issues to be achieved in Japan.129 
It seems that under the new administration, there has been rapid progress in the establishment of 
an NHRI 130 and indeed, the Japanese government should work together with civil society groups, 
including human rights NGOs, to make an NHRI in Japan a reality. Further, as the most 
developed country in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan should show positive leadership not only in 
the economic sphere but also in the human rights area in this region,131 because many human 
rights scholars indicate that the Japanese government’s constant refusal to provide an apology 
and compensation to WWII victims such as comfort women and forced conscripts from various 
countries in Asia, and to address the Nanking Massacre, has prevented the establishment of a 
regional human rights mechanism in Asia, as discussed in Chapter Three.132  
b. Controlled and Communalized Civil Society 
5. Malaysia 
Since Malaysia won its independence in 1957, the opposition parties have not succeeded 
in winning the national elections and the ruling party, the National Front Coalition, has always 
been in power.133 Most Malaysian leaders, including the longest serving Prime Minister Mahathir 
bin Mohamad, have constantly argued that Malaysia’s diverse and multiethnic uniqueness has 
inevitably restricted basic human rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and due 
                                                          
129 See ANNI Annual Report 2010: Rapid Developments in Japan.  
130 Id. 
131 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, supra note 22, at 130. 
132 Id., at 129. 
133 H.P. Lee, Human Rights in Malaysia in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE 
ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA, 191, 191-194 (Randall Peerenboom, et.el. ed., 2006); Human Rights 
Watch, World Report: Malaysia, (Jan. 2009) http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/malaysia.pdf  
 263 
 
process. 134  The Malaysian Constitution guarantees various basic human rights, but it also 
contains traditional factors, for example, declaring Islam as the religion of the Federation and the 
Malay language as the national language.135 Unlike other developing countries in Asia, Malaysia 
has not fully changed its 1957 Constitution since independence.136 International Human Rights 
NGOs like Human Rights Watch have criticized the human rights situation of Malaysia since 
“the government continues to use outdated repressive laws and regulations to silence its critics 
and extend its rule … [especially] ... to commit abuses against undocumented migrants, refugees, 
and asylum seekers.”137 Domestic human rights NGOs, lawyers, and other human rights activists 
have worked hard for the protection of human rights in spite of serious personal risks.138 The 
Malaysian government has consistently insisted that to maintain economic progress, it is 
necessary to downgrade the full exercise of civil and political rights.139  It also argues that 
national security and stability are essential for economic development and are thus the priority.140 
However, unlike in other Asian countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea, there 
has been no threat to national security, for instance, an attempt by the military to overturn the 
civil power or to intervene in the national political area.141 In addition, the ruling party, the 
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National Front Coalition, has always enjoyed the majority support of the Malaysian people, even 
though there has been criticism of the national electoral system.142 
The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) was established by Congress 
under the 1999 Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act (Act 597).143 The creation of the 
SUHAKAM was initially influenced by Malaysia’s involvement in the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) from 1993 to 1995, and then by the fact that other 
ASEAN member countries, like the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, established NHRIs.144 
Since its establishment, SUHAKAM’s effectiveness, independence and compliance with 
international standards has been debated among human rights NGOs. Supporters argue that 
having a Commission is better than not having one and actually the Commission has been a 
strong critic of the government’s policies and on many occasions has been recognized as an anti-
government NGO.145 For example, on its recommendation, gender was included in Article 8(2) 
of Part II of the Malaysian Constitution as a ground for discrimination and primary education 
became compulsory by amending the Education Act.146 However, there has also been undeniable 
criticism from human rights NGOs and even from SUHAKAM officials that the appointment 
process is not transparent, and that many recommendations have been ignored by the 
government.147 As a result, they argue that the Commission has been operated for the purpose of 
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window-dressing the government’s poor human rights practices. Overall, the SUHAKAM has 
had an ambivalent relationship with human rights NGOs, but still many of them see the 
importance of the Commission and continue to cooperate with it, for example, because the 
Commission has access to locations like detention facilities where human rights violations 
frequently occur and which are not easily accessible to NGOs.148  
SUHAKAM’s operational capacity has been questioned not only by human rights NGOs 
but also by international institutions like the International Coordinating Committee of National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC). 149 In the same vein, some 
argue that it may be hard to maintain an A status in the future.150 In 2009, the 1999 Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia Act was amended in an attempt to avoid international 
embarrassment by the Commission’s impending downgrading by the ICC.151 The amendment 
was done solely by the government and was passed just one day before the ICC convened to 
decide on the status of the SUHAKAM. There was no consultation with any civil society group 
during the process.  
6. Singapore 
After its independence from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has become one of the highly 
developed countries in Asia under the strong leadership of its first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
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and the People’s Action Party (APA).152 As the World Bank states, Singapore has “the highest 
standard of living in Asia” and is one of the Four Asian Tiger countries with huge economic 
success. 153 Though there are no specific reports by international human rights organizations of 
gross human rights violations by the Singapore government, it has broad power to limit its 
citizens’ human rights as an excuse for economic development and national stability, especially, 
based on the Internal Security Act.154 Singapore is the initiator of advocating Asian values and 
Neo-Confucianism based on the economics-first-discourse in order to justify its authoritarian 
political order to intervene extensively in the public and private arena.155  
Ironically, there has been no strong resistance from the opposition party and the public 
against the government’s human rights policy. Some scholars argue that “the excessive, if not 
repressive, mechanisms of the state prevent any serious challenge.” 156  In such a restricted 
political situation, there is limited room for domestic human rights NGOs to work and influence 
government policy.157 Therefore, most NGOs have tried to involve the political decision-making 
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process in order to address broad human rights concerns rather than to confront the government 
or to undermine it.158  
Regarding the creation of a human rights commission in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew 
maintains that “that was for the younger leaders to decide but ... as long as the Singapore 
Government remained clean, capable, meritocratic and fair, I don’t see the need for more 
political policemen.”159 Yet the question is whether NHRIs are established to act as policemen 
rather than to enhance the promotion of human rights and good governance for the civil 
society.160 One of the opposition party leaders (the Singapore Democratic Party), Dr. Chee Soon 
Juan, argues that a “human rights commission will not happen in Singapore” because the civil 
society has not had any will-power to confront the government and to challenge its human rights 
policy.161 Michael Hwang, President of the Law Society of Singapore, also points out that a 
human rights commission in Singapore “would study the human rights situation in Singapore, 
but not actually do anything about it” if the current political system does not change.162 
c. Repressed Civil Society 
7. Myanmar 
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Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has a grim human rights record. There are 
numerous reports of gross human rights violations by the Burmese military government, such as 
apartheid, forced labor, and drug trafficking.163 Millions of ethnic minorities in Myanmar have 
fled from economic and political oppression to Bangladesh, India, China, Malaysia and Thailand 
to seek asylum. More than 170,000 Myanmarese are living in nine refugee camps in Thailand 
and two in Bangladesh.164  
Myanmar became the object of international reproach after 1988, when the Burmese 
military junta seized power. This military government formed the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC)165 after a bloody crackdown on a series of democratic movements 
led by students. 166  The SLORC nullified the results of the national election in 1990 and 
arbitrarily detained democracy activists including their leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.167 It renamed 
itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and has since used a repressive military 
regime and the curbing of civil liberties as a strategy to maintain law and order.168 While 
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Myanmar is a member state of a number of major human rights treaties, 169  including the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 
Genocide Convention, the Myanmarese military government has violated fundamental human 
rights norms regarding arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial execution, forced child labor, 
and coercive relocation of minorities, for more than 10 years.170 The SPDC also used coercive 
tactics to gain complete control over the border regions by systematic forced relocations of 
villages.171 These repressive policies have contributed to a large extent to Myanmarese citizens’ 
fleeing the country.172 Furthermore, the SPDC is highly suspicious of the role played by Western 
NGOs. The military regime in Myanmar has made consistent attempts to keep international 
human rights NGOs away from the Thai-Myanmar border where massive forced relocations of 
the civilian population have taken place.173  
For the improvement of human rights in Myanmar, I believe the main force should come 
from the inside. But the existing civil society and NGOs in Myanmar appear to offer no threat to 
the government and there remains little prospect of them playing a key role in fostering a human 
rights culture, because the civil society in Myanmar is very weak and heavily controlled by the 
government. NGOs are even funded by the government and former military or government 
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officials participate in them.  Therefore, it is necessary for the countries, governments, and 
societies from the outside to support the expansion of civil society groups in Myanmar and 
mobilize them more effectively. Those with most opportunities to directly influence the 
development of civil society in Myanmar are probably its neighbors, especially those with 
relatively close ties like the ASEAN countries.  
To enhance the human rights situation in Myanmar, Western countries and international 
organizations have also constantly imposed sanctions against the gross human rights violations 
by the Myanmarese military government,174 which has been criticized by many neighboring 
Asian countries.175 However, the refusal of those countries like China and the ASEAN states to 
support the sanctions should be the main target of such criticism, because their rejection comes 
partly from not losing their own economic interest, considering the fact that the Myanmarese 
economy is heavily dependent on the export of natural resources like natural gas to these 
neighboring countries in the region. 
d. Summary  
My broad argument is that NHRIs have an important role in the promotion and protection 
of human rights in each country to confirm the international human rights standard and at the 
same time to meet local specificities, traditions, and culture. NHRIs are also the primary 
institutions within the domestic human rights mechanism and the essential partners for human 
rights NGOs and human rights defenders working on the ground. Their independence and 
effectiveness are the key element in determining their capacity. This case study shows that those 
                                                          
174 Report on U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Burma, supra note 170. 
175 Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts, Trade Policy Analysis No.1 (Mar. 26, 
1998) http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html 
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elements depend mainly on the way in which individual NHRIs interact both with the 
government and with NGOs, and on the level of relationship between the government and civil 
society. 
Comparing the countries with NHRIs, Thailand, India, the Philippines and Malaysia, the 
case study shows that the NHRIs in all four states have a tension with human rights NGOs, even 
though to a different degree. As the ANNI Annual Reports describe, the NHRIs and NGOs in the 
first category, Legitimate Civil Society, have a “rocky” relationship.  The NHRIs cooperate with 
NGOs on certain human rights issues, but in all three cases, their general consultations with 
NGOs are irregular and lack follow-up. The NGOs in those countries engage with the NHRIs if 
they perceive them as independent and effective institutions, and constantly publicize and raise 
the issue of the selection and appointment process in each NHRI to the public. In Malaysia, 
which is grouped in the second category, Controlled and Communalized Civil Society, the ICC 
has shown its concern on SUHAKAM’s independence and effectiveness and in response the 
government amended its enabling law. The law had been perceived as superficial and flawed 
since, for example, there was no room at all for NGOs to get involved in the amendment process. 
Malaysian NGOs have also voiced their concern on SUHAKAM’s limited operational power 
which can be used just for government’s interest, not for the people.  
The comparison of the countries without NHRIs, Japan, Singapore and Myanmar, reveals 
how civil society in Japan can mobilize pressure to establish NHRI and support it, while 
Singapore has provided no room for human rights NGOs to influence government policy toward 
establishing NHRI. In Singapore, NGOs also have no will-power to confront the government 
within such a restricted political system.  In Myanmar, the civil society is heavily controlled by 
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the government and the support from the outside, especially from neighboring states is essential 
in fostering the capacity of NGOs inside.  
This case study is just the starting point for further research to elaborate a series of 
benchmarks against which to evaluate countries with or without NHRIs in Asia. Understanding 
how NHRIs are properly established and the way in which they cooperate with human rights 
NGOs can enhance their far-reaching potential to protect human rights in individual states in 
Asia. 
 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I reviewed the way in which human rights NGOs can be defined and, 
based on the definition, how their role has evolved within the existing international and regional 
human rights mechanisms. My broad argument is that human rights NGOs should be understood 
as independent, non-profit, and peoples-based organizations with an end of protecting and 
promoting human rights. Not only have they contributed to strengthening the international 
human rights system, but have also been key partners of regional bodies to effectively implement 
international norms at the regional level. Human rights NGOs are increasingly becoming 
regional for a better protection and promotion of human rights issues of common concern in the 
region, and they actively cooperate with other NGOs across national borders.  Indeed, NGOs 
have contributed to enhancing the human rights situation in the region through their active 
participation and collaboration. All three existing regional human rights systems in Europe, the 
Americas, and Africa also show how human rights NGOs can interact and effectively address 
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their concerns and problems under their regional framework. In Asia, their initiatives, input, and 
efforts have become the strong foundation for the establishment of RHRIs in the region. 
Further, I examined the important role of human rights NGOs at the national level, 
especially in relation to the cooperation with NHRIs. I conclude that such collaboration is vital 
for the effectiveness of NHRIs and ultimately can lead to strengthening the national system for 
the protection and promotion of human rights. In the Asia-Pacific region, the APF has supported 
NGOs’ active engagement with the member NHRIs since its establishment. In addition, the case 
study of seven selected countries in Asia was provided to briefly review the process of 
establishing NHRIs, both successful and unsuccessful ones, and more specifically, how human 
rights NGOs have worked together with NHRIs and their governments for the protection and 
promotion of human rights. It demonstrates that NHRIs’ effectiveness for better human rights 
practices in each individual state depends mainly on how they can properly interact both with the 
government and NGOs and at the same time, on the level of interaction between governments 
and civil society.  
Overall, NGOs play important roles for the promotion and protection of human rights 
through their active participation into and cooperation with international, regional, and national 
human rights institutions. Furthermore, for the accountability, effectiveness, and transparency of 
all formal human rights bodies, be they national, regional or international, human rights NGOs 
have constantly monitored and assessed those institutions’ performances and operations, i.e. by 
publishing reports. This is also an important role of NGOs which should be emphasized. 
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Chapter SEVEN  
Conclusion 
  
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted over sixty years ago, 
human rights have been vigorously internationalized with the emergence of numerous 
subsequent human rights treaties and conventions to extend their areas of legalization. At the 
same time, under the evolving international human rights system, human rights norms and 
principles have been gradually internalized and localized into individual states’ domestic legal 
systems through the active participation of civil societies to effectively implement them. In this 
progress, the traditional concept of sovereignty has been strongly challenged, and now we 
recognize that individual states have main responsibilities to protect and promote the human 
rights of their people. Concurrently, with the advent of the transnational human rights movement 
and network for the best practice of human rights at the national level, the emerging role of civil 
society and human rights NGOs cannot be ignored anymore and their voice from below has been 
taken seriously in the international human rights mechanism. Moreover, all the ongoing human 
rights discourses, not only the stale debate on cultural relativism in the human rights literature, 
but also the Third World perspective of human rights in the public international law literature, 
the norm diffusion theory in the international relations literature and the vernacularization theory 
in the law and anthropology literature, emphasize the complicated but important issue of the 
implementation of international human rights law in the sense that the universality of human 
rights does not mean uniformity of human rights. At this point, I believe regional human rights 
institutions (RHRIs) and national human rights institutions (NHRIs) are important as 
intermediate institutions for the implementation of human rights at the regional and national 
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levels. The reason is that they can serve not as a replacement but also as an effective 
supplementary human rights protection tool to confirm international human rights norms and at 
the same time, reflect regional and national specificities with an extensive interaction with 
governments, civil societies, and international institutions as a channeling institution.  
The purpose of my dissertation is to examine whether and how NHRIs can be a driving 
force for the establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, which remains the only region 
without such institutions in contrast to Europe, the Americas, and Africa. I first explored the 
issue of whether RHRIs are desirable in this region, and argued that such a system is desirable. 
Then, I examined the reasons why RHRIs have not emerged through the discussion on the 
reception of human rights in Asia and developments over the last few decades, and, more 
broadly, the emergence of international human rights law and the problematic questions of what 
the Asian way of human rights and Asian values mean. The analysis of the obstacles that have 
hampered the creation of RHRIs led me to focus on NHRIs. By reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of NHRIs and their unique characteristics, I maintained that the way in which 
NHRIs and their network work together shows why they can be eminent actors toward the 
establishment of RHRIs. Further, examining the role that NHRIs can play in addressing the 
concerns and inhibitions of Asian states, while furthering the broad policies and aims of 
international human rights law, I suggested four specific ways to realize it. Lastly, I explored the 
broader literature on the role that human rights NGOs can play in the creation, implementation, 
and furtherance of the international human rights system, thus illuminating the particular role of 
such actors in the Asian human rights context, mainly related to their interaction with RHRIs and 
NHRIs. 
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7.1. SUMMARY 
In Chapter Two, I argued that regional human rights mechanisms are considered a more 
effective and efficient tool for the protection and promotion of human rights than the 
international human rights system under the U.N. structure, and it is indeed desirable to establish 
RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region. Surely, RHRIs cannot provide a total solution to human rights 
violations. A regional human rights system, however, emerges as the result of the frustration 
with the ineffectiveness of international mechanisms and, at the same time, the hope for a better 
implementation of international human rights norms as a supplement to human rights 
mechanisms. RHRIs have unique institutional advantages for the promotion and protection of 
human rights. If a regional human rights institution is established, Asian states will surely benefit 
from their geographic proximities, and historical and cultural bonds. Most Asian countries have 
experienced colonial rules, during which there were abundant human rights violations by the 
colonizing state or the local collaborators. In many states, the colonial legacy has not been 
disposed of properly and it often becomes a source of continuing human rights violations. In 
addition, there are transitional justice problems concerning the principles and mechanisms that 
can guarantee justice during a transition from an authoritarian regime or internal conflict to a 
democratic rule. None of these issues in Asia, however, are easy to solve by a single country, 
which truly shows the necessity of developing a human rights system in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Considering the continuing debate on Asian values and the Asian way of human rights in the last 
two decades, the U.N. Charter and the international human rights treaties cannot fully 
incorporate Asian regional contexts, which is another reason why regional human rights 
institutions should be established in the region.  
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In Chapter Three, I reviewed why Asia has not established regional human rights 
institutions so far. And to answer this question, first, I reviewed all the major initiatives to 
establish RHRIs in this region, which were divided in three categories: the U.N. initiatives, the 
NGOs initiatives and the NHRIs initiatives. After examining these initiatives in chronological 
order, I concluded that though there have been dynamic discussions on various human rights 
issues in Asia, as well as efforts to identify the human rights areas of common concern in the 
region, all the major initiatives have failed to take a concrete and specific step toward 
establishing RHRIs in Asia in the last two decades.  Most governments in the region have 
obviously shown that they still have no sufficient political will to enter into the establishment of 
RHRIs. There has also been relatively low governmental support for the initiatives by NGOs. 
The NHRIs initiatives have worked successfully both with the governments and NGOs, and 
show some positive signs. But, they are limited to the regional cooperation among NHRIs.  
Through the analysis of all the major initiatives for setting up RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, I, 
then, provided five main reasons that have been the main obstacles for establishing a regional 
human rights system in Asia: 1) sovereignty, 2) the failures in the recognition of human rights 
after WWII, 3) the failure of major Asian powers to play a leading role in human rights in Asia, 
4) the relatively low ratification rate of major U.N. human rights treaties, and 5) the Asian values 
debates. I believe, however, that all those obstacles that have hindered the establishment of 
RHRIs, have not come from a different understanding of fundamental human rights within the 
already existing international human rights legal system, but mainly from political considerations. 
Then, the analysis of the obstacles led to my focus on NHRIs.  
In Chapter Four, I examined 1) what NHRIs are, 2) their role, responsibility, and 
functions at the national, regional and international level, and 3) NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific 
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region and their network in the APF. Then, I reviewed, as a case study, the National Human 
Rights Commission of Korea to show the basic characteristics of NHRIs. Lastly, based upon my 
analysis, I provided three reasons why NHRIs can be a driving force for establishing RHRIs in 
the Asia-Pacific region: 1) NHRIs as bridging the gap between sovereignty and human rights, 2) 
NHRIs as mediators, and 3) NHRIs’ networks. I believe that the unique functions of NHRIs 
make them a driving force for establishing RHRIs in this region, especially considering that they 
can make social changes through strengthening the domestic human rights system by bridging 
the gap between sovereignty and human rights, and also political changes through working 
together with all human rights related actors as intermediate institutions. Because NHRIs are 
national institutions established by the domestic legislation or the constitution, their work for 
promoting and protecting human rights is less likely to raise the issue of sovereignty compared to 
that of international actors. Along the same lines, NHRIs in the region can mitigate Asian states’ 
overwhelming concern with the universality of human rights related to Asian values, because 
their voices for international human rights norms and against Asian values do not come from the 
outside, but from the inside of the Asia-Pacific region. NHRIs and their networks in this region 
are indeed in a good position to diffuse international human standards and increase the 
commitment of individual Asian countries to these standards. They can translate international 
principles into domestic policies and practices that are compatible with national and regional 
cultures and values, and, at the same time, reflect all rights stakeholders’ concerns about human 
rights issues both at the national and the regional level. My broad argument is that if NHRIs are 
properly constituted and managed, they have a far-reaching potential to protect human rights in 
individual states in Asia, and their work will be a touchstone for Asian countries’ growing 
willingness to establish regional human rights arrangements. There may be a concern that it is 
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too early to prove any systematic link between NHRIs and the establishment of regional 
arrangements. There are, however, some positive signs. First, the U.N. and the international 
community have supported and promoted the creation of NHRIs and their networks for a long 
time. Second, the increasing number of NHRIs in Asia has stimulated each government to make 
a commitment to be bound by international human rights norms, and, as a result, the ratification 
rates of major international human rights treaties have increased in the region. Third, the active 
cooperation among NHRIs at the sub-regional level has led to the establishment of the ASEAN 
human rights body and also the ongoing movement toward sub-regional human rights 
arrangements in the South Asia and the Pacific region. Therefore, I conclude that as the very 
nature, role, and functions of NHRIs show, the way in which NHRIs work and cooperate at the 
national, regional, and international level has profound implications for the resolution of the 
problems that hinder regional human rights arrangements in this region. 
In Chapter Five, I examined how NHRIs and their network can be a driving force for the 
establishment of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region, and provided four specific suggestions 
toward it. The first one is the creation of regional arrangements on common issues of human 
rights in the region.  I reviewed eight human rights issues of common concern, which have the 
potential to be developed into a legally binding regional arrangement: the rights of women, 
people with disabilities, human rights defenders, internally displaced persons, and migrants, as 
well as human trafficking, the environment, and the prevention of torture. Recognizing that most 
human rights issues in the region cannot be solved by a single country on its own, NHRIs should 
actively advocate for their governments to cooperate with other governments in the region. Such 
efforts will result in the adoption of regional instruments on the issues above. I believe that 
increasing the number of such instruments will lead to the establishment of integrated regional 
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human rights arrangements in this region. The second suggestion is to establish RHRIs at the 
sub-regional level through the active cooperation of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
South-East Asia, and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in the Pacific region. As a starting point, 
the establishment of sub-regional human rights mechanisms is important for the protection of 
human rights in the region, and once there are sub-regional arrangements, they can work toward 
a human rights institution on the regional level. The third one is strengthening the role of the 
APF. The APF was established to enhance the capacity of member NHRIs for better human 
rights practices at the national level and a strengthened domestic environment for effective 
implementation of international human rights standards, which will ultimately move 
governments to establish RHRIs in the region. The development of the APF and its network of 
member NHRIs will also mobilize civil societies across the region to reach regional consensus 
for establishing RHRIs and the recognition that it is necessary to have a regional human rights 
protection system. The last suggestion is to begin establishing RHRIs with a small number of 
countries with NHRIs that understand the necessity of solving complicated human rights issues 
together. Once established, the practices of these small but strong human rights bodies will 
provide an incentive for other countries in the region to participate in these instruments because 
of the increased benefits of membership. Overall, NHRIs have worked as a key player in 
strengthening domestic human rights protection systems by supporting and enriching 
international human rights standards and at the same time, reflecting local culture, tradition, and 
national specificities. Their networks have also played an important role in urging Asian 
countries to cooperate with the international human rights mechanism and also with neighboring 
states for the better protection and promotion of human rights in the region. Based on the 
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suggestions above, NHRIs can be eminent actors in developing a credible regional human rights 
system, and in the long run, establishing RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region.  
In Chapter Six, I reviewed the way in which human rights NGOs can be defined and, 
based on the definition, how their role has evolved within the existing international and regional 
human rights mechanisms. I broadly argue that human rights NGOs should be understood as 
independent, non-profit, and peoples-based organizations with an end of protecting and 
promoting human rights. Not only have they contributed to strengthening the international 
human rights system, but they have also been key partners of regional bodies to effectively 
implement international norms at the regional level. Human rights NGOs are increasingly 
becoming regional for a better protection and promotion of human rights issues of common 
concern in the region, and they actively cooperate with other NGOs across national borders.  
Indeed, NGOs have contributed to enhancing the human rights situation in the region through 
their active participation and collaboration. All three existing regional human rights systems in 
Europe, the Americas, and Africa also show how human rights NGOs can interact and 
effectively address their concerns and problems under their regional framework. In Asia, their 
initiatives, input, and efforts have become the strong foundation for the establishment of RHRIs 
in the region. Further, I examined the important role of human rights NGOs at the national level, 
especially in relation to the cooperation with NHRIs. I concluded that such collaboration is vital 
for the effectiveness of NHRIs and ultimately can lead to strengthening the national system for 
the protection and promotion of human rights. In addition, the case study of seven selected 
countries in Asia was provided to briefly review the process of establishing NHRIs, both 
successful and unsuccessful ones, and more specifically, how human rights NGOs have 
interacted with NHRIs and their governments for the protection and promotion of human rights. 
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It demonstrates that NHRIs’ effectiveness for better human rights practices in each individual 
state depends mainly on how they can properly interact both with the government and NGOs and 
at the same time, on the level of interaction between governments and civil society. 
 
7.2. NOTES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
I recognize the development of human rights system in Asia not as a result of the 
transplanting of foreign concepts but as the product of its internal dynamics of normative 
development with the interaction and collaboration among all stakeholders. It is undeniable that 
the main ideas of international human rights norms are heavily indebted to Western philosophers 
and the European cultural heritage. More and more Asian countries, however, have chosen to 
adopt a democratic political system and gradually embrace the standards and principles of 
international human rights law after their long fight against colonialism or authoritarian regimes. 
The first stage of the development of human rights mechanisms in Asia can be described as 
introduction of international human rights norms. That is, the Western oriented international 
norms and standards are accepted in Asian countries, first by the coercive transplanting under 
colonial powers or later by voluntarily ratification from individual Asian states. The next stage is 
the internalization of international human rights norms, i.e., the effective implementation both at 
the regional and local levels. At this point, the roles of NHRIs and RHRIs are critical as 
intermediate institutions, which can reflect local tradition, culture, and particular regional needs, 
at the same time monitoring individual states’ practices to meet international standards on human 
rights. However, in Asia, for a long time without such institutions, this localization process has 
been conducted and manipulated solely by governments for the effective control over their 
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people, which has often produced internal conflicts and tension. Moreover, there are no regional 
human rights bodies in this region yet. Therefore, the role of NHRIs and their regional network is 
more important than in other regions. That is, they should be a mediator to meet both national 
and regional specificities and the international standard through extensive contact with individual 
governments, civil societies, including human rights NGOs, and international institutions. 
Further, the NHRIs network will enhance an individual NHRI’s capacity to promote and protect 
human rights effectively by sharing information on domestic and regional problems. As a result, 
with the growing efforts to strengthen domestic human rights systems and foster human rights 
culture in the region, NHRIs can facilitate Asian countries’ increasing willingness to establish 
regional human rights arrangements. Indeed, NHRIs can be a driving force for the establishment 
of RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region.  
As discussed, it is unlikely to achieve single integrated RHRIs that include all Asian-
Pacific countries at once. I, however, do not believe that it is an unachievable goal. Asia may be 
too large to have a regional human rights institution which confronts the challenges of 
complicated political, cultural, and historical issues.  But, for example, through the establishment 
of sub-regional human rights mechanisms which can share a relatively common context in terms 
of history, religion, culture, or level of economic development, they can build a human rights 
institution from the sub-regional to the regional level.  
In addition, this process should be achieved first by setting up regional or sub-regional 
human rights commissions or charters as a means of adopting international human rights norms. 
Then, institutions like regional human rights courts can be created later as tools for enforcing 
norms adopted by individual member countries in the whole Asia-Pacific region. To create both 
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the regional human rights instrument and an enforcement mechanism in consecutive order is 
important because it can promote ownership of the human rights norms. That is, at the normative 
level, regional human rights conventions and treaties impose obligations to individual states to be 
bound by after they ratified them. But at the implementation level, those adopted norms establish 
that there should be regional-based ownership because to undertake these human rights 
obligations, the member state within the region has already made a step toward recognizing what 
the region’s priorities are. Regional enforcement mechanisms can produce broad consensus in 
the region about the legitimacy of regional institutions that govern decision making related to 
human rights issues, as well as an accountability that enables regional arrangements to provide 
guidance on the question of the types and extent of implementation of norms by identifying 
regional priorities and reflecting regional specificities. This is because as Abdullahi An-Na’im 
maintains, all normative principles are founded necessarily on specific cultures and 
philosophies,1 and as Makau Mutua argues, ownership of norms remains with those who work 
for their development and enforcement: Why is a certain matter important, who thinks it is 
important, and why. 2  Indeed, RHRIs will only be successful in their various stages from 
adaptation to implementation if they can claim ownership through the widest possible 
consultations with various rights stakeholders.  
One more thing to be noted is that this may seem a reversal of cultural particularism. 
However, I do not intend to intervene in the traditional philosophical debates over the 
universalism of human rights and its opposite, cultural relativism. Rather, I focused on the ways 
in which the universality of international human rights law has been challenged ever since the 
                                                          
1 Abdullahi An-Na’im, Conclusion, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR 
CONSENSUS 427–28 (Abdullahi An-Na’im ed., 1992). 
2 Makau Mutua, Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 547, 578-84 (2007). 
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adoption of the UDHR to articulate why and how countries in the Asia-Pacific region have 
responded and interacted with the development of international human rights law, which was 
discussed at length in Chapter Two, and how those norms can be effectively implemented in 
individual states in this region though intermediate institutions like RHRIs and NHRIs. As Yash 
Ghai points out, it is “relativism of forms, not substance” and is indeed “necessary for the 
establishment of universal values.”3 
Lastly then, once RHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region are established, how can we assure 
the effectiveness of those existing institutions? For example, first, in what ways can we 
guarantee the independence of RHRIs? Second, how can we have the transparent appointment 
procedures for the members of RHRIs to ensure the pluralist representation of the stakeholders 
involved in the protection and promotion of human rights in the region? Third, should there be 
independent financial resources for RHRIs which are not under the direct member states’ control 
to avoid reflecting their political interest? Fourth, how can we ensure that RHRIs are accessible 
to those people who are most vulnerable to basic human rights violations?  Fifth, in what ways, 
can RHRIs cooperate with other regional and national agencies including NHRIs, and also work 
actively with civil society to enhance their public legitimacy, and at the same time, ensure the 
reflection of regional human rights issues of common concern?  Lastly, how can RHRIs maintain 
a close relationship with international human rights bodies, which can strengthen their capacity 
by sharing information for best practices and facilitating networking among other human rights 
institutions?  All those questions should be answered though active and dynamic discussions 
both in academia and in the field. I will also leave them for my next research project in the hope 
that by pursuing these questions in the future, I can fill in the important margins between the 
                                                          
3 Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 10 Asia. Pac. J.HR & L., 1, 52 (2000). 
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successful creation and the effective operation of RHRIs, especially through enhancing our 
understanding of the role, capacity, and potential of NHRIs and their networking in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
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